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In this thesis I study how complementarities/substitutabilities of information affect learning strategies and
behavior in different economic environments. The thesis contains three chapters that focus on different
economic situations.
Chapter 1 studies the efficiency of decentralized team formation inside research organizations through the
lens of a one-sided matching model with non-cooperative after-match information production. In our model,
inefficient sorting arises from two sources. First, moral hazard within teams may cause workers to join less
productive teams in which they exert relatively less effort. Second, even if productive teams form, such teams
may reduce average productivity across all teams. We identify management interventions that restore
efficiency.
Chapter 2 studies how a monopolist data broker (seller), who wants to maximize profits, should present and
sell consumer data to a rm (buyer). The buyer has an interest in forecasting a particular consumer
characteristic, but the seller is uncertain about which characteristic the buyer wants to forecast and how much
the buyer values information. I assume that the joint distribution of both the unknown characteristics and the
data is elliptical. This information environment reduces to a multidimensional, multi-product mechanism
design problem in which the buyer's payoffs are nonlinear. Hence, I cannot use the common differential
approach to solve for the optimal mechanism. I obtain two main results. First, I show that the seller should
optimally offer statistics that are linear combinations of the data and independent noise. Second, by using a
direct approach, I show that in the optimal mechanism the seller might need to offer a continuum of different
statistics, and these statistics, without containing independent noise, are less correlated than they would be if
the seller could perfectly price discriminate. Thus this distortion affects the mimicking type more than the
mimicked type.
Chapter 3 studies endogenous network formation in an environment in which individuals want to forecast a
stochastic state and it is costly for them to communicate with others to exchange some exogenously observed
information. Due to the existence of information complementarities, individuals' preferences for networks in
which they have multiple neighbors cannot be characterized by a linear ranking of the pairwise correlations
between their signals. Instead, these complementarities generate a counterintuitive result: for a fixed number
of individuals, information structures exist in which all signals are conditionally positively correlated, and
these are preferred to a structure in which all signals are conditionally independent. Therefore, it may be that
the only strongly stable network consists of two cliques with signals that are highly positively correlated within
each clique that generate different beliefs across cliques, even when there are opportunities to exchange
information with individuals sharing less correlated signals. Thus, this model exemplifies how homophily and
belief polarization can coexist in a rational environment.
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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF CONDITIONALLY CORRELATED VARIABLES IN INFORMATION
ECONOMICS
Carlos Segura-Rodriguez
George Mailath
In this thesis I study how complementarities/substitutabilities of information affect learning strategies and behavior in different economic environments. The thesis contains three
chapters that focus on different economic situations.
Chapter 1 studies the efficiency of decentralized team formation inside research organizations through the lens of a one-sided matching model with non-cooperative after-match
information production. In our model, inefficient sorting arises from two sources. First,
moral hazard within teams may cause workers to join less productive teams in which they
exert relatively less effort. Second, even if productive teams form, such teams may reduce
average productivity across all teams. We identify management interventions that restore
efficiency.
Chapter 2 studies how a monopolist data broker (seller), who wants to maximize profits,
should present and sell consumer data to a firm (buyer). The buyer has an interest in
forecasting a particular consumer characteristic, but the seller is uncertain about which
characteristic the buyer wants to forecast and how much the buyer values information.
I assume that the joint distribution of both the unknown characteristics and the data
is elliptical. This information environment reduces to a multidimensional, multi-product
mechanism design problem in which the buyer?s payoffs are nonlinear. Hence, I cannot
use the common differential approach to solve for the optimal mechanism. I obtain two
main results. First, I show that the seller should optimally offer statistics that are linear
combinations of the data and independent noise. Second, by using a direct approach, I
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show that in the optimal mechanism the seller might need to offer a continuum of different
statistics, and these statistics, without containing independent noise, are less correlated
than they would be if the seller could perfectly price discriminate. Thus this distortion
affects the mimicking type more than the mimicked type.
Chapter 3 studies endogenous network formation in an environment in which individuals
want to forecast a stochastic state and it is costly for them to communicate with others to
exchange some exogenously observed information. Due to the existence of information complementarities, individuals? preferences for networks in which they have multiple neighbors
cannot be characterized by a linear ranking of the pairwise correlations between their signals. Instead, these complementarities generate a counterintuitive result: for a fixed number
of individuals, information structures exist in which all signals are conditionally positively
correlated, and these are preferred to a structure in which all signals are conditionally independent. Therefore, it may be that the only strongly stable network consists of two cliques
with signals that are highly positively correlated within each clique that generate different
beliefs across cliques, even when there are opportunities to exchange information with individuals sharing less correlated signals. Thus, this model exemplifies how homophily and
belief polarization can coexist in a rational environment.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xi

CHAPTER 1 :

Matching to Produce Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

1.3

Production Subgame Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

1.4

Inefficiency of Decentralized Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

1.5

Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

1.6

Conclusion

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

1.7

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

CHAPTER 2 :

Selling Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

2.2

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

2.3

Value of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

2.4

Optimal Mechanism with Two Information Types

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

2.5

Many Information Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

2.6

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

100

CHAPTER 3 :

Higher Order Information Complementarities and Polarization . . .

121

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121

3.2

Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

124

vii

3.3

Optimal Action and Endogenous Networks

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125

3.4

Higher Order Information Complementarities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

130

3.5

Economic Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

136

3.6

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

143

3.7

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

144

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

155

viii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1.1 : Parameters for Pareto Inefficiency and Empty Core Examples . . .

17

TABLE 1.2 : Parameters for Asymmetric Effort and Stratification Inefficiencies
Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

TABLE 1.3 : Parameters for Asymmetric Effort Information Inefficiency Example

34

TABLE 1.4 : Equilibrium Strategies for Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency Example

35

TABLE 1.5 : Equilibrium Strategies Large Groups Example . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

TABLE 1.6 : Posterior Variances Two-Sate Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

ix

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1.1 : Signal Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

FIGURE 1.2 : Ex-post Variances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

FIGURE 1.3 : Marginal Value

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

FIGURE 1.4 : Pareto Inefficiency Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

FIGURE 1.5 : Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

FIGURE 1.6 : Stratification Inefficiency Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

FIGURE 1.7 : Different Variances Equilibrium Correspondence . . . . . . . . . .

25

FIGURE 1.8 : Empty Core Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

FIGURE 1.9 : Non-Monotonic Equilibrium Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

FIGURE 1.10 :Set Order Monotonicity Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

FIGURE 1.11 :Correlation Matrix for Asymmetric Effort Information Inefficiency.

35

FIGURE 1.12 :Empty Core Example with Large Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

FIGURE 1.13 :Joint Distribution Two-State Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

FIGURE 1.14 :ρ̃(2, p) and ρ̂(2, p) in Two-State Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

FIGURE 2.1 : Timing Model in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

FIGURE 2.2 : Elliptical Distribution Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

FIGURE 2.3 : Buyer’s Willingness to Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

FIGURE 2.4 : Relation between Vectors γ and Covariances Angles . . . . . . . .

87

FIGURE 2.5 : Optimal Mechanism Continuum of Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

FIGURE 2.6 : Type Exclusion Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

FIGURE 2.7 : γ Vectors’ Geometric Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

107

FIGURE 2.8 : Graphic Representation Angle Distortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

111

FIGURE 3.1 : Timing in Model Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125

FIGURE 3.2 : Ex-post Variance Three Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

134

x

FIGURE 3.3 : Preferences Reversion Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

137

FIGURE 3.4 : Homophily and Polarization Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

141

xi

CHAPTER 1 : Matching to Produce Information
Ashwin Kambhampati, Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, and Peng Shao

1.1. Introduction
In many research-oriented organizations, workers produce information in teams. Hierarchical theories of the firm assume management assigns workers to teams (Coase (1937),
Williamson (1996)).

But recent management literature suggests a trend towards less-

structured organizational forms (Bloom et al. (2010), Foss (2003), Grandori (2001)). At
their extreme, these forms mirror the internal organization of a University: workers choose
their productive partners and partnerships are self-enforced.
The history of the Danish hearing aid manufacturer Oticon provides evidence that unstructured organizations are vulnerable to incentive problems. In 1987, Oticon lost almost half
of its equity when its competitors began selling cosmetically superior devices. In response,
Oticon replaced vertical, hierarchical production with horizontal, project-based production.
At first, these changes were profitable. Eliminating hierarchies and allowing workers to
lead their own teams enabled the firm to take advantage of the private information of its
workers.1 However, new problems arose. First, management could not keep track of the
number of hours workers dedicated to each project (Foss, 2003). Second, some teams were
better than others “in terms of how well the team members worked together and what the
outcome of team effort was” (Larsen, 2002). Third, competition meant that “anybody [at
a project] could leave at will, if noticing a superior opportunity in the internal job market”
(Foss, 2003). Due to these problems, Oticon’s organizational form “has been superceded by
something far more structured” (Foss, 2000).
We posit a model of endogenous team formation to study the incentives of workers inside
organizations that decentralize information production. We characterize two inefficiencies
1

Dessein (2002) shows that pushing decision-rights down a hierarchy can improve profitability if it
allows the firm to exploit “local knowledge”. Consistent with this finding, Oticon’s CEO commented that
decentralization “improved markedly [Oticon’s] ability to invent new ideas, concepts, and make use of what
[Oticon] actually [had]” (Kao, 1996). In particular, the firm was able to revive old projects that later turned
out to be profitable.

1

that resemble those observed in Oticon. Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency occurs when a productive team is disrupted by a worker who chooses to join a less productive team because
there is an equilibrium played inside the less productive team in which she exerts relatively
less effort. As a result, there is too much asymmetry of effort inside teams. Stratification
Inefficiency occurs when a productive team forms, but generates a significant negative externality on the productivity of other teams; excluded workers may form highly unproductive
teams and the firm would be better off re-assigning the most productive workers in order to
prevent them from forming. As a result, there is too much inequality in productivity across
teams. Our model thus provides one plausible explanation for Oticon’s decision to revert
back to a hierarchical structure after experimenting with decentralization: if workers no
longer had private information, then continuing to allow them sort themselves into teams
may have been inefficient.
In our model, there is a finite collection of workers. Each worker wants to predict a Gaussian state and may acquire Gaussian signals about it at a cost. Signals have the same
precision, but may be correlated in any way. First, workers form teams. Second, workers
simultaneously produce signals. Finally, after observing the signals of their teammates,
each team guesses the state. To study endogenous team formation, we introduce a new solution concept called Coalitional Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (CSPE). In a CSPE, workers
cooperatively form teams given fixed non-cooperative productive behavior within teams.2
Hence, to analyze equilibrium sorting patterns, we proceed backwards and first characterize
the equilibria of the game played within teams, which we call the Production Subgame.
In the main text, we restrict attention to pure strategies in the Production Subgame and
focus on the case in which teams have at most two workers3 . To account for pre-play
2
Formally, a CSPE is a collection of equilibria, one for every feasible team, and a partition of workers
into teams such that there is no deviating team yielding each worker in that team a higher payoff given the
prescribed off-path PEN. Our notion of stability contrasts with the Core. A partition of workers into teams
is in the Core if there is no deviating team in which workers can choose an equilibrium and each be made
better off. In our environment, the Core may be empty due to cycles of re-negotiation. In Section 1.7.2.1,
we provide an example reminiscent of the Roommate Problem of Gale and Shapley (1962) illustrating these
cycles.
3
Our definitions extend immediately to the case in which team size is unrestricted, though it complicates

2

communication and re-negotiation, we study Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibria (PEN). Our
characterization of equilibria consists of cutoff values on pairwise correlations of worker
signals that order PEN in terms of their symmetry. Under a mild assumption on the
cost of producing a signal, there is a cutoff above which there is a unique asymmetric
PEN, and another cutoff below which there is a unique symmetric PEN. Higher (lower)
correlations imply signals are substitutable (complementary), and strategic substitutability
(complementarity) drives equilibria to be asymmetric (symmetric). When signals are not
too revealing, we obtain an even stronger characterization: there is an intermediate cutoff
above which all PEN are asymmetric and below which there is at least one symmetric and
one asymmetric PEN.4
We first show that a CSPE may be Pareto-Inefficient, though a Pareto-Efficient CSPE
always exists. Off-path PEN that enforce stability may also prevent mutually beneficial
re-negotiation. We then characterize Asymmetric Effort and Stratification Inefficiencies,
which reduce utilitarian welfare and information production. Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency
happens when a worker playing a symmetric equilibrium has a profitable outside option to
join a less productive team playing an asymmetric equilibrium. Stratification Inefficiency
happens if breaking up a productive team is beneficial; the loss in productivity of separating
workers in productive teams may be outweighed by the gain in productivity obtained by
re-matching workers in unproductive teams. Finally, we show that both inefficiencies occur
in an open set of correlation matrices.
Our proofs reveal two interesting insights relevant for applications. First, whenever there is
an Asymmetric-Effort Inefficient CSPE, there is multiplicity and an efficient CSPE exists
as well. That an efficient CSPE exists suggests a simple resolution to incentive problems:
make particular workers more responsible for team output. Then, opportunities to free
ride can be eliminated and so the efficient outcome can be obtained as an equilibrium.
our characterizations. See Section 1.5.2 for a discussion of how the analysis changes.
4
The intuition for the latter result, described in detail in Section 1.3.3, is more subtle due to multiplicity
of equilibria in the Production Subgame and a non-monotonicity in the marginal value of information.
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Second, whenever a CSPE is Stratification Inefficient, there is no other efficient CSPE.
Hence, stratification inefficiency is a robust phenomena that can only be eliminated by
actively assigning workers to teams.
Related Literature
Team Formation. A general lesson of the team formation literature (e.g. Chade and Eeckhout (2018), Page (2008), Prat (2002)) is that forming heterogeneous teams is optimal when
workers are complementary. We show that such teams may not form endogenously. Teams
may be comprised of similar individuals even when heterogeneous teams are available.
Chade and Eeckhout (2018), the most closely related paper to ours, analyze welfare optimal
sorting patterns. In their environment, individuals have quadratic payoffs and form teams
to share information. Within teams, each individual obtains exactly one signal. Signals
have different precisions, but have a constant pairwise correlation. Their main result is that
negative assortative matching is optimal.
In our environment, we cannot order individuals by their productivity; the productivities
of the individuals in a team are determined by their pairwise correlations. Hence, our focus
is not on assortativity, but on whether endogenous matches are efficient. More crucially, we
allow individuals to choose the number of signals they produce, while Chade and Eeckhout
(2018) abstract from strategic considerations. In Section 1.5.1, we fix the signal structure
of Chade and Eeckhout (2018) and show that negative assortative matching need not be
optimal if individuals can choose the number of signals they produce. Indeed, once effort
choice is endogenous, optimal matching must simultaneously diversify, while incentivizing
production.
Matching. Our paper contributes to a small, but growing, literature that considers matching
settings with ex-post games. In our model, a worker’s payoff from a match depends on
strategically-taken actions after the match has been formed. Legros and Newman (2007)
consider environments in which payoffs are not fully transferable between individuals. They
assume that, for each individual and matched pair, there is a feasible set of utilities. This set

4

can be derived from a game–see, for example, Sperisen and Wiseman (2016) and Gierlinger
and Laczó (2018). A stable outcome is a matching function and a point in the utility
possibility frontier for each matched pair such that (i) no matched individual is better off
alone and (ii) no pair can match and pick a point in their utility possibility frontier that
makes both better off.
A key difference between our paper and Legros and Newman (2007) is that we study a
one-to-one, one-sided matching problem, while Legros and Newman (2007) study two-sided
matching problems. Existence of stable matchings in two-sided environments is guaranteed
by standard arguments. In one-sided environments, however, there are well-known existence
issues (see, for example, the Roommate Problem of Gale and Shapley (1962)). This motivates us to define a new, weaker solution concept, Coalitional Subgame Perfect Equilibrium,
that differs from the solution concept of Legros and Newman (2007). In particular, in our
solution concept, we fix points in the utility possibility frontiers for all feasible matches.
We can therefore prove constructively that an equilibrium exists in our environment.
Finally, Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014) consider a related problem to ours. In their environment, individuals match and decide how much effort to exert in the production of
output. If effort is not observable, a manager can provide incentives by destroying output
or hiring a budget-breaker. Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014) ask which organization is optimal ex-ante; studying symmetric equilibria, they derive conditions under which hiring a
budget-breaker is advantageous. Instead, we focus on the incentives to form teams after
fixing an organizational structure.
Strategic Experimentation. As in Bolton and Harris (1999) and Cripps et al. (2005), individuals have incentives to free-ride off of information produced by others. Information is a
public good and hence, they do not take into account the positive externality of producing
information. In our model, we focus on a different effect: individuals can choose to form a
team in which their partners provide larger quantities of the public good.

5

1.2. Model
1.2.1. Set-Up
A finite collection of workers, indexed by the set N := {1, ..., N}, are uncertain about a
state θ. They have a common Gaussian prior, with mean µθ and variance σθ2 , and can
obtain costly Gaussian signals about θ. Workers can either work alone or with a teammate.
When working alone, a worker produces an unbiased signal with variance σ 2 . In a team,
workers produce correlated, unbiased signals, conditional on the state, with variance σ 2
and correlation ρij , where i and j index the workers. We require correlations across all
workers to be feasible, i.e. the conditional correlation matrix (ρij ) ∈ [−1, 1]N×N is positive
semi-definite.
We define a two-stage game. In the first stage, workers form teams. Teams have at most
two members; the set of feasible teams is S := N × N . If (i, j) ∈ S and i 6= j, the team
has two members. If i = j, the team has one member. Workers may only be a member
of one team. Hence, the assignment of workers to teams is a partition Π : N → S, where
Π(i) = (i, j) implies Π(j) = (i, j). Adding a teammate has a positive, fixed cost; the cost
of forming team S = (i, j) is K ∗ IS , where K is a strictly positive constant, and IS is the
indicator function that is equal to one if i 6= j and zero otherwise. The primary role of this
cost (which may be arbitrarily small) is to prevent teams from forming in which one worker
takes zero draws.
In the second stage, each worker chooses a positive integer number of signals. Workers
choose integers simultaneously. Denote the pair of integers chosen by worker i and worker
j, in a team S = (i, j), by (mi , mj ). We interpret an integer, mi , as a decision by worker i
to produce a single signal in each of mi consecutive “periods”, starting from period 1. For
simplicity, we assume signals are independent across periods, but correlated within periods,
conditional on the state. In particular, if worker i and worker j each produce a signal in
the same period (i.e. when mi ≥ mj > 0 and the period is t ∈ {1, ..., mj }), these signals
are conditionally correlated according to ρij , and conditionally independent of all signals
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produced in previous periods. If, in some period, only worker i produces a signal (i.e. when
mi > mj and the period is t ∈ {mj + 1, ..., mi }), this signal is conditionally independent
of all signals taken in previous periods. Figure 1.1 depicts the case in which mi = 3 and
mj = 2.
Finally, after observing the signal realizations of every team member, each team takes an
action a∗ ∈ R to minimize the expected value of a quadratic loss function. Formally,
h
i
a∗ ∈ arg min Eθ (a − θ)2 | x S ,
a∈R

where x S denotes the concatenation of signals observed in team S.
Period

Worker j

Worker i
ρij

1

Independent
ρij

2

Independent
3
Figure 1.1: Signal structure when mi = 3 and mj = 2.
1.2.2. Solution Concepts
Throughout our analysis, we restrict attention to pure strategies. Hence, a strategy for
worker i is a mapping from teams to non-negative integers, mi : ∪j∈N (i, j) → N ∪ {0}.
Whenever there is no confusion about the team, S, to which a worker i belongs, we abuse
notation and use mi to denote the non-negative integer chosen by worker i in team S. The
payoff to worker i of membership in a team S = (i, j), given a strategy profile, (mi , mj ), is,
viS (mi , mj )



h

2

= −Ex S min Eθ (a − θ) | x
a∈R
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S

i

− c(mi ),

(1.1)

where c : N ∪ {0} → R is an increasing cost function satisfying increasing marginal costs,
and c(0) = 0. Our convexity assumption captures situations in which marginal research
costs are weakly greater than learning-by-doing gains.
Fixing a team S, the action space N ∪ {0} and payoff functions viS define a normal form
game–call it the Production Subgame. To account for pre-play communication, in each
team S = (i, j), we require that the strategy profile m∗ (S) := (mi∗ (S), mj∗ (S)) is a ParetoEfficient Nash Equilibrium (PEN) of the Production Subgame. Given our restriction
to pure strategies, a PEN is a Nash Equilibrium that is Pareto undominated by any other
Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.5
For the two-stage game, we introduce a new solution concept called Coalitional Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium (CSPE). A partition Π is part of a CSPE if, fixing a PEN in every
feasible team, there is no profitable deviating team S 0 ∈ S. For notational convenience, let
SΠ (i) denote the team in partition Π to which worker i belongs.
Definition 1.1. Let Π be a partition of N and M ∗ = {m∗ (S)}S∈S be a collection of PEN,
one for every feasible team. The tuple (Π, M ∗ ) is a Coalitional Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (CSPE) if there does not exist a team, S 0 ∈ S, such that, for all i ∈ S 0 ,
0

0

SΠ (i)

viS (m∗ (S 0 )) − K ∗ IS > vi

(m∗ (SΠ (i))) − K ∗ ISΠ (i) .

Notice, our definition could have been written using a matching function. We write it in
terms of partitions so that it extends easily to the case in which teams are unrestricted in
size. We discuss this extension in Section 1.5.2.
1.2.3. Existence
The valuation of a team is determined by an equilibrium correspondence. Hence, we cannot
appeal to standard existence arguments in the matching literature. Nonetheless, we prove
5
In the general analysis in Section 1.7.6, we use Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) as our
solution concept for the Production Subgame. When teams have at most two workers, the set of CPNE is
equivalent to the set of PEN (Bernheim et al. (1987)).
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that an equilibrium always exists, and that at least one is Pareto-Efficient.
Proposition 1.1. A CSPE exists. At least one CSPE is Pareto-Efficient.
Two comments are in order. First, Proposition 1.1 generalizes to environments beyond
the one we consider; as long as the after-match game is symmetric, a CSPE exists. The
proof, which may be found in Appendix 1.7.8 along with all other proofs, is non-trivial and
constructive. It may be consulted after reading Section 1.3. Second, we note that while a
CSPE always exists, the Core may be empty.6 In Section 1.7.2, we present an empty Core
example reminiscent of the Roomate Problem, and further explore the relationship between
our solution concept and the Core.
1.2.4. Discussion
Before proceeding to the analysis, we motivate each substantial assumption and discuss the
robustness of our results to their modification. We postpone the discussion of two interesting
extensions–one in which teams have no size restrictions and one in which correlation is
homogeneous, but variance is heterogeneous – to Section 1.5. Since we fix variance and vary
correlation in the main text, our model may be thought to capture a workforce heterogeneous
in “complementarity”, but homogeneous in “ability”, in contrast to the setting of Chade
and Eeckhout (2018).
Gaussian environment. We model information acquisition using a canonical quadraticGaussian set-up; workers obtain normally distributed signals to minimize a quadratic loss
function and have normally distributed prior beliefs.7 In this environment, the expected
value of the posterior distribution simplifies to the negative posterior variance (Lemma
1.1). Hence, we can derive comparative statics using a closed-form utility function. Our
analysis uncovers how correlation between teammates affects the symmetry of the PEN
6

A partition in the Core must be robust to another round of negotiation. Our definition of the Core
coincides with the notion of stability in Legros and Newman (2007). After teams are formed, it requires
that workers cannot form a deviating team S 0 ∈ S and choose a PEN that makes each worker better off.
7
Our results generalize to the case in which the joint distribution of signals and states for any number
of draws is elliptical with finite second moments. In this case, the conditional expectation is still linear in
signals and our characterization results will possess the same qualitative features.
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correspondence–that we can order equilibria by symmetry in terms of correlation is the
crucial property for our main inefficiency results.8
In Section 1.7.7.2, we consider a different environment in which the state and the signal are
binary, as is commonly assumed in the literature on social learning. There, we show that,
when the number of signals produced is small, the marginal value of a draw satisfies the
same properties as in the Gaussian case: for low enough correlation parameters, equilibria
are symmetric, and, for high enough correlation parameters, equilibria are asymmetric.
Draw Procedure. The procedure through which workers acquire and share information possesses three features which deserve comment. First, workers choose numbers of signals
simultaneously. Methodologically, we abstract from dynamic considerations in order to
isolate the key property relevant for team formation–namely, the relationship between correlation and the symmetry of equilibrium strategies. In Section 1.7.7.1, we study a finite
extensive game with sequential decisions. Our main conclusion is that for many, but not all,
correlations there is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the sequential game that coincides
with the most symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous game.9 However, it need not be
the case that all equilibria of the extensive game are more symmetric than all equilibria of
the simultaneous game.10
Second, the correlation between signals differs across “periods”; if (m, n) draws are taken
in a team with correlation ρ, and m > n > 0, then 2n signals are correlated according to
ρ and m − n signals are conditionally independent. We make this assumption to capture
the economics of a situation in which joint and simultaneous effort is affected by complementarities, while unilateral effort is not. Our desire to capture this situation affects our
8
Our interest in this paper is to understand how ex-post information acquisition affects team formation.
However, the reader should note that any ex-post game with the property that, for some parameterizations of complementarities equilibria are asymmetric while for others equilibria are symmetric, will generate
inefficient matching patterns of the kind we describe.
9
The cases in which there may not be a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium that coincides with any equilibrium
of the simultaneous game occur when pairwise correlations lie in an intermediate region.
10
We provide an example in which the extensive game has an equilibrium that is more asymmetric than
the most symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous game, and does not coincide with any equilibrium of
the simultaneous game.
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modeling choices. In particular, it is no longer equivalent to analyze a continuous choice
model in which workers first choose precisions and then share a single signal. In this set-up,
within and across period effects cannot be disentangled. We thus model workers as choosing
integers.11
Third, signals are conditionally independent across time. Qualitatively, our results do not
change when allowing for serial correlation. The key property of the procedure that generates our results is the relative difference between complentarities within periods and across
periods. Footnote 12 shows that the posterior variance formula has the same structure as
the independent case when draws are serially correlated according to an AR(1) process.
Pure Strategies. Mixed strategy equilibria are difficult to compute in our environment. For
tractability, we only characterize equilibria in pure strategies. However, our substantive
results on the inefficiency of decentralized teams are unaffected by this restriction; recall,
in a CSPE, equilibria are fixed on and off-path. Hence, every CSPE we identify is a CSPE
in the case in which mixed strategies are available.
While beyond the scope of the present analysis, one might wonder if mixed strategies would
help reduce free-riding problems in the Production Subgame. In particular, one might suspect that there are symmetric and Pareto-improving mixed strategy equilibria. Simulations
suggest this intuition is false; we have not been able to identify a parameterization under
which a mixed strategy equilibrium (symmetric or otherwise) Pareto-dominates all pure
strategy equilibria. We therefore conjecture that this is a general property, but have been
unable to prove it.
11

While it does not make any sense, physically or statistically, for workers to choose real numbers of
signals, a kind of “continuous draw” set-up may be imagined as follows. Suppose, relative to a single
signal, a worker can instead draw signals with lower precisions at lower costs, so that the cost of obtaining
information with the precision generated by the original signal is the same as before. In Section 1.7.7.3, we
analyze the limit model obtained when such precisions become arbitrarily small and costs are adjusted. In
this limit model, the equilibrium correspondence can be ordered by symmetry using pairwise correlations
as in our main characterization result, and hence our main inefficiency Propositions generalize. Though
the limit model is tractable, we do not use such a model in the main text as we have not proven that the
equilibrium correspondence of the sequence of discrete-draw models converges to that of the continuous-draw
model. Furthermore, we find its interpretation to be unnatural as the situation we describe is inherently
discrete.
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Non-transferable Utility. We view our model as capturing situations in which formal contracts are too costly to implement. For instance, when working on a short-term project with
a colleague, it may not make sense to pay the administrative costs of having a third-party
endorse one. In this setting, utility is non-transferable. As we do not study re-matching,
however, we cannot assess the consequences of relational contracts. We believe such contracts might help mitigate Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency, and that this is an interesting
avenue for future research.

1.3. Production Subgame Analysis
1.3.1. Preliminaries
Because each worker’s payoff function is quadratic, her optimal action given any signal
realization is the posterior mean. Hence, her expected payoff when signals are costless
is the negative posterior variance. Lemma 1.1 states these observations and provides a
closed-form solution for the posterior variance in a two-worker team.
Lemma 1.1. The optimal action for a worker in team S is,

a = E (θ | x S ).

If signals are costless, the expected payoff of a worker is the negative posterior variance. The
posterior variance in a two-worker team, with pairwise correlation ρ ∈ (−1, 1], acquiring
(m, n) signals is,

−1

2
−2
−2
+ |m − n| σ + σθ
.
f (ρ, m, n) :=
min{n, m}
1+ρ
It is zero if m, n ≥ 1 and ρ = −1.12
12

Fix n ≤ m and suppose that the drawing procedure follows an AR(1) process with correlation ρ̂. Then
the two-worker team variance after (m, n) signals is
 
−1
 m−(m−2)ρ̂ σ −2 + σ −2
if n = 0
θ
1+ρ̂
i
−1
h
Var (θ | (m, n)) =
ρ̂)
n−(n−2)ρ̂ 2

+ (m−n)(1−
σ −2 + σθ−2
if n > 0.
1+ρ̂
1+ρij
1+ρ̂

12

Inspecting the formula, we see that, for any m, n > 0, the posterior variance is monotonically increasing in ρ; as the pairwise correlation between teammates increases, the value of
matching signals (working together) decreases. For intuition, consider the extreme cases.
When ρ = −1, working together to produce (1, 1) signals reduces the posterior variance to
zero, so that the team learns the true state. When ρ = 1, working together to produce
(1, 1) signals is equivalent to having only one worker produce a signal, i.e. there are no
complementarities in information production.
In light of the above discussion, to rule out uninteresting cases, we make an assumption on
the cost of the first draw so that (i) in a two-worker team in which ρ = −1, both workers
have an incentive to produce a single signal (and so perfectly learn the state), and (ii) in
any team, at least one worker has an incentive to produce at least one signal.
Assumption 1.1. c(1) <

σθ2
2
σθ +σ 2

min{σθ2 , σ 2 }.

1.3.2. The Marginal Value of Information
To characterize PEN, we define and analyze the marginal value of information to worker
i of producing a signal in the mi -th period given that worker j produces a signal in the first
mj periods,

MV (mi ; mj , ρ) ≡ [−f (ρ, mi , mj )] − [−f (ρ, mi − 1, mj )] = f (ρ, mi − 1, mj ) − f (ρ, mi , mj ).

If mi ≥ mj , we call worker i a leader. If the inequality is strict, we call worker j a follower.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the posterior variance f (ρ, m, m) for different correlations ρ and strategy profiles (m, n) when σ = σθ = 1, i.e. when the signal and prior variances are equal.
The solid, black line corresponds to the posterior variance when the profile is (1, 1). The
dashed, red line corresponds to the posterior variance when the profile is (2, 1). The dotted,
blue line corresponds to the posterior variance when the profile is (2, 2). The difference
between the red line and the black line is the marginal value of information to a leader of
producing a signal in period two, while the difference between the blue line and the red line
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Figure 1.2: Ex-post variances under different strategy profiles.

Figure 1.3: Marginal value of second signal
for leader and follower.

is the marginal value of information to a follower of producing a signal in period two, given
that the leader is already producing one in the first two periods. The former difference is
represented by the solid, red line in Figure 1.3, while the latter is represented by the dashed,
blue line in Figure 1.3.
We make three observations about the figures, which generalize beyond the parameterization
we consider, and which we exploit in proving our main characterization result. The first
observation is that the marginal value of information to the leader is strictly increasing
in ρ. This happens because the value of the information obtained from working together
with the follower in previous periods decreases. By concavity of the information production
function, the marginal value of information left to learn increases.
The second observation is that this is not necessarily true for a follower. Indeed, we see
the difference between the blue line and red line in Figure 1.2 is non-monotonic. Hence,
the blue line in Figure 1.3 is hump-shaped. The marginal value of the follower is increasing
in an initial region for the same reason the leader’s marginal value is increasing; when ρ
increases, the value of work done together in past periods decreases and so the marginal
value of information left to learn increases. However, there is another effect to consider.
When ρ increases, the value of working together with the leader in a future period decreases–
the leader and follower’s information is less complementary. After an interior cutoff value ρ̃,

14

the second effect dominates and the marginal value of information to the follower decreases.
The third observation is that the marginal value to the leader is higher than the marginal
value to the follower above a negative cutoff value, ρ̂. It turns out that the relationship
between ρ̂ and ρ̃ is the key to ordering the equilibrium correspondence in terms of symmetry.
We discuss this in detail after stating our main characterization result.
1.3.3. PEN Characterization
Proposition 1.2. If Assumption 1.1 is satisfied, there exist interior cutoff values ρ∗ ≤ ρ∗∗
for which the following properties hold:
1. For ρ ≤ ρ∗ , there is a unique PEN. It is symmetric.
2. For ρ > ρ∗∗ , there is a unique PEN up to the identity of each worker. In it, one
worker takes a strictly positive number of draws and the other takes none.
If, in addition, σ 2 ≥ σθ2 , there exists another cutoff value ρ∗∗∗ for which ρ∗ ≤ ρ∗∗∗ ≤ ρ∗∗
and the following properties hold:
3. For ρ ∈ (ρ∗ , ρ∗∗∗ ], there is at least one symmetric and one asymmetric PEN.
4. For ρ > ρ∗∗∗ , all PEN are asymmetric.
The first property follows almost immediately from Assumption 1.1; since (1, 1) is the
unique equilibrium when ρ = −1 and the posterior variance is continuous in ρ, there exists
a cutoff ρ∗ > −1 below which the unique equilibrium is symmetric. The second property
follows from the intuition provided by analyzing the marginal value of information; since
the marginal value to a leader is monotonically increasing in correlation, and the marginal
value to a follower is monotonically decreasing above some interior correlation, for a high
enough correlation (above ρ∗∗ < 1) the unique equilibrium is asymmetric.
The characterization for correlations between ρ∗ and ρ∗∗ is subtle. Nonetheless, if the signal
variance is greater than the prior variance, σ 2 ≥ σθ2 , we obtain a strong result: there is an
intermediate cutoff below which there is at least one symmetric and one asymmetric PEN
15

and above which all PEN are asymmetric. What is the role of this condition? It turns out
that if σ 2 ≥ σθ2 , then ρ̂ > ρ̃ for any strategy profile, as in Figure 1.3. Hence, increasing ρ
past ρ̂ increases the marginal value to the leader while decreasing the marginal value to the
follower. Behavior then coheres with our intuition: higher correlations drive equilibria to
be asymmetric because leaders have an increasing incentive to acquire more information,
while followers have a decreasing incentive to match the signals produced by leaders.
If ρ̂ < ρ̃, a counterintuitive phenomena emerges. In this case, there is a region in which
increasing ρ past ρ̂ increases the marginal value for both the leader and the follower. Hence,
if an asymmetric equilibrium is played at some correlation ρ above ρ̂, but below ρ̃, it may
be the case that for a higher correlation a symmetric equilibrium may be played. Why?
The increase in the value of information left to learn for the follower might induce her to
match the leader’s signal. If this happens, the leader’s incentive to produce another signal
may decline enough so that she does not produce another one herself. For such an example,
and a full characterization of this case, we direct the reader to Section 1.7.4.

1.4. Inefficiency of Decentralized Teams
Using our characterization of the Production Subgame, we study the efficiency of CSPE
outcomes; an outcome is a partition, Π∗ , and a collection of PEN within that partition,
(m∗ (S))S∈Π∗ . We measure the efficiency of outcomes using three criteria. First, an outcome
is Pareto-Efficient if no worker can be made strictly better off without making another
worse off. Second, an outcome is Welfare-Efficient if it maximizes the sum of worker
payoffs. Third, an outcome is Information-Efficient if the sum of the precision of information created by each team is greater than in any other outcome with the same number
of teams.13
In our model, there are three forces that lead to inefficiency. The first is that mutuallybeneficial off-path teams may be prevented from forming because of the PEN prescribed
13

In Appendix 1.7.1, we point out that an Information-Efficient outcome minimizes the forecast error of
a manager with a quadratic loss function, as long as the manager receives reports from each team and knows
the equilibrium strategy profiles.
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within that off-path team. The second is team-specific moral hazard. The third is that,
when deciding whom to match with, workers do not consider the externalities they generate
on the qualities of other matches. Our examples and characterizations isolate each of these
three forces.
1.4.1. Pareto Inefficiency
While a Pareto-Efficient CSPE always exists, not every CSPE is Pareto-Efficient.14 Fix the
parameters in Table 1.1 and suppose technologies are correlated according to the network
in Figure 1.4. We report all equilibrium strategies and payoffs below the network.
Parameter

Interpretation

Value

σ2

Signal Variance

2

σθ2

Prior Variance

1

c(m)

Cost of m Draws

0.002m2

K

Cost of Teammate

0.01

Table 1.1: Parameters for Example in Section 1.4.1.

Figure 1.4 depicts a Pareto-Inefficient CSPE with partition Π∗ = {(1, 2), (3, 4)} and onpath PEN (m∗ (S))S∈Π∗ = {(4, 4), (4, 5)}. Why is the outcome Pareto-Inefficient? Worker
1 and worker 2 may only be matched in a CSPE if worker 1 is forced to be the leader in
an off-path team with worker 3. Otherwise, worker 1 and worker 3 can form a profitable
deviating team. Should they do so, however, not only would both be made better off, so
would worker 2 and worker 4, as long as worker 2 is the follower in such a pair. We see that
Pareto inefficiency arises because off-path PEN that enforce stability may prevent mutually
beneficial re-negotiation.
1.4.2. Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency
We next describe Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency. We first consider a numerical example
with parameters presented in Table 1.2 and signal structure described by the network in
Figure 1.5. The PEN in all size-two teams are unique up to identity and, as before, each is
14

We thank Yeon-Koo Che for drawing our attention to this issue.
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Figure 1.4: Correlation Matrix and PEN Correspondence Section 1.4.1.
presented below the Figure.
Parameter
σ2
σθ2
c(m)
K

Interpretation
Signal Variance
Prior Variance
Cost of m Draws
Cost of Teammate

Value
1
1
0.01m2
0.01

Table 1.2: Parameters for Examples in Section 1.4.2 and Section 1.4.3.
In the example, there is a Welfare and Information-Inefficient CSPE outcome Π∗ = {(1, 3), (2, 4)}
and on-path PEN (m∗ (S))S∈Π∗ = {(1, 3), (3, 1)}. Even though (1, 2) is the most productive
0
feasible team, as measured by the equilibrium posterior precision 1m(S) Σ−1
m(S) 1m(S) , asym-

metric equilibria within teams (1, 3) and (2, 4) disrupt it. Why? worker 1 can produce fewer
signals in a team with worker 3 than in a team with worker 2. Despite learning less, worker
1 obtains a higher payoff because she exerts less effort. Analogously, worker 4 can produce
fewer signals in a team with worker 2 than in a team with worker 3. If the cost of forming
a team, K , is small enough, worker 2 and worker 3 are left with no better option than to
accept a team in which each works more than her partner.
We now formalize the type of inefficiency described in the example. Let M̂(S) be the set of
PEN in the Production Subgame played by team S’s members.
Definition 1.2 (Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency). A CSPE (Π∗ , M ∗ ) is Asymmetric Ef18
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Figure 1.5: Correlation Matrix and PEN Correspondence Section 1.4.2.
fort Inefficient in terms of welfare if there exist teams (i, j), (i 0 , j 0 ) ∈ Π∗ for which there
is a PEN m̂((i, i 0 )) ∈ M̂((i, i 0 )) satisfying
mi∗ ((i, j))
m̂i ((i, i 0 ))
<
,
mj∗ ((i, j))
m̂i 0 ((i, i 0 ))
and a PEN, m̂((j, j 0 )) ∈ M̂((j, j 0 )), such that,
P
`∈{i,j}

(i,j)

v`

(m∗ ((i, j))) +

(i 0 ,j 0 )

P
`∈{i 0 ,j 0 }

P
`∈{i,i 0 }

v`

(i,i 0 )

v`

(m∗ ((i 0 , j 0 ))) <

(m̂((i, i 0 ))) +

P
`∈{j,j 0 }

(j,j 0 )

v`

(m̂((j, j 0 ))).

If,
−1
0
10m̂((i,j)) + 1m̂((i 0 ,j 0 )) Σ−1
1m̂((i,j)) Σm̂((i,j))
m̂((i 0 ,j 0 )) 1m̂((i 0 ,j 0 )) <
−1
0
0
0
1m̂((i,i 0 )) Σ−1
m̂((i,i 0 )) 1m̂((i,i 0 )) + 1m̂((j,j )) Σm̂((j,j 0 )) 1m̂((j,j 0 )) ,

then we say the CSPE is Asymmetric Effort Inefficient in terms of information production.
To understand the definition, consider again the example. Let (i, j) = (1, 3) and (i 0 , j 0 ) =
(2, 4). The manager prefers to match worker 1 with worker 2 because there is a symmetric
PEN inside the team, m̂((1, 2)) = (2, 2), in which worker 1 exerts relatively more effort
than her partner when compared to the on-path PEN, m∗ ((1, 3)) = (1, 3). In particular,
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m1∗ ((1,3))
m3∗ ((1,3))

=

1
3

<1=

m̂1 ((1,2))
m̂2 ((1,2))

so that the first inequality of the definition is satisfied. The

second part of the definition ensures that, upon re-matching worker 1 and worker 2 and
selecting a PEN in that team, a manager can select a PEN in the team consisting of worker
3 and worker 4 so that the firm is “better off”. The first efficiency criterion is about welfare:
it says that the sum of payoffs across all workers is higher than in the CSPE. The second is
about information production: it says that the sum of precisions in the re-matched teams
is higher than in the teams formed in the CSPE. In the example, the manager can choose
m̂((3, 4)) = (2, 2) and satisfy both criteria.
Our main characterization result shows that Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency can happen
whenever non-trivial asymmetric equilibria exist in the Production Subgame–that is, whenever ρ∗ < ρ∗∗ .15
Proposition 1.3 (Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency). Suppose Assumption 1 holds, K is
small, and ρ∗ < ρ∗∗ . Then, there is an open set of correlation matrices for which there
is an Asymmetric Effort Inefficient CSPE in terms of welfare. Furthermore, every Asymmetric Effort Inefficient CSPE is accompanied by an Efficient CSPE.
Notice, the Proposition does not state that the outcome is inefficient in terms of information
production. In the numerical example we provided, welfare-maximizing teams maximize
information production. But this is not true in general. The reason is that there are
two ways a welfare-optimal team playing a symmetric equilibrium can be broken. First,
the deviating teammate may produce fewer signals in another asymmetric equilibrium. In
this case, the asymmetric equilibrium generates less information and Welfare Efficiency
and Information Efficiency coincide. Second, a worker may produce the same number of
signals in a Welfare-Inefficient team as in the Welfare-Efficient team. The asymmetric-effort
15
Recall, when Assumption 1 holds, there exists a cutoff, ρ∗ , below which there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium, and a cutoff, ρ∗∗ , above which there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium in which one teammate
takes zero draws. If ρ∗ < ρ∗∗ , for ρ greater than, but close to, ρ∗ , there is an asymmetric equilibrium in
which each worker takes a positive number of draws.
There are easy, albeit cumbersome, sufficient conditions on model primitives that guarantee this condition
holds. For example, one sufficient condition is that a worker takes at least three draws when alone– this

happens whenever c(3) − c(2) <

−2
σθ

−2
−2
(2θθ
+σ −2 )(3θθ
+σ −2 )

.

20

temptation arises because the worker’s partner in the Welfare-Inefficient team may produce
more signals than her partner in the Welfare-Efficient team (recall, the first inequality
in Definition 1.2 is a relative effort condition). In this case, better information may be
produced in the Welfare-Inefficient partition. We provide such an example in Section 1.7.5.
A second, more applied, point is worth emphasizing. In the open set we identify, a WelfareInefficient CSPE is always accompanied by a Welfare-Efficient CSPE. Hence, if a manager
can assign roles to individual workers, Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency can be eliminated.
For example, returning to Figure 1.5, if a manager designates worker 1 as a “project leader”
with more assumed responsibilities, then she can enforce the efficient CSPE. Such powers
seem plausible; while it may be costly to assign all workers to teams, it may not be so costly
to manage the behavior of particular workers.
1.4.3. Stratification Inefficiency
We now illustrate Stratification Inefficiency. Suppose technologies are correlated according to the network in Figure 1.6. Then, the unique PEN in every two-worker team is the
symmetric equilibrium, (2, 2), except when the pairwise correlation parameter is 0.9. The
partition in which the most productive pair, (3, 4), match and the least productive pair,
(1, 2), match is the unique CSPE partition. Nonetheless, individual incentives are misaligned with manager objectives to exploit the entire correlation matrix; the outcome is
both Welfare- and Information-Inefficient.
To see why, note that worker 3 and worker 4 obtain the highest feasible payoff and always
prefer to form a team together. Given that worker 3 and worker 4 form a team, when K
is small enough, worker 1 and worker 2 have no better option than to form a team. But
together, worker 1 and worker 2 are relatively unproductive; a joint draw is positively correlated. For a manager, the loss of information from disrupting the productive team comprised
of worker 3 and worker 4 is outweighed by the gain from re-matching the unproductive team
comprised of worker 1 and worker 2.
As before, we formalize the type of inefficiency described in the example.
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Figure 1.6: Correlation Matrix and PEN Correspondence Section 1.4.3.
Definition 1.3 (Stratification Inefficiency). A CSPE (Π∗ , M ∗ ) is Stratification Inefficient
in terms of welfare if there exist teams (i, j), (i 0 , j 0 ) ∈ Π∗ such that, for ` ∈ {i, j},
(
(i,j)
v` (m∗ ((i, j)))

> max

max
m̂∈M̂((`,i 0 ))

(`,i 0 )
v` (m̂),

max
m̂∈M̂((`,i 0 ))

(`,i 0 )
v` (m̂)

)
,

and there exist PEN, m̂((i, i 0 )) ∈ M̂((i, i 0 )) and m̂((j, j 0 )) ∈ M̂((j, j 0 )), such that
P
`∈{i,j}

(i,j)

v`

(m∗ ((i, j))) +

(i 0 ,j 0 )

P
`∈{i 0 ,j 0 }

P
`∈{i,i 0 }

v`

(i,i 0 )

v`

(m∗ ((i 0 , j 0 ))) <

(m̂((i, i 0 ))) +

P
`∈{j,j 0 }

(j,j 0 )

v`

(m̂((j, j 0 ))).

If,
−1
0
1m̂((i,j)) Σm̂((i,j))
10m̂((i,j)) + 1m̂((i 0 ,j 0 )) Σ−1
m̂((i 0 ,j 0 )) 1m̂((i 0 ,j 0 )) <
−1
0
0
0
1m̂((i,i 0 )) Σ−1
m̂((i,i 0 )) 1m̂((i,i 0 )) + 1m̂((j,j )) Σm̂((j,j 0 )) 1m̂((j,j 0 )) ,

then we say the CSPE is Stratification Inefficient in terms of information production.
To understand the definition, consider again the CSPE in the example. Let (i, j) = (3, 4)
and (i 0 , j 0 ) = (1, 2). In equilibrium, worker 3 and worker 4 each obtain a higher utility
in m∗ ((3, 4)) = (2, 2) than in any PEN with any other worker. Hence, the first condition
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of the definition is satisfied. Nonetheless, by forcing worker 3 (worker 4) to form a team
with worker 1 (worker 2), and selecting the unique PEN within each team, the manager
can increase both welfare and information production. We thus call the original CSPE
“Stratification”-Inefficient because it is characterized by inequality across teams (both in
terms of welfare and information production).
We now state our main characterization result.
Proposition 1.4 (Stratification Inefficiency). Suppose Assumption 1 holds and K is small.
Then, there is an open set of correlation matrices for which any CSPE is Welfare- and
Information-Inefficient due to Stratification.
Notice, in contrast to the case of Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency, every CSPE in the open set
we identify is both Welfare and Information-Inefficient. Hence, Stratification Inefficiency is
robust; there is no way for efficiency to emerge as a part of any equilibrium. In particular,
there is no way to assign roles off-path to eliminate Stratification Inefficiency; it can only
be eliminated by explicitly assigning workers to teams. Re-visiting Figure 1.6, each relevant
team has a unique, symmetric, and identical PEN. Thus, it is not possible to change the
behavior of individual workers within teams to induce an efficient equilibrium outcome.16

1.5. Extensions
1.5.1. Heterogeneous Variance
Chade and Eeckhout (2018) consider a environment similar to ours. In theirs, the correlation
between signals is constant, but precisions may be heterogeneous. They show that if each
worker produces only one signal, the reduced form utility obtained from forecasting the
state is submodular for a large range of correlations. This directly implies that, when the
objective of the manager is to maximize welfare, optimal teams are diversified; no team has
uniformly superior workers. When teams are comprised of two workers, this means that
the optimal matching is Negative Assortative: the best worker is matched with the worst
16
In general, we do not require uniqueness and symmetry. We present such an example to abstract away
from the moral hazard problem and clarify the stratification issue.
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one, the second best with the second worst, and so on. In this section, we modify our
environment to facilitate comparison with theirs. We show that it need not be true that
the Negative Assortative matching maximizes welfare, nor that it emerges endogenously, if
the number of draws is endogenous and utilities are non-transferable.17
We focus on the case in which pairwise correlations are zero to eliminate any confounding
effects that may contribute to our negative result. Suppose each worker produces conditionally independent signals with precisions τ1 < τ2 < ... < τN . Suppose that each worker
can produce any number of signals, and, if they produce n signals, they must pay a cost
equal to c(n). As in the model described in the main text, suppose the cost function satisfies non-decreasing differences, that each agent receives the quadratic loss associated to
the optimal forecast inside her team, and that each team has at most two workers. Then,
if workers i and j are in a team together, and produce ni and nj signals, the utility loss
associated with their forecast is
−

1
.
τθ + ni τi + nj τj

Proposition 2 of Chade and Eeckhout (2018) applies and, hence, the posterior variance is
submodular in ni τi . Consequently, Negative Assortative Matching with respect to ni τi is
optimal if, for every worker i, ni is independent of the team worker i is in. We next consider
what happens when two workers, i and j, choose the number of signals they produce.
For simplicity, suppose worker i can produce signals with unit variance (τi = 1) and the
variance of the prior is 1. In Figure 1.7, we show how the PEN correspondence in the
Production Subgame changes as worker j’s variance increases above 1 (τj decreases below
1), holding fixed a common cost function c(m) = 0.001m2 . Notice, as worker j’s variance
increases, equilibria become asymmetric. Why? Fixing the number of draws by worker i,
the marginal value of worker j’s last signal decreases. At the same time, the marginal value
17

That utilities are non-transferable is not necessary to revert their result, but we keep it to preserve the
structure of the game we study. Following our approach, the equilibrium of the production game is inherently
inefficient due to its public goods nature, while in a fully transferable world this inefficiency disappears. We
focus on whether the Negative Assortative matching is optimal given the equilibrium played inside each
team, and in a situation where, with or without contracts, we conjecture that asymmetry would still exist.

24

of a signal for worker i increases, fixing the number of signals produces by worker j. Both
forces lead to asymmetry.
3.5
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Figure 1.7: PEN Correspondence when ρij = 0 and τi = 1.

The implications of this behavior for team formation are stark. Suppose that there are
four workers with variances 0.25, 0.5, 1 and 1.25. If we match the best worker (the one
with variance 0.25) with the worst worker (the one with variance 1.25), the unique PEN
played within the team is (2, 0); in words, the worst worker does not contribute at all. In
contrast, when the worst worker is paired with the worker with variance 1, the unique PEN is
(2, 1). Consequently, the optimal matching is {(0.25, 1), (0.5, 1.25)}, instead of the Negative
Assortative matching, {(0.25, 1.25), (0.5, 1)}. It turns out that the optimal matching may
also be decentralized as a CSPE, while the Negative Assortative matching cannot.
The main takeaway is that, once effort choice is endogenous, optimal matching must simultaneously diversify, while incentivizing production. Indeed, in the above example, the
optimal matching is the most Negative Assortative matching subject to an incentive constraint that all workers take a positive number of draws in equilibrium.18
18

Another interesting observation is that a smaller variance is not always beneficial. If a worker reduces her
variance, she may have to acquire more information or may induce her teammate to acquire less information.
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1.5.2. Unrestricted Team Size
We now summarize how our analysis changes when we allow for larger teams.19 While
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium inside each team is guaranteed, existence in
the two-stage game is complicated. The reason is that the game inside each team is no
longer symmetric–this is the crucial property we exploit in the proof of Proposition 1.1.
When the game is no longer symmetric, off the path of play, it may not be possible to force
a worker to take more draws than her teammates.
When a CSPE does exist, we observe that there are many correlation matrices for which the
grand coalition does not form. There are two reasons for this. First, in the grand coalition,
there may be a worker that chooses to take zero draws. As long as membership fees are
positive (they may be arbitrarily small), such a team can never be a part of the equilibrium
partition; indeed, the rest of the workers would prefer to form a team excluding the noncontributing worker. Second, fixing any membership fee, we can choose cross-correlations so
that, even if she chooses to take a positive number of draws, the information she produces
is so redundant that the other workers prefer to exclude her.
We also note that, as a general matter, it is neither easier nor more difficult to enforce
stability when allowing for larger teams. In Section 1.7.6.3, we present an example in which
the Core is not empty when teams have at most two members, but is empty when teams
are unrestricted. We present another example, however, in which the reverse holds.

1.6. Conclusion
Our paper is a first step towards understanding how research teams are formed absent a
central authority. Our main contribution is to characterize the inefficiencies that might arise
in such scenarios. Asymmetric Effort Inefficiency occurs when a worker exerts relatively
different effort levels in different teams; even when a more productive team is available, a
worker may prefer to form a less productive team in which she can exert less effort than
her partner. Stratification Inefficiency occurs when the best teams form, but reduce the
Hence, pre-match investments may not be profitable.
19
See Section 1.7.6 for a more detailed discussion.
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average productivity of all teams.
As the quotations in the introduction suggest, the inefficiencies we identify cohere with those
observed in Oticon in the 1980’s. It is our hope that our model sheds on light the incentives
at play in institutions with a similarly decentralized structure, such as Universities. A
natural next step, beyond the scope of the current paper, is to study how management
might motivate workers to form optimal teams using contracts. While the management
interventions observed in Oticon in the 1990’s resemble the solutions we identify in our
model–management assigned “roles” within teams by appointing project leaders and, in
some cases, specifically assigned workers to teams (Foss (2000))– we do not model managers
as jointly choosing wages and matchings. Furthermore, we abstract from dynamic incentives
among workers that could help mitigate moral hazard problems. In future research, we
are interested in studying the interaction between formal contracts set by managers and
relational contracts among workers.

1.7. Appendix
1.7.1. Information Criterion
An outcome is Information Efficient if it solves

max
∗

Π∈P |Π | ,(m(S))S∈Π

∗|

where P |Π

X 10m(S) Σ−1
m(S) 1m(S)
σ2

S∈Π

,

is the set of partitions containing the same number of teams as Π∗ , 1m(S) is a

vector of ones with length given by the equilibrium number of signals produced in team S,
and Σm(S) is the correlation structure of these signals. Lemma 1 implies each team reports
their posterior mean. Hence, if the manager knows the equilibrium strategy profile, but not
the identity of each worker, it can construct a bias-corrected report from each team S:

x̃S :=

10m(S) Σ−1
m(S) xm(S)
10m(S) Σ−1
m(S) 1m(S)

∼N
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θ,

σ2
10m(S) Σ−1
m(S) 1m(S)

!
.

Assuming independence of reported estimates across teams, the manager’s ex-ante loss is

− σθ−2 +

X 10m(S) Σ−1
m(S) 1m(S)
σ2

S∈Π

It follows that maximizing

P
S∈Π

!−1

10m(S) Σ−1
1
m(S) m(S)

.

is equivalent to minimizing the manager’s ex-

σ2

ante loss.
1.7.2. Analysis of the Core
We first formally define the Core. Our definition may be interpreted as the Core of a
coalition game in which the valuation of a coalition is determined by the equilibrium correspondence of the Production Subgame.
Definition 1.4. Let Π be a partition of N and M̂ = {m̂(S)}S∈Π be a collection of PEN,
one for each team in Π. The tuple (Π, M̂) is in the Core if there does not exist a team
S 0 ∈ S and a PEN m0 (S 0 ) such that for all i ∈ S 0 ,
0

0

SΠ (i)

viS (m0 (S 0 )) − K ∗ IS > vi

(m̂(SΠ (i))) − K ∗ ISΠ (i) .

Notice, the Core coincides with the definition of a CSPE if there is a unique PEN within
every feasible team. Further, every Core partition is a CSPE partition. However, in contrast
to a CSPE, there may not exist any partition in the Core.
1.7.2.1

Empty Core Example

Suppose there are three workers and their technologies are correlated according to the
network depicted in Figure 1.8. The number inside each circle is the identity of the worker
and the numbers next to the edges connecting the circles are pairwise correlations.
Given the parameters in Table 1.1, the equilibria and payoffs of the Production Subgame for
each feasible team are as follows. In team (1, 2), there is a unique, symmetric equilibrium
(4, 4). Workers obtain a payoff of −0.22. In teams (1, 3) and (2, 3), there is a unique
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Figure 1.8: Correlation Matrix for an Empty Core.
equilibrium, up to identity, (5, 4). The worker producing five signals obtains a payoff of
−0.23 and the worker producing four signals obtains a payoff of −0.21. Finally, if any
worker remains alone, she produces seven signals and obtains a payoff of −0.32.
By exhibiting a preference cycle, we show the Core is empty. Suppose the team (1, 2) is
formed. Then, Worker 3 and Worker 1 can form a mutually beneficial deviating team in
which Worker 3 is the leader. Suppose the team (1, 3) is formed. Then, Worker 2 can make
an offer to its leader and form a mutually beneficial deviating team in which Worker 2 is the
leader. Suppose the team (3, 2) is formed. Then, Worker 1 can form a mutually beneficial
deviating team with its leader in which Worker 1 is the leader. Finally, if all teams are
singletons, Worker 1 and Worker 2 can form a team and be made better off. Hence, there
is no partition in the Core.20,21
In the example, non-existence is driven by incentives to re-negotiate off-path equilibria.
In a CSPE, fixed off-path PEN eliminate incentives to deviate; in fact, the partition Π =
{(1, 2), (3)} is a part of a CSPE. If the equilibrium in teams (1, 3) and (2, 3) is fixed to be
(5, 4), Worker 1 and Worker 2 cannot join another team in which they exert less effort than
their partner.
20

The same logic would hold if all pairwise correlations were 0. We add the correlation of -0.05 so that
there is a unique CSPE, which we discuss below.
21
We provide sufficient conditions for the Core to be nonempty in Section 1.7.2.2. The sufficient conditions
eliminate all possible cycles. They are not necessary because the Core may be non-empty even when cycles
exist.
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1.7.2.2

Sufficient Conditions for a Non-Empty Core

Define three sets of correlations using our characterization in Proposition 1.2. First, define
the set of correlations for which the only PEN is symmetric:
P 1 = [−1, ρ∗ ].

Second, define a set P 2 that is the union of (i) the elements in P 1 for which a worker can
obtain a higher payoff in an asymmetric equilibrium and (ii) the set of correlations for which
there may be multiple equilibria:
(
P2 =

)

ρ ∈ P 1 : v̄i (ρ) < sup (v̄i (ρ̃))

∪ [ρ∗ , ρ∗∗ ],

ρ̃∈(P 1 )c

where v̄i (ρ) is the maximum equilibrium payoff of a worker inside a team with correlation
ρ. Third, define the set of correlations for which there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium
in which one worker produces zero signals:
P 3 = (ρ∗∗ , 1].

Proposition 1.5. Suppose Assumption 1 and one of the following two conditions holds:
1. All correlations are in P 1 ∪ P 3 .
2. If Worker j has more than one pairwise correlation in P 2 , then for all i such that
ρij ∈ P 2 , ρij is the only pairwise correlation in P 2 for Worker i.
Then, the Core is non-empty.
The logic of the first condition is that if all PEN are symmetric or include complete free
riding, we can form teams with pairwise correlations in P 1 sequentially in decreasing order
of payoffs. Since those with correlations in P 1 will be matched with their preferred feasible
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choice and nobody wants to be in a team with a partner that produces zero signals, there are
no profitable deviations. The second condition in Theorem 1.5 ensures there are no cycles
of profitable deviations to non-trivial asymmetric equilibria, i.e. to teams with correlations
outside of P 3 . Hence, the example in Figure 1.8 is ruled out.
1.7.3. Sequential Research Response Algorithm
While we have proved that there exists a Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibrium (PEN) of the
Production Subgame, we have not specified a procedure to find one. We accomplish this
task with the Sequential Research Response Algorithm. It identifies a unique PEN up to
the worker identity. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Fix a team S = (i, j).
2. Set (m10 , m20 ) = (0, 0).
3. In iteration t, if f (ρ, t − 1, mt−1 ) − f (ρ, t, mt−1 ) > c(t) − c(t − 1), set m1t = m1t−1 + 1
so that Worker 1 produces one more signal and move to Step 4. If not, set m1t = m1t−1
so that Worker 1 does not produce another signal and move to Step 5.
4. In iteration t, Worker 2 chooses m2t = arg maxm≤t f (ρ, t, m) − c(m). Go back to Step
3 and replace t with t + 1.
5. (Complement Effect) Workers consider choosing (m1t+1 , m2t+1 ) = (m1t + 1, m2t + 1).
They choose it only when it is a Nash equilibrium and makes each worker weakly
better off. Iterate until the condition is not satisfied. Then, move to Step 6.
6. (Substitution Effect) Consider (m1t + 1, m2t − n) where m2t − n is a best-response by
Player 2 given m1t +1 and subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ n ≤ m2t . If (m1t +1, m2t −n)
is a Nash equilibrium and makes each worker weakly better off set (m1t+1 , m2t+1 ) =
(m1t + 1, m2t − n). Iterate until the condition is not satisfied and stop the algorithm.
The algorithm finds a Nash Equilibrium without Step 5 and Step 6. Step 5 and Step 6 allow
us to find a PEN by considering possible Pareto improvements. Step 5 is important only
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when the strategy profile found in the first four steps is symmetric and when signals are
strategic complements. Step 6 can affect the final outcome only if the correlation between
teammates is positive.
Lemma 1.2. Step 5 in the Sequential Research Response Algorithm can affect the outcome
selected only if at the end of Step 3 m1t = m2t ≡ m and MV (m+1; m+1, ρ) > MV (m+1; m, ρ).
Step 6 can affect the outcome only if ρ > 0.
Using the preceding Lemma, we show that our algorithm finds a PEN.
Proposition 1.6. The Sequential Research Response Algorithm finds a unique PEN of
the Production Subgame up to the identity of the workers. It finds the most symmetric
equilibrium, i.e. one which minimizes |mi − mj |.
1.7.4. Additional PEN Characterization
1.7.4.1

Failure of the Sufficient Condition in Theorem 1.2

Consider the equilibrium correspondence presented in Figure 1.9, which depicts a case in
1
4

which σ 2 =

< 1 = σθ2 so that the sufficient condition in Theorem 1.2 is not satisfied.

From the Figure, we see that when ρ = −0.29, the unique PEN is asymmetric, while for a
slightly higher correlation the unique PEN is symmetric.
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Figure 1.9: Equilibrium correspondence when c(m) = 0.019m, σ 2 =
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0.8
1
4

1

and σθ2 = 1.

Why does this happen? When n = 1, for ρ = −0.29 ∈ (ρ̂, ρ̃) the marginal value of a signal
for a leader is greater than the marginal value of a signal for a follower. Notice, that this
can only happen when ρ̂ < ρ̃. We may then fix the marginal cost of a second signal so that
the asymmetric equilibrium (2, 1) is played. But then, if ρ increases, the marginal value of
the follower increases and may exceed the chosen marginal cost. The former phenomena
occurs because the increase in the value of information left to learn for the follower offsets
the declining value of matching the leader’s signal. If the follower produces a second signal,
however, the leader has no incentive to produce a third signal because the information left
to learn decreases sufficiently. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium (2, 2) is played.
1.7.4.2

Monotone Comparative Statics

Define the equilibrium correspondence of a leader (Worker 1) and follower (Worker 2):
M1 (ρ) = {m1 : (m1 , m2 ) is a PEN and m1 ≥ m2 }
M2 (ρ) = {m2 : (m1 , m2 ) is a PEN and m1 > m2 }.

When γ ≤ 1/2, we obtain a sharp characterization of the equilibrium correspondence. The
key is that, by Lemma 1.9, ρ̃ > ρ̂. Following Topkis (2011), we say that the equilibrium
correspondence for worker i, Mi (ρ), is increasing in the weak set order sense when the
following two properties are satisfied:
1. If ρ0 > ρ and mi ∈ Mi (ρ), then there is mi0 ∈ Mi (ρ0 ) such that mi0 ≥ mi .
2. If ρ0 > ρ and mi0 ∈ Mi (ρ0 ), then there is mi ∈ Mi (ρ) such that mi ≤ mi0 .
Proposition 1.7. Suppose Assumption 1.1 is satisfied and γ ≤ 12 . Then:
• M1 (ρ) is increasing with respect to ρ in the weak set order sense.
• M2 (ρ) is decreasing with respect to ρ in the weak set order sense on the interval(s) for
which it is defined.
Figure 1.10 presents an example that shows that we cannot strengthen the monotonicity
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condition we use in the corollary. In the Figure, for ρ = 0 there are three equilibria: (3, 2),
(4, 1) and (5, 0). However, for smaller correlations there are no equilibria in which the leader
produces 3 or 4 signals.
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Figure 1.10: Equilibrium strategies when c = 0.01m, σ = 12 , and σθ = 1.
1.7.5. Asymmetric Effort and Information Efficiency
In the main text, we presented an example in which asymmetric effort leads to an InformationInefficient outcome. In this section, we present an example in which it leads to an InformationEfficient outcome. We fix parameters in Table 1.3. Because c(1) = 0.002 <
and γ =

σ2
σθ2

1
3

=

min{σθ2 ,σ 2 }
1+γ

= 2, Proposition 1.2 holds. The cutoff values are: ρ∗ = ρ∗∗∗ = −0.006 and

ρ∗∗ = 0.849.
Table 1.3: Parameters for Example 1.7.2.1.
Parameter

Interpretation

Value

σ2

Signal Variance

2

σθ2

Prior Variance

1

c(m)

Cost of m Signals

0.002m2

K

Cost of Teammate

0.01

Suppose signals are correlated according to the network in Figure 1.11. Then, all PEN
are unique up to identity. The equilibrium actions and information in all possible size-two
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teams are presented in Table 1.4. In the partition {(1, 2), (3, 4)}, the unique PEN in each
team, (4, 4), is symmetric. However, there is a CSPE with outcome partition {(1, 3), (2, 4)}
and PEN (4, 5) in each team.
1

−0.1

0

2

0.9
3

−0.1

CSPE and Info Optimal
Welfare Optimal

0
4

Figure 1.11: Correlation Matrix for Asymmetric Effort Information Inefficiency.
Table 1.4: Equilibrium actions and payoff in all size-two groups.
Correlation

Equilibrium

Payoff

10S Σ−1
S 1S

−0.1

(4, 4)

(−0.216, −0.216)

4.44

0.0

(4, 5)

(−0.214, −0.232)

4.5

0.9

(0, 7)

(−0.222, −0.32)

3.5

In this outcome, in contrast to the example in the main text, asymmetric effort increases
information production. The reason is that Worker 1 (Worker 4) produces the same number
of signals in a team with Worker 2 (Worker 3) as she does in a team with Worker 3 (Worker
2). However, Worker 1 (Worker 4) exerts relatively less effort in a team with Worker 3
(Worker 2) than in a team with Worker 2 (Worker 3). Notice, this means that seemingly
worse teams may be superior in terms of information production given after-match strategic
considerations; (1, 2) and (3, 4) each have a pairwise correlation of -0.1 and play a unique
and symmetric PEN, while the teams (1, 3) and (2, 4) have a higher correlation and play a
unique and asymmetric PEN. Nonetheless, (1, 2) and (3, 4) produce superior information as
measured by 10S Σ−1
S 1S since Worker 3 (Worker 2) is induced to produce more signals than
Worker 2 (Worker 3) when matched with Worker 1 (Worker 4).
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1.7.6. Extension to Any Team Size
In this section, we allow workers to form teams of any size. First, we show that a Nash
equilibrium within each team always exists. Second, we show a CSPE need not exist. Third,
we show that increasing the maximum allowable team size can work in favor or against the
existence of the Core.
1.7.6.1

Existence Nash Equilibrium

Lemma 1.1 still applies, so the optimal decision given a realization of signals is the conditional expected value of θ and the expected payoff is the negative expected posterior
variance. We simplify the expected posterior variance in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.3. Suppose there are P Workers in a team and they produce, without loss of
generality, m1 ≥ m2 ≥ ... ≥ mP signals. Let Φp be the correlation matrix of Workers 1, ... , p
p p
and (ai,j
)i=1 denote the entries of the inverse of each of these matrices. The integrated

variance is then,


2,2
X

3,3
X

3
+ (m3 − m4 )
ai,j
+ ...

−1
i=1,j=1
i=1,j=1
P−1,P−1
P,P
X
X
P−1
P  −2
+(mP−1 − mP )
ai,j
+ mP
ai,j
σ + σθ−2  .

f (m1 , m2 , ... , mP ) = (m1 − m2 ) + (m2 − m3 )

i=1,j=1

2
ai,j

i=1,j=1

As there is still a finite bound on the best response of any worker, we can bound the action
space and show that the modified finite game is a Potential game. It follows that there
is a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium. With many workers the natural generalization of a
Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibrium (PEN) is a Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE).
In some cases, the algorithm presented in section 1.7.3 can be modified to find a CPNE.
Details are available upon request.
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1.7.6.2

Existence CSPE

We next show that a CSPE need not exist. Fix σ = 1, σθ = 1, c(m) = 0.01m2 , and
K = 0.01. Suppose signals are correlated according to the covariance matrix,
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In this example, there are 20 possible teams with 3 workers. We categorize teams into
seven classes based on their correlation structure. Table 1.5 presents all CPNE and payoffs
in each class.
Table 1.5: Equilibrium strategies and payoff in all size-three teams.
Class
(1, 2, 3)
(1, 2, 4)
(1, 2, 6)
(1, 4, 6)
(1, 5, 6)
(1, 3, 4)
(2, 5, 6)

Equilibrium
(2, 2, 1)
(2, 2, 0)
(2, 2, 0)
(2, 2, 1)
(2, 2, 0)
Any permutation of (2, 2, 1)
Any permutation of (3, 1, 1)

Payoff
(−0.196, −0.196, −0.156)
(−0.207, −0.207, −0.167)
(−0.207, −0.207, −0.167)
(−0.248, −0.248, −0.248)
(−0.263, −0.263, −0.233)
(−0.238, −0.238, −0.208)
(−0.304, −0.224, −0.224)

Suppose we start with the partition {(1, 2, 3), (4, 5, 6)}. (4, 5, 6) is in the class (1, 2, 4) and
Workers 4 and 5 would prefer to deviate and form a team with Worker 1, since (4, 5, 1)
is in the class (1, 2, 3). Suppose we start with the partition {(4, 5, 1), (3, 6, 2)}. (3, 6, 2)
is in the class (1, 2, 4) and Worker 3 and 6 would prefer to form a team with Worker 4,
since team (3, 6, 4) is in the class (1, 2, 3). Finally, suppose we start with the partition
{(3, 6, 4), (1, 2, 5)}. (1, 2, 5) is in the class (1, 2, 4) and Workers 1 and 2 would prefer to form
a team with Worker 3, since team (1, 2, 3) is in the class (1, 2, 3). As the last deviating
partition is the one we started with, none of these partitions are part of a CSPE.
We next observe that no other team in another class of three workers can be part of a
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CSPE since workers can always deviate to a team in the class (1, 2, 3) and obtain a higher
payoff. Further, the only two-worker teams in which workers obtain a higher payoff than
in a three-worker team are those in which the pairwise correlation is −0.2. However, the
only equilibrium in these teams is (2, 2) and workers obtain (−0.21, −0.21). Hence, each
worker would also like to deviate to a three-worker team in the class (1, 2, 3). To complete
the argument, we note that any single worker can be made better off by creating a team in
the class (1, 2, 3) with two other workers.
1.7.6.3

Larger Teams Can Either Enforce or Prevent Stability

Consider the example in Section 1.7.2.1. There we showed that if teams have at most two
members, then the Core is empty. However, if size-three teams are allowed workers can form
the grand coalition and play an equilibrium (4, 4, 3) yielding payoffs (−0.182, −0.182, −0.168).
Since we assume that the cost of adding a worker is small (K = 0.01), there is no profitable
deviating team. Hence, the grand coalition of three workers is in the Core.
The previous example shows that larger teams can enforce stability. Unfortunately, they
may prevent stability as well. Suppose σ = σθ = 1 and c(m) = 0.04m2 . Suppose the signals
are correlated according to the network in Figure 1.12. If teams have at most two members,
the partition {(1, 4), (2, 3)} is in the Core. In both teams, the PEN (1, 1) is played. Workers
in (1, 4) obtain a payoff of −0.415 and workers in (2, 3) obtain a payoff of −0.434.
0.4

1
0.2

2
0.3

0.9

0.3

3

0.3

4

Figure 1.12: Correlation matrix for which allowing large teams prevents stability.

If we allow for larger teams, however, the team (2, 3, 4) is a profitable deviation for Worker
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2, 3, and 4. In this team, the unique PEN is (1, 1, 1) and each worker obtains a payoff of
−0.387. If this team is formed, however, Worker 1 is alone and obtains a payoff of −0.493.
Then, Worker 1 can then form a profitable deviating team with Worker 2 and play a PEN
(2, 1); Worker 1 obtains a payoff of −0.452 and Worker 2 obtains a payoff of −0.332 and
hence it is profitable for both. If Worker 1 and Worker 2 form a team, however, Worker
3 and 4 will also form a team and obtain −0.434 each. But if such a team were to form,
Worker 1 and 4 could form a profitable deviating team. As we end with the partition we
began with, there is a cycle and the Core is empty.22
1.7.7. Robustness Checks
1.7.7.1

Sequential versus Simultaneous Decision

In this section, we present a finite sequential version of the game played within each team.
We assume that the total number of periods T ≥ 2M̄, where M̄ is the upper bound on
best responses described in Lemma 1.4. In each period, each worker chooses whether or not
to produce a signal ati ∈ {0, 1}. Signals across periods are conditionally independent and
signals in the same period are correlated according to the pairwise correlation of teammates,
ρ. In period t, all workers observe all actions at−1 and signals xt−1 in periods 1, ...t − 1; the
1 2
public history at period t is given by ht−1 = (ar , xr )t−1
r =1 where ar = (ar , ar ) .

Let H t−1 denote the set of feasible histories up to period t. Then, a strategy for Worker
S
t−1 → {0, 1}. The expected payoff of Worker i given the history
i is a function si : T
t=1 H
(ar , xr )T
r =1 is:
(i,j)
vi (((ar )T
r =1 ))

= −

1
2
1+ρij

PT

1 2
r =1 ar ar

+

PT

1
r =1 (ar

+

ar2

−



2as1 ar2 )

σ −2

+

σθ−2

−c

T
X

!
ari

,

r =1

where we drop the signal realizations as an input in the payoff function because they do
not affect payoffs. We refer to the equilibrium outcome number of signals as (n1 , n2 ), where
P
i
ni = T
r =1 ar .
22

The grand coalition is not in the Core either. In all PEN, some worker produces zero signals.
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We consider Subgame Perfect Equilibria that are not Pareto Dominated by any other Subgame Perfect Equilibrium– call such an equilibrium a Pareto-Efficient Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (PESP). The next proposition states that, if there is a PEN in the simultaneous game such that strategies differ by at most 1, there is an identical PESP outcome of
the sequential game.
Proposition 1.8. Let (m1 , m2 ) be the most symmetric PEN in the simultaneous game. If
|m1 − m2 | < 2, there is a PESP of the sequential game with outcome (n1 , n2 ), where n1 = m1
and n2 = m2 .
The following example shows why we cannot extend the proposition to all correlations.
Suppose σ = σθ = 1 and c(m) = 0.05m. If ρ = 0.15, the only equilibrium in the simultaneous game is (3, 0). However, in the sequential game this cannot be a Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium. Suppose Worker 1 deviates and decides to produce only one signal in each of
the last two periods. Then, the best response of Worker 2 is to produce a signal in period
T − 1 or period T . This gives to Worker 1 a payoff of −0.367 instead of −0.4.23 This
observation illustrates that, for intermediate correlations, inefficiency due to asymmetric
equilibria may be smaller in the extensive game than in the simultaneous game.
Although our intuition suggests that all equilibria of the simultaneous game are more asymmetric than all equilibria of the sequential game, this may not be true. In the following
example, there is an asymmetric equilibrium of the sequential game that is more asymmetric than the most symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous game. Further, it is not an
equilibrium of the simultaneous game. Reconsider the example in Figure 1.10. In the simultaneous game, for correlation ρ = 0.1, the profile (3, 2) is the most symmetric equilibrium
and (4, 1) is not an equilibrium. However, in the sequential game, the on-path sequence
2
1
i
(ar )T
r =1 , with aT = 1, ar = 1 for r = T − 4, T − 3, T − 2, T − 1 and ar = 0 in any other

period, is consistent with a PESP. Notice, all signals are taken in different periods and (4, 1)
23

In the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, up to identity, Worker 1 produces 2 signals and Worker 2
produces 1 signal, with no signals taken in the same period.
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Worker j

H
L

Worker i
H
L
p 2 + ρij p(1 − p)
p(1 − p)(1 − ρij )
p(1 − p)(1 − ρij ) (1 − p)2 + ρij p(1 − p)

Figure 1.13: Joint distribution when state is High (H).
is the outcome number of signals. A deviation by Worker 1 at period T − 4 is not necessarily followed by an increase in the number of signals by Worker 2, since an extra signal
by her implies acquiring correlated information. It can be shown that a Nash equilibrium
of the Subgame following such a deviation is (3, 1). As (4, 1) is preferred by Worker 1 to
(3, 1), Worker 1 does not have incentive to deviate at T − 4. A similar argument follows for
deviations in other periods.24
1.7.7.2

Other Stochastic Processes

The normal information environment, which we characterize in the main section of the paper, is only one of many we could consider. In this section, we analyze another environment
that has been extensively studied in the learning literature. Instead of having a continuum
of possible states, we assume that there are two possible states, High (H) and Low (L).
For simplicity we assume that workers share a common prior over the state θ in which
Pr (θ = H) = 21 . Each worker can purchase a signal, with L or H realization, and it equals
to the true state with probability p > 12 . Figure 1.13 presents the probability of the four
possible realizations of two correlated signals, one by Worker i and one by Worker j, when
the state is H. If the state is L, probabilities are given by the matrix in Figure 1.13 in which
elements on the main diagonal switched.
Notice that in this environment the feasible set of correlations is bounded below. In particular, it has to be that ρij ≥ − 1−p
p . In the normal case, if workers have correlation −1
they learn the state perfectly after one signal. In the two-state environment, when a couple
compares signals and has the most feasible negative correlation they need not learn the
24

It can also be shown that (5, 0) is the outcome number of signals of a PESP of the sequential game.
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state; the state is revealed if HH (or LL) is observed, but not given any other realization.
Further, for any correlation, there is a positive probability that HL or LH is observed.
Table 1.6: Expected Posterior Variance in the two-state model for some strategies.
# signals i
0
1

# signals j
0
0

Expected Posterior Variance
p(1 − p)

1

1

p(1 − p)



2

0

p(1 − p)



2

1

p 2 (1 − p)2



(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
p 3 +(1−p)3 +ρij p(1−p)

2

2

p 2 (1 − p)2



(p+ρij (1−p))2 (1−p+ρij p)2
(p 2 +ρij p(1−p))2 +((1−p)2 +ρij p(1−p))2

3

0

3

1


4(1−ρij )(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
+(1 − ρij )2 +
p 2 +(1−p)2 +2ρij p(1−p)


p(1−p)
2
2
p (1 − p) p3 +(1−p)3 + 3

p(p−1)(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
p 2 (1 − p)2 p2 (p2 +ρ p(1−p))+(1−p)
2 ((1−p)2 +ρ p(1−p)) + (1 − ρij ) +

1
4

(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
p 2 +(1−p)2 +2ρij p(1−p)
p(1−p)

+

p 2 +(1−p)2

1
2

+

1 (1−ρij )
2


+ 2(1 − ρij ) +

ij

+



2(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
p 2 +(1−p)2 +2ρij p(1−p)

ij

+

+

(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
(1+ρij )p(1−p)



(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
2p(1−p)

2p(1−p)(1−ρij )
p 2 +(1−p)2

(p+ρij (1−p))(1−p+ρij p)
p(1−p+ρij p)+(1−p)(p+ρij (1−p))



When workers share an arbitrary number of signals, there is no simple expression to calculate
the expected posterior variance. It can still be found analytically, but its calculation becomes
considerably more complicated when a larger number of signals is considered. Table 1.6
gives the integrated variance for a number of cases. Detailed calculations are available upon
request.
These values are enough to find the equilibrium of the game when each worker’s best
response is bounded by three. We define ρ̃(t, p) and ρ̂(t, p) as in the main text. Figure
1.14 displays the value of these functions when t = 2. It shows it is still true that we have
ρ̃(2, p) > ρ̂(2, p) if and only if the precision of the signal is high enough. We suspect a
similar result is true for larger t. We can then find similar examples of inefficiency and an
empty Core.
Finally, the proof of existence of a CSPE depends only on the symmetry of the equilibrium
correspondence; that is, given a cross correlation ρ, if (m, m0 ) is an equilibrium then the pro-
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Figure 1.14: Values ρ̃(2, p) and ρ̂(2, p) for different signal precisions p.
file (m0 , m) is an equilibrium, as well. As this property holds in the two-state environment,
the existence of a CSPE is still guaranteed.
1.7.7.3

Is discreteness of the action space important?

In our model, informativeness a signal is scaled by the precision of the signal. In this section,
we modify the production game by making signals more imprecise and scaling the cost so
that there is no “free lunch” effect. This allows us to find a limit game where the action
space is continuous.
Let us consider a sequence of games in which each signal becomes less informative. In
the kth game, k signals are equivalent to a single signal of the original game, that is, the
variance in the kth game, σk2 is equal to kσ 2 where σ 2 is the variance of each signal in the
original game. For simplicity we assume that the cost of taking a signal is linear. No free
lunch implies that in the kth game the cost of a signal is

d
k,

where d is the cost of a signal

in the original game. Suppose workers i and j are in a team together and the correlation
between their signals is ρ. Then in the kth game, if they choose mik and mjk signals, worker
i’s payoff is given by
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(
(i,j)
vi (mik , mjk )

=

min

k

mik mj
,
k k

)

!−1

!

mjk
mik
2
+
−
1+ρ
k
k

σ −2 + σθ2

−d

mik
.
k

Notice that for any real number z and fixed  > 0, there exist rational numbers k and m
such

m
k

− z < . Therefore, the sequence of games converges to the game where player i

chooses ri ∈ R+ and, if workers choose ri and rj signals, worker i’s payoff is given by
(i,j)

vi

(ri , rj ) =

−1
− dri ,
(r ij (γij − 1) + r̄ij )σ −2 + σθ−2

where r ij = min{ri , rj }, r̄i j = max{ri , rj } and γij =

2
1+ρij .

If we choose parameters so that workers take a positive number of signals when left alone,
q
2
2
this number is r = σd − σσ2 . This result is consistent with our previous ones: the cheaper
θ

the information is and/or the larger the uncertainty the worker faces, the larger number
of signals she buys. If workers i and j are in a team together, payoffs depend on a factor
γij ∈ [1, ∞) that specifies the team’s productivity. The equilibrium correspondence is similar
to the one described in the main text and characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.9.
• If γij < 2, the unique Nash equilibrium, up to the identity of the workers, is (0,
σ2
σθ2

q

σ2
d

−

).

• If γij = 2, any strategy profile such that ri + rj =

q

σ2
d

−

σ2
σθ2

is a PEN.

• If γij ≥ 2, the only PEN is
q
ri = rj =

σ 2 (γij −1)
d

γij

−

σ2
σθ2

.

The proposition implies that for negative correlations the only equilibrium is symmetric,
for conditionally independent signals there is multiplicity, and for positive correlations the
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only equilibrium is fully asymmetric. We obtain similar results for convex cost functions.
In these cases, if γij < 2 there is an asymmetric PEN and for γij > 2 there is a symmetric
PEN.
1.7.8. Proofs
1.7.8.1

Proof of Lemma 1.1

For any function g : X → R, where X is the set of possible realizations of signals,




 

−Ex,θ (g (x) − θ)2 ≤ −Ex (E(θ | x) − θ)2 = −Ex Eθ (E(θ | x) − θ)2 | x = −Var (θ | x).


The inequality follows because E (b − θ)2 |x is minimized by setting b = E[θ|x]. The first
equality follows from the Law of Iterated Expectations. The second equality follows from
the definition of conditional variance.
Let Σ be the correlation matrix of joint signals x. And 1N is a N-column vector of 1s.


1
The likelihood function of joint signals is, p(x|θ) = det(2πσ −2 Σ)− 2 exp − 21 (θ · 1N −






−2
− 12
1
2
−2
0
−2
−1
.
x) σ Σ (θ·1N −x) and the prior density is, p(θ) = (2πσ ) exp − 2 (θ−µθ ) σθ
By Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of θ|x is proportional to,

p(x|θ)p(θ) ∝ exp

−



(θ −

−

1
2



θ2 (σθ−2


∝ exp

∝ exp

µθ )2 σθ−2

1
2

+

+ (θ · 1N −

σ −2 10N Σ−1 1N )

x)0 σ −2 Σ−1 (θ

−

θ(2µθ σθ−2

· 1N − x)

+




σ −2 (x 0 Σ−1 1

N

+

10N Σ−1 x)



0 

1
− 2 θ−A B θ−A ,

where B = (σθ−2 + σ −2 10N Σ−1 1N ), A = B −1 (µθ σθ−2 + σ −2 10N Σ−1 x), and the proportionality
operator eliminates positive constants. Since the derived expression is the kernel of a normal
distribution, Var (θ | x) = B −1 .
We construct B −1 when N = 2, worker 1 takes m ≥ n draws, and worker 2 takes n draws.
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The prior covariance matrix, Σ−1 , is block diagonal with n blocks of the form,
1 ρ

Σ0 =

ρ 1

!
,

and m − n scalar blocks each equal to 1. The inverse of a block diagonal matrix is equal to
the block diagonal matrix formed by inverting each block. Since,

Σ−1
0

1
=
1 − ρ2

1

−ρ

−ρ

1

!
,

we have,
102 Σ−1
0 12 =

2
.
1+ρ

Then, 10N Σ−1 1N is the sum of n of these blocks and m − n times 1. Hence,
B

−1

=

σ −2 10N Σ−1 1N

+

−1
σθ−2




−1
2
−2
−2
= σ
n
+ (m − n) + σθ
.
1+ρ

The general expression when m need not be greater than n is:

Var (θ | x) =

1.7.8.2


−1
2
−2
−2
min{n, m}
+ |m − n| σ + σθ
.
1+ρ

Proof Proposition 1.1

Step 1: Existence of Nash Equilibrium
The following Lemma states that we may bound the action space without loss of generality.
The reason is that diminishing marginal returns to information production implies that,
eventually, the marginal value of producing a signal must be less than the marginal cost
regardless of the behavior of one’s partner.
Lemma 1.4. There is a positive integer M̄ such that for each positive integer m ≥ M̄, m
is a not best response by worker i to any strategy by worker j.
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Proof. We show that if ni 6= nj ,

MV (ni ; nj , ρ) − MV (ni − 1; nj , ρ) < 0,

and if ni 6= nj + 1,
MV (ni ; nj + 1, ρ) − MV (ni ; nj , ρ) < 0.
For ni ≤ nj ,


f (ρ, ni − 1, nj ) − f (ρ, ni , nj ) =

1−ρ
1+ρ



σ −2





1−ρ
−2
2
ni 1+ρ +nj +1− 1+ρ
σ −2 +σθ
ni 1−ρ
+nj σ −2 +σθ−2
1+ρ

is strictly decreasing in nj and in ni because
f (ρ, ni − 1, nj ) − f (ρ, ni , nj ) =

1−ρ
1+ρ

> 0. For ni ≥ nj + 1,

σ −2





1−ρ
−2
−2
nj 1+ρ +ni −1 σ +σθ
nj 1−ρ
+ni σ −2 +σθ−2
1+ρ

is strictly decreasing in ni and in nj , again because

1−ρ
1+ρ

> 0.

The preceding observations imply that the best response by worker i is decreasing in nj ,
since the marginal value is strictly decreasing. We only need to prove that the best response
by worker i to 0 draws by worker j is finite. It suffices to show that there is an n ∈ Z+ such
that f (ρ, n − 1, 0) − f (ρ, n, 0) is smaller than c(1).

f (ρ, n − 1, 0) − f (ρ, n, 0) =

implies it’s sufficient to have n >

σ2
c(1)n

1
(n−1)σ −2 +σθ−2

−

1
nσ −2 +σθ−2

<

+ 1. This happens when n >

σ2
n(n−1) ,

σ2
c(1)

+ 1 and we have

the desired inequality. Define M̄ as the smallest such n.

Since we can bound the action space, we may redefine the game as a finite exact potential
game to show that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1.5. There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the Production Subgame.
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Proof. Given that no worker optimally produces a number of signals larger than M̄, we
can redefine, without loss of generality, the Production Subgame as the normal form game
(i,j)

({0, 1, ... , M̄}2 , {vi

(i,j)

, vj

}). Define the function,

Φ(m, n, ρ) = −f (m, n, ρ) − c(m) − c(n).

Let ρij be correlation for team (i, j). It is a potential function since
(i,j)

(m, n) − vi

(i,j)

(m, n) − vj

vi

vj

(i,j)

(m0 , n) = −f (m, n, ρij ) − c(m) + f (m0 , n, ρij ) + c(m0 ) = Φ(m, n, ρij ) − Φ(m0 , n, ρij )

(i,j)

(m, n0 ) = −f (m, n, ρij ) − c(n) + f (m, n0 , ρij ) + c(n0 ) = Φ(m, n, ρij ) − Φ(m, n0 , ρij ).

Hence, the redefined game is a finite exact potential game. So it is guaranteed to have a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium by Corollary 2.2 of Monderer and Shapley (1996).

Step 2: Existence of Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibrium
By Lemma 1.4, we can conclude that the set of Nash Equilibria is finite. Consider the
subset of equilibria that maximizes worker i’s payoff. Choose any equilibrium that (weakly)
maximizes worker j’s payoff within this subset. The chosen equilibrium must be ParetoEfficient. Hence, a Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibrium exists.
Step 3: Existence of CSPE
First, note that only

N
2



couples can be formed. For each couple, each equilibrium played

inside the couple yields a (finite) payoff for each teammate. Order every such equilibrium
and couple by the payoff obtained by the leader. Choose the couple, say (i, j), and equilibrium such that the leader, say i, obtains the highest payoff compared to any leader in any
couple playing any equilibrium. If there is more than one such couple, equilibrium, leader
combination, choose one arbitrarily.
Fix both workers to be leaders in any other team. If i and j know that in any other couple
they will be a leader neither will want to deviate; worker i knows that in any other couple the
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leader gets at most what she is getting now. As both i and j acquire the same information
and i is producing more signals, we know that the payoff of j is larger than the payoff of i.
Hence, j also cannot do any better.
Set i and j aside and repeat the process with the workers that are left. The only difference
is that the workers picked in the second round will be the leaders in any couple they can
form not including i or j. By induction, we find a partition and strategy profile comprising
a CSPE.
Step 4: Existence of Pareto-Efficient CSPE
As there exists at least one CSPE and since the number of possible partitions and equilibria
for each team are finite, there is a finite, strictly positive number of CSPE. Choose a CSPE
(Π, {m∗ (S)}S ). If it is Pareto-Efficient we are done. Suppose it is not. Then, there is
another feasible partition Π̂ = {T1 , ... , Tm } and on-path equilibria, m̂(T )T ∈Π̂ , such that,
for each worker,

vi (m̂(TΠ̂(i) )) − K ∗ I

TΠ̂(i)

≥ vi (m∗ (SΠ (i))) − K ∗ ISΠ (i) ,

and the inequality is strict for at least one of them. Consider the profile (Π̂, {m̃(S)}S ) where
m̃(S) = m∗ (S) if S 6∈ Π̂ and m̃(S) = m̂(S) if S ∈ Π̂. This profile is a CSPE; on-path, each
worker obtains a higher payoff than in the original CSPE and each worker has the same
possible deviations. As there is a finite number of CSPE and in every step we are weakly
increasing the payoff of all worker and strictly increasing it for at least one, we can repeat
the process until a Pareto-Efficient CSPE is found.
1.7.8.3

Proof of Proposition 1.2

Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 1.6 states that the marginal value of a signal by a leader is increasing in ρ.25 The
25

Recall, a leader is a teammate taking weakly more draws than her partner.
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reason is that the information left to learn, fixing mi and mj , is increasing in ρ.
Lemma 1.6 (Leader Comparative Statics in ρ). For mi > mj , MV (mi ; mj , ρ) is increasing
in ρ.
Proof. For ni > nj ,
∂f (ρ, ni − 1, nj ) − f (ρ, ni , nj )
∝
∂ρ


nj

1−ρ
+ ni
1+ρ




 

1−ρ
σ −2 + σθ−2 + nj
+ ni − 1 σ −2 + σθ−2 > 0.
1+ρ

The same property does not hold for a follower.26 While the amount of information left to
learn, fixing the number of signals by each teammate, increases in ρ, the value of matching a
leader’s signal decreases in ρ because the information produced is more redundant. Hence,
the marginal benefit of a draw by a follower is non-monotonic. We prove it is strictly concave
in the pairwise correlation ρ and has a unique maximizer. For the following lemmas it is
useful to define the signal-to-prior variance ratio γ :=

σ2
.
σθ2

Lemma 1.7 (Follower Comparative Statics in ρ). For mi ≤ mj where mj ≥ 1, MV (mi ; mj , ρ)
is strictly concave in ρ with unique maximizer,

ρ̃(mi , mj , γ) =

mj + γ −

2
p
mi (mi + 1)

−(mj + γ)2 + mi (mi + 1)

.

Proof. If worker 1 produces t signals, the marginal benefit of producing signal n + 1 for
worker 2 is,


f (ρ, t, n) − f (ρ, t, n + 1) =
26

1−ρ
1+ρ


σ −2





.
2
2
n 1+ρ
+t−n σ −2 +σθ−2
(n+1) 1+ρ
+t−n−1 σ −2 +σθ−2

Recall, a follower is a teammate taking strictly fewer draws than her partner.
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Differentiating with respect to ρ,

2σ 2 −(t + γ)2 (1 + ρ)2 + n(n − 1)(1 − ρ)2
∂f (ρ, t, n) − f (ρ, t, n + 1)
=
.
∂ρ
(2n + (t − n + γ)(1 + ρ))2 (2(n + 1) + (t − n − 1 + γ)(1 + ρ))2

Differentiating again with respect to ρ,
∂ 2 f (ρ,t,n)−f (ρ,t,n+1)
∂ρ2

∝ 4n(n + 1) −(t + γ)2 (1 + ρ) − n(n − 1)(1 − ρ)



+n(n + 1) [2n(t − n − 1 + γ) + 2(n + 1)(t − n + γ) + (t − n − 1 + γ)(t − n + γ)] (2ρ − 2) < 0.

Hence, the marginal value f (ρ, t, n)−f (ρ, t, n+1) is strictly concave. The unique maximizer
ρ̃(t, n, γ) must satisfy,

(t + γ)2 (1 + ρ̃(t, n, γ))2 = n(n + 1)(1 − ρ̃(t, n, γ))2 ,

a quadratic equation in ρ with roots,

ρ+ =

2
p
n(n + 1)

−(t + γ)2 + n(n + 1)


ρ− =

t +γ+

t +γ−

p

n(n + 1)

2

−(t + γ)2 + n(n + 1)

.

Both roots are negative because the denominator is negative. However, ρ− is less than −1
and therefore is infeasible. Since n + 1 ≤ t, ρ+ is greater than −1. Set ρ̃(t, n, γ) = ρ+ .

We now make stepwise comparisons between the marginal value of a signal by a leader and
the marginal value of a signal by a follower. workers initially produce m − 1 signals. The
leader’s marginal value is the payoff of producing an m-th signal. The follower’s marginal
value is the payoff of producing an m-th signal, given that the leader already produced m
signals. Lemma 1.8 states that for any number m ≥ 1 and signal-to-prior variance ratio
γ=

σ2
,
σθ2

there is a unique correlation, ρ̂(n, γ), below which the marginal value of the leader

is less than the marginal value of the follower, and above which the opposite holds.
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Lemma 1.8 (Leader-Follower MV Comparison 1). Fix mi ≥ 1 and γ. Then,

MV (mi ; mi − 1, ρ) <
|
{z
}
Marginal Value Leader

MV (mi ; mi , ρ)
|
{z
}

Marginal Value Follower

if and only if,

ρ < ρ̂(mi , γ) =

−(γ − 1 + 2mi ) +

p
(γ − 1 + 2mi )2 − 4γ
< 0.
2γ

Proof.
f (ρ, t − 1, t) − f (ρ, t, t) ≥ f (ρ, t − 1, t − 1) − f (ρ, t − 1, t)

⇔

1
1
1
≥ (t−1) 2 1σ−2 +σ−2 − (t−1) 2 +1
−2 −
2
2
−2
t 1+ρ
σ −2 +σθ−2
((t−1)
(
)σ−2 +σθ−2
1+ρ
1+ρ
 
 θ
 1+ρ +1)σ +σθ
1−ρ
−2
−2
2
2
−2
−2
+ σθ
≥ t 1+ρ σ + σθ
1+ρ (t − 1) 1+ρ σ

⇔

0 ≥ γρ2 + (γ − 1 + 2t)ρ + 1.

⇔

The last inequality involves a quadratic concave function in ρ. The roots are:

p
(γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ
ρ (t) =
2γ
p
−(γ − 1 + 2t) − (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ
−
.
ρ (t) =
2γ
+

−(γ − 1 + 2t) +

We first show that ρ− (t) is infeasible by showing that ρ− (t) < −1 for t > 1. Note,
−

−

ρ (t) − ρ (t + 1) =

2+

p
p
(γ − 1 + 2(t + 1))2 − 4γ − (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ
,
2γ

is positive since (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ is increasing in t ≥ 1 and, at t = 1, (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ =
(γ − 1)2 > 0. If γ < 1, then ρ− (1) < −1 and hence ρ− (t) < −1 for all t ≥ 1. If γ ≥ 1, then
ρ− (1) = −1, but ρ− (t) < −1 for all t > 1.
Second, we show that ρ+ (t) ∈ [−1, 0) so that ρ̂(t, γ) = ρ+ (t) as stated in the Lemma.
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ρ+ (t) < 0 since

p
p
(γ − 1 + 2t)2 > (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ. Further,
√

ρ+ (t

+ 1) −

ρ+ (t)

=

−2+

(γ−1+2(t+1))2 −4γ−
2γ

√

(γ−1+2t)2 −4γ

is positive since,
−2 +

p
p
(γ − 1 + 2(t + 1))2 − 4γ > (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ

⇔ (γ + 1 + 2t)2 > (γ − 1 + 2(t + 1))2 − 4γ
⇔ 4γ > 0.
Then, ρ+ (t) is increasing in t and,

(
p
−(γ + 1) + (γ − 1)2
ρ (1) =
=
2γ
+

−2
2γ > −1
−2γ
2γ = −1

if γ ≥ 1
if γ < 1.

Lemma 1.9 states that if γ is sufficiently large the pairwise correlation at which the marginal
value of a follower is maximized, ρ̃(mi , mj , γ), must be less than ρ̂(mi , γ). We use this
property in the next section to order equilibria in terms of their symmetry.
Lemma 1.9 (Leader-Follower MV Comparison 2). Fix mi ≥ 2. Then, there exists γ ∗ (mi ) ∈
[ 21 , 1) such that γ ≥ γ ∗ (mi ) if and only if
ρ̃(mi , mi − 1, γ) ≤ ρ̂(mi , γ).27

Proof. Let g (t, γ) = ρ̃(t, t − 1, γ) − ρ̂(t, γ). For any t ∈ [2, ∞), we show that g (t, γ) has a
unique zero in the interval [ 21 , 1). First, note that,
√

g (t, 21 ) =
27

−8t 2 −1+8(t+ 12 )
8t+1

t(t−1)

− ( 12 − 2t +

q
4t 2 − 2t − 74 ) > 0,

For mi = 1, ρ̃(mi , mi − 1, γ) = −1, so the inequality is satisfied for any γ.
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if and only if
3
2 + 4(2t + 1) t(t
48t 2 − 15t − 1 > 0,

p

8t 2 − 2t −
⇔ 64t 3 −

− 1) > (8t + 1)

q
4t 2 − 2t −

7
4

which holds for t ≥ 2.
Second, when t ≥ 2, (t + 1)(t − 1 + 2

p
p
t(t − 1)) < (3t + 1) (t + 1)(t − 1) and so,
√

g (t, 1) =

−(t+1)(t−1)−2(t+1)

√

t(t−1)+(3t+1)
−(3t+1)

(t+1)(t−1)

<0 .

By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a γ ∗ ∈ [ 21 , 1) such that g (t, γ ∗ ) = 0.
To prove that g (·, γ) is strictly decreasing in γ we show that
To show

∂ ρ̂(t,γ)
∂γ

∂ ρ̂(t,γ)
∂γ

∂ ρ̂(t,γ)
∂γ

> 0 and

∂ ρ̃(t,t−1,γ)
∂γ

> 0, note,

=





√
−0.5
−1+((γ−1+2t)2 −4γ )
(γ−3+2t) 2γ−2 −(γ−1+2t)+ (γ−1+2t)2 −4γ
4γ 2

∝ 3γ − 2tγ − 1 + 4t −
Then,

∂ ρ̂(t,γ)
∂γ

4t 2

p
+ (2t − 1) (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ.

> 0 if and only if,
p
(2t − 1) (γ − 1 + 2t)2 − 4γ > γ(2t − 3) + (2t − 1)2
⇔ γ 2 (2t − 1)2 > γ 2 (2t − 3)2 .

As the last inequality holds,

∂ ρ̃(t,t−1,γ)
∂γ

=

∂ ρ̂(t,γ)
∂γ

> 0. Finally, since γ > 0 and t − 1 <

p
t(t − 1),


 √
√
√
4(t+γ) t(t−1)−(t+γ) t(t−1) −2 (t(t−1))3 −4(t+γ)2 t(t−1)
(−(t+γ)2 +t(t−1))2

Proof of 1. and 2.
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< 0.

< 0.

A sufficient condition for a symmetric equilibrium is:

f (ρ, n − 1, n) − f (ρ, n, n) ≥ f (ρ, n − 1, n − 1) − f (ρ, n − 1, n).

From Lemma 1.8, the condition is satisfied for correlations smaller than ρ̂(t, γ). Lemma
1.8’s proof shows ρ̂(t, γ) is increasing in t and in γ. ρ̂(1, γ) = −1 for any γ. However,
by Assumption 1.1, for ρ = −1 and correlations close to it, both workers produce at least
one signal. Hence, there is a threshold ρ∗ > −1 below which the unique equilibrium is
symmetric.
As ρ approaches 1, the marginal benefit of matching the first signal of the follower, f (ρ, 0, 1)−
f (ρ, 1, 1), approaches zero. By continuity and monotonicity of the marginal value in ρ, there
exists a unique ρ∗∗ < 1 such that f (ρ∗∗ , 0, 1) − f (ρ∗∗ , 1, 1) = c(1). By the proof of Lemma
1.4, the marginal value is decreasing with respect to the number of signals produced by the
leader so for any correlation higher than ρ∗∗ the follower does not produce a signal.
Proof of 3. and 4.
Suppose that for correlation ρ there is an asymmetric equilibrium (m1 , m2 ) in which m1 > m2
and there is no symmetric equilibrium. Then, ρ > ρ̂(m1 , γ). We need to argue that for
correlation ρ0 > ρ there is no symmetric equilibrium. We use the Sequential Research
Response Algorithm described in section 1.7.3 to argue that this is the case.
By Lemma 1.7 and Lemma 1.9 at any iteration s in the algorithm, we can conclude that
m2s (ρ0 ) ≤ m2s (ρ) since the marginal value of a signal by the follower is always smaller under
ρ0 . To complete the argument, Lemma 1.6 implies that when the process reaches iteration
s, if worker 1 decides to take signal s when the correlation is ρ she would take it when the
correlation is ρ0 as well. This implies that the procedure will continue for more iterations
for higher correlations and the most symmetric equilibrium will be more asymmetric under
ρ0 than under ρ. Therefore, since the algorithm finds the most symmetric equilibrium
we conclude the result. If there is a symmetric equilibrium, we can repeat the argument
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by starting the Sequential Research Response Algorithm from the asymmetric equilibrium
(m1 , m2 ). Then, for ρ > ρ0 there has to be an equilibrium more asymmetric than (m1 , m2 ).
1.7.8.4

Proof Proposition 1.3

Consider a four-worker economy {i, j, i 0 , j 0 }. Define three sets of correlations using our
characterization in Proposition 1.2. First, define the set of correlations for which the only
PEN is symmetric:
P 1 = [−1, ρ∗ ).
Second, define the set of correlations for which there may be multiple equilibria:
P 2 = [ρ∗ , ρ∗∗ ].

Third, define the set of correlations for which the only PEN is symmetric, but in which each
worker can obtain a higher payoff in an asymmetric equilibrium:
(
P3 =

)

ρ ∈ P 1 : v̄i (ρ) < sup (v̄i (ρ̃)) .
ρ̃∈(P 1 )c

Note, ρ∗ < ρ∗∗ not only ensures that P 2 is non-empty, but also ensures that P 3 is non-empty
and open.
We select correlations so that (i, j) and (i 0 , j 0 ) are efficient, but (i, i 0 ) and (j, j 0 ) match in
a CSPE because of asymmetric-effort opportunities. Select ρii 0 and ρjj 0 in [ρ∗ , ρ∗∗ ] close to
ρ∗ so that the payoff of the follower in the most asymmetric equilibrium is larger than the
payoff obtained in an open set contained in P 3 . Let δii 0 and δjj 0 be the difference in payoffs
between the follower and leader in the most asymmetric equilibria in teams (i, i 0 ) and (j, j 0 ).
Pick ρij , ρi 0 j 0 ∈ P 3 so that the payoff of each worker in (i, j) and (i 0 , j 0 ) is less than

min{δii 0 ,δjj 0 }
2

away from the maximum payoff a follower can attain in team (i, i 0 ) or (j, j 0 ). Finally, pick
all other correlations including these four workers in (ρ∗∗ , 1] so that these teams are never
formed.
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Since the sum of payoffs of workers i and j in (i, j) is larger than the sum of the payoffs
of workers i and i 0 in (i, i 0 ), and analogously for (i 0 , j 0 ) and (j, j 0 ), matching (i, j) and (i 0 , j 0 )
is efficient. However, there is a CSPE matching (i, i 0 ) and (j, j 0 ). Suppose i and j are the
followers in these pairs, respectively. Then, each receives the highest obtainable payoff and
has no incentive to deviate. Further, i 0 and j 0 do not have a better outside option; they do
not want to form a deviating team and as long as K is small enough being alone gives each
a lower payoff.
We now show that teams (i, j) and (i 0 , j 0 ) are part of a CSPE and hence there is an efficient
equilibrium as well. Suppose that workers i (i 0 ) and j 0 (j) have an incentive to form a
deviating team. In the deviating team (i, j 0 ) ((i 0 , j)), pick an asymmetric PEN and select one
worker to be the leader. Then, the deviation cannot be profitable for that worker. Finally,
since in each two-worker team each worker is producing a positive number of signals, as
long as K is small enough, no worker prefers to form a one-agent team.
1.7.8.5

Proof Proposition 1.4

Consider an economy with n workers and pick workers {i, j, i 0 , j 0 }. We select correlations
so that forming teams (i, i 0 ) and (j, j 0 ) is efficient, but for which there is a CSPE matching
(i, j) and (i 0 , j 0 ). Pick ρij such that there is a unique equilibrium (m, n), m ≥ n in this team.
Pick ρij < ρi 0 j 0 such that (m, n) is the only PEN in team (i 0 , j 0 ) and ρii 0 , ρjj 0 ∈ [ρij , ρi 0 j 0 ] close
enough to ρij such that (m, n) is the unique PEN in (i, i 0 ) and (j, j 0 ).28 Finally, choose all
other correlations involving any of workers {i, j, i 0 , j 0 } greater than ρ∗∗ so that these workers
never want to form any other team in a CSPE or efficient outcome.
Fix (m, n) in (i, j), (i 0 , j 0 ), (i, i 0 ), and (j, j 0 ). Then, if K small enough, forming teams
{(i, j), (i 0 , j 0 )} is the only partition of these four workers in a CSPE partition; i and j obtain
the highest possible payoff in a team together and, if K small enough, i 0 and j 0 prefer to be
28

To understand why, consider the intuition from Figure 1.3. As long as ρij is not the largest correlation
in an interval in which (m, n) is played, these correlations are guaranteed to exist by the continuity of the
marginal value function. If ρij is the largest such correlation, select a new ρij to the left of the original one.
Notice that it is not true in general that for all correlations between ρij and ρi 0 j 0 the same equilibrium exists.
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in a team together than to be alone. Next, note that each worker’s payoff is decreasing in
the pairwise correlation ρ,
−2mσ −2
∂v (m, n, ρ)
 < 0.
=
ρ
(2m + (m − n)(1 + ρ)) σ −2 + (1 + ρ)σθ−2
Hence, by picking ρii 0 , ρjj 0 close enough to ρij the sum of payoffs from matching (i, i 0 ) and
(j, j 0 ) is greater than the sum of payoffs from matching (i, j) and (i 0 , j 0 ). As the same
equilibrium is played in each of these teams, the latter result implies that for these four
workers the amount of information created in the Welfare- Efficient matching is greater
than in the CSPE matching.
1.7.8.6

Proof of Proposition 1.5

Recall that forming a team of size 2 costs K > 0. Hence, no team will form if its members
have a pairwise correlation in P 3 . If they did, the leader of the team would have a profitable
deviation; she could obtain the same information alone without paying K .
The set P 1 satisfies the top coalition property (see Banerjee et al. (2001)) when teams have
at most two members. Hence, if all members have pairwise correlations in P 1 there is a
Core partition. As no couple with a pairwise correlation in P 3 will form a team, the result
follows if all correlations are in P 1 ∪ P 3 .
Now, suppose the second condition holds. Form the team with pairwise correlation in P 1 \P 2
that gives each member the highest payoff. By definition, no teammate wants to form a
deviating team in which members have a pairwise correlation outside P 1 \ P 2 . We may
inductively construct teams with pairwise correlations in P 1 \ P 2 in this manner.
After we have finished creating all teams with pairwise correlations in P 1 \ P 2 , set aside
these workers. Consider the resulting correlation matrix in which some workers may have
multiple pairwise correlations in P 2 . Pick any such worker and allow her to choose a
teammate from the subset of her possible partners that prefers being the leader in a team
with a pairwise correlation in P 2 over being alone. Select a PEN in which the worker with
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multiple pairwise correlations in P 2 is the follower. As she chooses this teammate, she does
not have an incentive to deviate and the worker she picks does not have an incentive to
deviate either since all her other pairwise correlations are in P 3 . Iterate until all workers
with multiple pairwise correlations ρij ∈ P 2 have been paired. There may be an even number
of remaining workers with one correlation in P 2 . Form these couples if they prefer them
over being alone.
1.7.8.7

Proof Lemma 1.2

First, suppose m1t > m2t at the end of Step 3. Then, the marginal value of m2 + 1 given
m1 is less than its marginal cost. From Lemma 1.4, the marginal value of signal m2 + 1 is
even smaller when Worker 1 is producing m1 + 1 signals. Hence, Worker 2 will never agree
to a joint increase. Second, Step 5 can effect the outcome only if MV (m + 1; m + 1, ρ) >
MV (m + 1; m, ρ) since, if not, Worker 1 should have increased her number of signals in Step
3.
Step 6 can affect the final outcome only if f (m1 + 1, m2 − 1, ρ) + c(m1 + 1) − c(m1 ) <
f (m1 , m2 , ρ) and f (m1 , m2 , ρ) + c(m2 ) − c(m2 − 1) > f (m1 + 1, m2 − 1, ρ). These inequalities
are satisfied only if
2f (m1 + 1, m2 − 1, ρ) < 2f (m1 , m2 , ρ),
since c satisfies increasing marginal costs. The above expression holds only if ρ > 0.
1.7.8.8

Proof Proposition 1.6

We first show that the algorithm finds a Nash equilibrium by arguing that no worker has an
incentive to deviate. Partition the algorithm into three sections. In the first section, possibly
with zero iterations, both workers strictly increase the number of signals they produce. In
the second section, Worker 1 strictly increases the number of signals she produces while
Worker 2 weakly decreases them. In the third section, corresponding to Steps 5 and 6, both
workers decide simultaneously whether or not to deviate.
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In the first section, Worker 1 does not want to weakly decrease after both workers increase.
By symmetry, Worker 2’s incentive to increase her number of signals by one is the same as
Worker 1’s incentive to decrease her number of signals by one. Denote t 0 as the period in
which the first section ends.
In the second section, Worker 1 never wants to decrease her number of signals when Worker
2 decreases her number of signals in the previous period. The proof of Lemma 1.4 implies
that the benefit of a signal decreases in the number of signals of the other worker. Therefore,
the marginal benefit of the last signal by Worker 1 is larger than what it was before. Denote
t 00 as the period in which the second section ends.
In the third section, no worker wants to deviate as deviations must, by definition, be
mutually beneficial. Finally, note that during the whole procedure Worker 1 is always
increasing her number of signals. By Lemma 1.2, we know that we cannot alternate between
steps 5 and 6. Then, Lemma 1.4 implies that the procedure cannot go beyond iteration M̄.
Therefore, times t 0 and t 00 are well defined and the algorithm finds a Nash equilibrium.
To see the outcome selected is a PEN, note that the only profitable deviations left to
consider after t 00 are those in which Worker 1 decreases and Worker 2 increases. But Worker
1 and Worker 2 will only want to deviate jointly if they can coordinate and produce more
information, or if redundancy of information implies a profitable deviation to an asymmetric
equilibrium. Both deviations are accounted for in Step 5 and Step 6. Uniqueness and
symmetry follow from construction.
1.7.8.9

Proof of Proposition 1.7

For a given ρ, we consider three possible cases:
1. (Case 1) All PEN (m1 , m2 ) are such that |m1 − m2 | ≥ 2.
2. (Case 2) There is a PEN (m1 , m2 ) such that |m1 − m2 | ≥ 2 and a PEN (m10 , m20 ) such
that |m10 − m20 | ≤ 2
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3. (Case 3) There is no PEN (m1 , m2 ) such that |m1 − m2 | ≥ 2.
In each case, we show that the following two properties hold:
1. (Property 1) If ρ0 > ρ and m1 ∈ M1 (ρ), then there is a m10 ∈ M1 (ρ0 ) such that m10 ≥ m1 .
If ρ0 > ρ and m2 ∈ M2 (ρ), then there is a m20 ∈ M2 (ρ0 ) such that m20 ≤ m2 .
2. (Property 2) If ρ0 > ρ and m10 ∈ M1 (ρ0 ), then there is a m1 ∈ M1 (ρ) such that m1 ≥ m10 .
If ρ0 > ρ and m20 ∈ M2 (ρ0 ), then there is a m2 ∈ M2 (ρ) such that m2 ≤ m20 .
The following claim states that Property 1 holds in Case 1 and 2. Let mi (ρ) denote a PEN
strategy for Worker i given a correlation ρ.
Claim 1.1. Suppose that (m1 (ρ), m2 (ρ)) is a PEN with |m1 (ρ) − m2 (ρ)| ≥ 2. Then for any
ρ0 > ρ there is a PEN (m1 (ρ0 ), m2 (ρ0 )) such that m1 (ρ0 ) ≥ m1 (ρ) and m2 (ρ0 ) ≤ m2 (ρ).
Proof. Let (m1 (ρ), m2 (ρ)) be a PEN such that |m1 (ρ) − m2 (ρ)| ≥ 2. Without loss of generality, assume that m1 (ρ) > m2 (ρ). Now, start the Sequential Research Response Algorithm
by initializing (m10 , m20 ) = (m1 (ρ), m2 (ρ)) and fixing ρ0 > ρ. We only need to prove that
Worker 2 does not want to deviate up, since Lemma 1.6 implies Worker 1 does not want to
deviate down.
The fact that the equilibrium is asymmetric for correlation ρ implies that ρ > ρ̂(m1 (ρ), γ).
We only need to prove that ρ̃(m1 (ρ), m1 (ρ) − k, γ) < ρ̂(m1 (ρ), γ); if this inequality holds,
the marginal benefit of increasing from m1 (ρ) − k to m1 (ρ) − k + 1 is larger at ρ than at ρ0 .
Let t = m1 (ρ). From the proof of Lemma 1.8 we know that

ρ̂(t,γ)
∂γ

> 0 and a straightforward

calculation from the definition of ρ̂(m, γ) shows that limγ→0 ρ̂(2, γ) =

∂ ρ̂(t,γ)
∂t

=

Then, ρ̂(t, γ) ≥

−2+4(γ−1+2t)

√

(γ−1+2t)2 −4γ

Finally,

−1

∝ −1 + √ 2(γ−1+2t)
2

2γ

−1
3

−1
3 .

(γ−1+2t) −4γ

for any t ≥ 2 and γ.
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> −1 + 2 > 0.

The quadratic equation 1 − 5a + 4a2 is negative for a < 1. Plugging in a =

(t−1)(t−2)
(t+γ)2

gives,

(t + γ)4 + 4((t − 1)(t − 2))2 > 5(t − 1)(t − 2)(t + γ)2 ⇔ ρ̃(t, t − 2, γ) < − 13 .

Since ρ̃(t, t − k, γ) is decreasing in k we conclude that for any t ≥ k, k ≥ 2 and γ,
ρ̃(t, t − k, γ) < ρ̂(t, γ).

The following claim implies that Property 1 is satisfied for case 3.
Claim 1.2. Suppose, for some ρ, there is a PEN (m1 , m2 ) in which |m1 − m2 | = k. Then,
there cannot be another PEN (m10 , m20 ) in which |m10 − m20 | = k + 1. Hence, if for ρ there
is a unique PEN (m1 , m2 ) with absm1 − m2 < 2, for ρ00 < ρ there must be a unique PEN
(m100 , m200 ) such that |m100 − m200 | < 2 and m100 ≤ m1 .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that m1 > m2 . Towards contradiction, consider
another PEN (m10 , m20 ) in which |m10 − m20 | = k +1. Then, either m10 = m1 +1 or m20 = m2 −1,
but not both.
Suppose m10 = m1 + 1. If both (m1 , m2 ) and (m10 , m20 ) are Nash equilibria, it means that
Worker 1 is indifferent between both of them. But Worker 2 strictly prefers (m10 , m20 ), so
(m1 , m2 ) cannot be a PEN.
If instead m20 = m2 − 1 and both profiles are Nash equilibria, Worker 2 is indifferent but
Worker 1 strictly prefers (m1 , m2 ), so (m10 , m20 ) cannot be a PEN.
At ρ, if there is a unique equilibrium in which |m1 (ρ) − m2 (ρ)| < 2, then for any lower
correlation there is a unique equilibrium in which |m1 (ρ) − m2 (ρ)| < 2. This follows from a
contradiction argument using Claim 5.
To conclude, notice that we can find the unique equilibrium by using the Sequential Research
Response Algorithm. Since by Lemma 1.6 the marginal value of a signal for the leader
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is strictly increasing in ρ, the algorithm stops earlier for a lower correlation and hence,
m100 ≤ m1 .
The following claim implies Property 2 holds in Case 1 since, for a given ρ, (m1 , m2 ) and
(m10 , m20 ) such that m1 > m10 and m2 > m20 cannot both be PEN.
Claim 1.3. Suppose that for ρ the most symmetric PEN (m1 , m2 ) is such that |m1 −m2 | ≥ 2.
Then for ρ0 > ρ the most symmetric equilibrium, (m10 , m20 ), is such that m10 ≥ m1 and
m20 ≤ m2 .
Proof. Suppose for ρ, (m1 , m2 ) with m1 − m2 ≥ 2 is the most symmetric PEN. Then, it can
be found using the Sequential Research Response Algorithm. We only need to prove that
for ρ0 > ρ the algorithm takes at least as many iterations.
We will show first that ρ > 0. Take ρ̄ ≤ 0. Suppose that when applying the algorithm
with correlation ρ̄, the follower stops increasing the number of signals at iteration s. First,
m2s = s − 1, since

f (s, s − 2, ρ̄) − f (s, s − 1, ρ̄) ≥ f (s − 1, s − 1, ρ̄) − f (s, s − 1, ρ̄) ⇔

2
1+ρ̄

≥ 2.

where the inequality holds since ρ̄ ≤ 0. This implies that if Worker 1 wants to increase to
s signals, then Worker 2 wants to keep at least s − 1 signals. Second, Worker 1 is going to
stop at iteration s + 1, since his marginal value of taking signal s + 1 is smaller than that
of Worker 2 of increasing to s signals:

f (s, s − 1, ρ̄) − f (s, s, ρ̄) ≥ f (s, s − 1, ρ̄) − f (s + 1, s − 1, ρ̄) ⇔

2
1+ρ̄

≥ 2.

Since by Lemma 1.2 the last step of the algorithm can be only applied for positive correlations, we conclude that ρ > 0.
We know that ρ̃(t, n, γ) ≤ 0 for all t, n ≤ t − 1 and γ. This means that for any step in the
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algorithm the marginal value of the follower is larger when facing correlation ρ than when
facing correlation ρ0 . Then, for each iteration s, m2s (ρ) ≥ m2s (ρ0 ). But this implies, by the
proof of Lemma 1.4, that the marginal value of a signal for the leader at each iteration is
larger when facing correlation ρ0 . Hence, m1s (ρ) ≤ m1s (ρ0 ).
If Worker 1 does not want to continue increasing her number of signals unilaterally at the
same iteration when facing correlations ρ and ρ0 , Lemma 1.2 implies that they can only
increase the asymmetricity of the outcome when the correlation is ρ0 .

Finally, the following claim implies that Property 2 is satisfied in Cases 2 and 3.
Claim 1.4. Suppose for ρ the most symmetric equilibrium is such that |m1 − m2 | = 1. If
for ρ0 > ρ the most symmetric equilibrium is such that |m10 − m20 | = 1 then m1 ≤ m10 and
m2 ≥ m20 .
Proof. Suppose m10 < m1 , so m20 < m2 . Lemma 1.6 and the proof of Lemma 1.4 imply that
MV (m10 ; m20 , ρ0 ) > MV (m1 + 1; m2 , ρ), so both profiles cannot be equilibria, a contradiction.
Therefore, m10 ≥ m1 .
If m10 = m1 , by assumption it has to be that m20 = m2 and we are done. Suppose m10 > m1 ,
so m20 > m2 . If these are equilibria it has to be that MV (m1 + 1; m20 , ρ0 ) > MV (m1 + 1; m2 , ρ)
contradicting Lemma 1.6 and the proof of Lemma 1.4. Therefore, m20 ≤ m2 .
1.7.8.10

Proof Proposition 1.8

After every history ht−1 each worker knows the posterior variance of θ, which we denote
σ t (ht−1 ). We define three automaton states: WN , WD1 , WD2 . WN is the state at which no
worker deviates, WD1 is the state at which Worker 1 is the last deviator, and WD2 is the
state at which Worker 2 is the last deviator. Consider the strategy profile
(
si (h

t−1

)=

1 if mi (σ t (ht−1 )) ≥ T − t
0 otherwise
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,

where mi (σ t (ht−1 )) is the most symmetric equilibrium given σ t (ht−1 ) and m1 (σ t (ht−1 )) ≥
m2 (σ t (ht−1 )). Off the path of play choose any Nash equilibrium of the Subgame. Make the
last worker that has deviated from the prescribed strategy profile take the largest number
of signals implied by this Nash equilibrium.
To see why no worker has an incentive to deviate, notice if Worker 1 does not produce a
signal when she is prescribed to do so, then she can never produce as many signals as she
was initially prescribed. But as |m1 − m2 | < 2, Worker 2 cannot compensate for Worker 1’s
deviation. As Worker 1 prefers to produce m1 instead of m1 − 1 signals in the simultaneous
game, she has no incentive to deviate. A similar argument applies for Worker 2.
1.7.8.11

Proof Proposition 1.9

Suppose ri > rj . Then, the marginal value of ri for Worker i is,
σ −2
(rj (γij − 1) + ri )σ −2 + σθ−2

2

and the marginal of rj for Worker j is,
(γij − 1)σ −2
(rj (γij − 1) + ri )σ −2 + σθ−2

2 .

If γij < 2, there is a corner solution in which rj = 0. Given rj , i’s best-response is ri =
q
σ2
σ2
d − σ2 .
θ

If γij = 2, the marginal value of a signal is the same for both workers. Optimally, each
chooses r so that the marginal value equals the marginal cost. Since any investment division
between the workers does not affect the marginal output, any profile (ri , rj ) such that ri +rj =
q
σ2
σ2
d − σ 2 is an equilibrium.
θ

If γij > 2, it cannot be the case that ri > rj since the marginal benefit for Worker j is strictly
larger and both workers face the same marginal cost. Hence, all equilibria are symmetric.
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For (r , r ) to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that:
σ −2
(rj (γij − 1) + ri )σ −2 + σθ−2

≤ d,

2
ri =rj

and,
(γij − 1)σ −2
(rj (γij − 1) + ri )σ −2 + σθ−2

≥ d.

2
ri =rj

The only PEN is the profile in which r = ri = rj is maximized and satisfies the previous
constraints. Hence, the second inequality binds. Re-arranging yields the equation stated in
the Proposition.
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CHAPTER 2 : Selling Data
Carlos Segura-Rodriguez

2.1. Introduction
Consumer data is valuable to economic agents that want to forecast an unobservable consumer characteristic. Consider a firm that plans to introduce a new product to the market.
The firm can either send advertisements to all consumers or target those who are more
likely to buy the new product. A targeted marketing campaign is effective only if the firm
can identify accurately which consumers will react positively to its marketing efforts. As
another example, consider a politician who wants to win an election. Sending personalized
messages to undecided voters, in which the candidate explains how his/her promises can
fulfill the voters’ expectations, might be effective. To implement this strategy, the politician
needs to identify the undecided voters and their expectations.
Due to the ease of gathering information from electronic commerce and online surfing, a
new industry that specializes in collecting consumer data has emerged. This is a billion
dollar and growing business, controlled by a small number of large data brokers.1 These
data brokers have collected a large amount of information about millions of consumers, and
according to the Federal Trade Commission (2014), most of these brokers do not directly
sell the data they have collected; instead, they either sell internally produced analyses or
provide buyers with consumer ”scores.” These scores can refer, for example, to how likely
a consumer is to make a purchase.
I study how monopolist data brokers (sellers) with access to consumer data can maximize
profits by presenting and selling that data in an environment in which they lack information
about buyers’ motives to buy the data. The key novel issue in this environment is that
different presentations of the data, which I called statistics, act as imperfect substitutes.
Consider the problem of selling data to a coffee shop and a restaurant, each of which
wants to advertise only to those consumers with high willingness to pay for a coffee or a
1

According to Marr (2017), the main data brokers are Acxiom, Nielsen, Experian, Equifax and Corelogic.
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lunch, respectively. Some observable characteristics might be useful for forecasting unknown
variables that are relevant to both businesses. For instance, a consumer with a higher income
might be willing to pay more for both coffee and a lunch. In that case, the forecast of a
consumer’s willingness to pay for a lunch might help the coffee shop owner to make an
informed decision by using that same information to draw inferences about the consumer’s
willingness to pay for a coffee. I study how sellers (data brokers) should optimally produce
adequate statistics for each product and charge prices for each statistic such that buyers
purchase the statistics targeted to the products they want to advertise.
In my model, a random vector θ represents the set of consumer characteristics the buyer
might want to forecast. The buyers are different in two dimensions: the unknown consumer
characteristic they want to forecast and the value that they place on information. Each
buyer wants to forecast only one of the components of θ and faces a quadratic loss function
that is weighted by how valuable this information is for her. There is a seller, who does
not know the buyer type, but who can access data about some other observable consumer
characteristics. I assume that the seller can commit to a mechanism before observing the
realization of the data.2 While the data is observed only by the seller, the seller and the
buyer share a common prior about the joint distribution of all consumer characteristics,
observable or not. I assume that this joint distribution is elliptical, following the usual
practice in applied work. I show that the seller should optimally offer only mechanisms
in which the statistics are linear combinations of the data and independent noise. The
argument, which I believe is novel in economics, depends crucially on the existence of
conflict between the seller and the buyers in the designing environment.3
My model leads to a mechanism design problem in which the buyer’s preferences are multidimensional, the seller needs to design multiple products, and the ranking of the buyer’s
2

The commitment assumption is satisfied if, for example, the seller can publish menus only in discrete
periods of time, but new consumer data arrives continuously.
3
As some examples in the literature show (see, for example, Witsenhausen (1968)), using only linear
statistics is not always optimal in the absence of conflict between players, even when the joint distribution
of all variables is normal.
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payoffs is nonlinear. In the literature there is no general solution for this class of problem. I
study a novel example where all of the properties just indicated are inherent to the economic
environment, and I characterize the main properties satisfied by the optimal mechanism.
To better understand the problem, in Section 2.4.1 I characterize the optimal mechanism for
when there are only two information types who share a common valuation type. The main
property of the optimal mechanism is that the offered statistics are less correlated than they
would be if the seller could perfectly price discriminate. Without introducing independent
noise, the seller degrades the statistic targeted to the mimicked type by relatively decreasing
the weights assigned to the variables that are more informative for the mimicking type,
affecting the mimicking type more than the mimicked type. Although these coefficients
are reduced, they are generically different from zero; that is, the seller does not create
differentiation by selling a set of variables to one type and a different set of variables to
another type. Furthermore, the mimicked type always receives a statistic that is informative
for her.4,5
In section 2.4.2, I consider the more general problem in which there are two information
types, and for each of them there is a continuum of valuation types. When fixing an
information type, the problem that the seller faces is the problem studied by Myerson (1981).
But the difficulty in my environment comes from the extra IC constraints across information
types. Since the buyer’s payoffs are nonlinear, I cannot use Myerson’s differential approach
to deal with them, and instead I use a direct method to find the optimal mechanism.
The solution to the relaxed problem without the IC constraints across-information types is
simple. It consists of two take-it-or-leave-it offers for a statistic that for each information
type is equivalent to receiving all the data. In the general problem, the solution is more
involved. The seller offers to the type paying the highest price in the relaxed problem two
4
This contrasts with the results of the literature in quality degradation, where it is always possible to find
parameters such that a type is excluded from the mechanism. The reason for this is that in my environment
the ranking of payoffs is product dependent.
5
I use masculine pronouns for the seller (data broker) and feminine pronouns for the buyer (firm).
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statistics: a statistic that is equivalent to receiving all data targeted to high valuation types
and another less informative statistic targeted to an intermediate range of valuation types.
The novelty is that this less informative statistic can be produced by either introducing independent noise or by reducing the coefficients in the variables that are more informative for
the other information type. To the information type paying the lowest price in the relaxed
problem, the seller offers either a unique statistic or a continuum of degraded statistics. In
both cases, the statistics are degraded by reducing the coefficients in the variables that are
more informative for the first information type.
When considering many information types, I cannot solve completely for the optimal mechanism since I cannot identify ex-ante which IC constraints are relevant. There are two
reasons for this. First, reducing the price of the statistic targeted to one information type
might provoke an incentive problem in which another type will want to mimic the first
one. Second, changing the coefficients of the statistic targeted to an information type might
make the modified statistic too informative for another type. I provide examples that show
these complications and how they affect the optimal mechanism.
In spite of these issues, I partially characterize the optimal mechanism and show that the
properties that I have highlighted are still satisfied with a caveat: even when there is only
one valuation type, there might be some types that are excluded from the mechanism and
do not receive any useful information. Furthermore, I show that at least one type will
receive a statistic that for her is equivalent to receiving all of the data. But this type
does not necessarily coincide with the type with the highest willingness to pay for all the
data, as would be the case if there were only two information types. This generalizes
the nondistortion at the top condition that appears in environments where the payoffs are
linear.6
6
For the unidimensional case, see for example, Mussa and Rosen (1978), while Rochet and Choné (1998)
shows that a similar condition is satisfied in the multidimensional case.
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2.1.1. Literature Review
My paper contributes to a growing body of literature that studies the optimal ways in
which a monopolist can sell information. The work that comes closest to my approach is
Bergemann et al. (2018). They study an environment in which the seller knows perfectly
the realization of a random variable that can take a finite number of values, and in which
all buyer types want to match the realization of the same unknown random variable. The
types differ in their prior, so that each type willingness to pay for a signal depends on how
informative the signal is for different realizations of the state. In contrast, I consider the
problem in which the monopolist has multidimensional data that is informative, though
not necessarily perfectly revealing, about a random vector. In my model, the types share
the same prior, but each type wants to reduce the variance associated with only one of
the random variables, and therefore they are interested in different features of the data.
This new approach addresses some novel questions. I am able to study the optimal way to
degrade the quality of the information in each of the dimensions of the data and consider
whether or not the monopolist is better off giving only a subset of the data to certain
buyers. To answer these questions, I analyze a simplified environment. Instead of studying
any discrete distribution and payoff function for the buyer, I restrict the focus to cases in
which the joint distribution of the data and states is elliptical and the buyer weights the
goodness-of-fit of its forecast according to a quadratic loss function.7
There are a few other papers that have studied similar problems in which one agent buys
information from another one. In an environment without private information, Bergemann
and Bonatti (2015) have studied the problem of selling information when the market for it is
competitive and the seller of information can only sell signals that reveal perfectly one of the
states. Yang (2018) considers an environment in which the data broker reveals information
to the consumers about their valuations for a good. However, the data broker charges
the sellers of goods for this information. In this environment the data brokers’ optimal
7

In Appendix 2.6.1, I show that when the monopolist is interested in forecasting the intercept of a linear
demand function, the implied loss is quadratic.
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strategy is to reveal perfectly the consumers’ willingness to pay when the consumers have
low valuations and pool all the high valuation consumers. This way the sellers of goods can
sell to all of their best clients. Babaioff et al. (2012) consider a problem where both the
seller and the buyer have private information about one distinct state, but the buyer’s payoff
function depends on both of them. Assuming that the outcome of the mechanism can depend
on the signal observed by the seller, they study the conditions under which the revelation
principle holds, and they find algorithms that approximate the optimal mechanism.
The problem I study is technically related to the literature on multidimensional mechanism design (see, for example, Armstrong (1996); Thanassoulis (2004); Manelli and Vincent
(2006); Daskalakis et al. (2017)). While this literature normally assumes that a buyer may
want to buy multiple products, and the products are fixed, in my environment each type
strictly prefers a unique product, and I allow the monopolist to design the products he will
offer. By designing the products, the data broker makes sure that out of the many partially
substitutable products, the buyer buys the product specifically targeted to her.
In this sense, my paper is related to the literature that considers the problem of selling
substitutable goods. The problem I study reduces to a problem analogous to a discrete
version (see Vohra (2011)) of a problem solved by Wilson (1993)—except that the payoff
is nonlinear in my environment, while in his is linear—with a completely different solution.
In a linear two-goods environment, Pavlov (2011) has shown that the optimal mechanism
involves lotteries that either assign one of the two goods with probability 1 or assign none
of the goods to the buyer. Balestrieri et al. (2015) show in a Hotelling-type model, in
which there are two goods located on the extremes of a line and the consumers face a
transportation cost, that even in a unidimensional environment the optimal mechanism
may involve lotteries depending on the shape of the transportation cost function.
Finally, when the data broker designs the statistics he wants to offer, he chooses the quality
of each type’s inference. A similar problem has been studied before in the literature on
quality degradation (see, for example, Mussa and Rosen (1978); Maskin and Riley (1984))
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and product design (see, for example, Anderson and Celik (2015)). In these branches of
literature, it is normally assumed that the preferences are unidimensional and that the
ranking of buyer types, in terms of their willingness to pay, is product independent. In my
multidimensional environment, the ranking of types according to their valuations is statistic
dependent, in the sense that statistics that are considered to be of high quality by some
types are considered to be of bad quality by others.

2.2. Model
Data brokers sell consumer data to firms. I study how a monopolist data broker, who
wants to maximize profits, should present and sell the consumer data he can access when
he is uncertain about the buyer’s motives for purchasing the data. By assuming that each
consumer’s characteristics come from the same distribution, I focus on the problem of selling
data about a representative consumer.
The data broker has access to some observable variables about a consumer x = (x1 , ... , xk ) ∈
Rk that are potentially relevant for the firm to estimate an unknown consumer’s characteristic in the set θ = (θ1 , θ2 , ... , θn ). I represent the firm’s preferences by a two-dimensional
type. The first component is one of n possible information types: t1 , ... , tn ; the second
component is a valuation type v that can take any value in an interval [vi , v̄i ]. This interval
¯
might depend on the first component. Type (ti , v )’s forecast loss is equal to
−vE [(θi − a)2 ];

that is, type (ti , v ) is interested in making an accurate forecast of the consumer’s characteristic θi and faces a quadratic loss function that is weighted, according to how valuable the
estimation is for her, by v .8 Since acquiring information allows the firm to make a better
forecast, the firm is willing to buy all, a part of, or a summary of the data available to the
data broker. I assume that the firm’s global payoff is quasilinear in money; it is equal to
8
In Appendix 2.6.1, I prove that when a monopolist is uncertain about the intercept of a linear demand,
his optimal decisions lead to a profit loss that is quadratic with respect to the forecast of the intercept that
the monopolist uses in his decision-making process.
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the forecast loss minus the price she pays for the information.
The data broker faces the issue that he does not know the firm’s type, so he cannot first order
price discriminate. The data broker assigns probability αi to the firm being information type
ti and believes that the valuation type is distributed, conditional on the information type
being ti , according to an absolutely continuous distribution G (v | ti ) that admits a density
g (v | ti ). I assume that the data broker, before knowing the data realization, can commit to
a selling mechanism and look for the incentive-compatible and ex-ante individually rational
direct mechanism that maximizes the broker’s profit. I endow the data broker with a zeromean random variable  that is independent of X and θ and that allows him to flexibly
lessen the informativeness of the data statistics he offers. In this environment, a direct
mechanism is a pair (ψ, p), such that if the firm reports type (ti , v ), she receives a statistic
of the data and noise ψ(ti , v ) : Rk+1 → Rm and pays a price p(ti , v ) ∈ R.
The firm has a prior over θ, denoted by Fθ , and believes that the random variable X is
distributed, conditional on θ, according to FX |θ . This information environment is common
knowledge to both the data broker and the firm.
In Figure 2.1 I summarize the timing in the model. The data broker commits to a direct
mechanism before knowing the realization of the data. After this, nature draws the random
vector θ and the data X according to the distribution F(X ,θ) . When the firm reports her
type, the data broker provides her with the data transformation he promised at the price
he committed to in the mechanism. Once the firm has observed this extra information, she
makes a forecast.
Broker commits to
mechanism (ψ, p)

Nature
draws (θ, X )

Broker delivers data
Firm reveals transformation ψ(ti , v )(X ) Firm chooses
type (ti , v )
and charges p(ti , v )
forecast a

Figure 2.1: Timing in the model.
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2.2.1. Distribution Restriction
The model that I have specified is too general to generate meaningful conclusions. I restrict
the model by assuming that the joint distribution of (X , θ, ) is elliptical and has finite
second moments; the covariance matrix of the vector X , Var (X ), is positive definite; and
Var () = σ 2 > 0.
Assumption 2.1. The joint distribution of (X , θ, ) is elliptical with finite second moments.
Some multivariate elliptical distributions with finite second moments are the multivariate
normal distribution, the multivariate t-student distribution, the multivariate symmetric
Laplace distribution, the multivariate logistic distribution, and the multivariate symmetric
hyperbolic distribution. While this assumption restricts the set of distributions that I
consider, it is general enough to include distributions that are skewed or leptokurtic, and
distributions for which zero covariance is different from independence.
The distinct characteristic of an elliptical distribution is that the iso-density plot for a
two-dimensional random vector is an ellipse (and a generalization of an ellipse for higher
dimensions). An example is presented in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: General shape of probability density function for an Elliptical distribution.
This family of distributions satisfies two properties that are important for my purposes.
First, for any elliptical distribution, the conditional expectation is linear; second, the linear
combination of elliptical distributions is an elliptical distribution. The proof of the following
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claim can be found in Fang et al. (1990).
Claim 2.1. Suppose the joint distribution of (X , Y ) is jointly elliptical. Then
1. E [Y | X ] is linear in X , and
2. any linear transformation of (X , Y ), A(X , Y ), is elliptical.
These properties of the elliptical distributions are important for my analysis since they imply
that when the seller offers a linear statistic of the data, the buyer’s conditional expectation
after observing such a statistic is linear. I show in Theorem 2.1 that under this restriction,
it is optimal for the seller to only offer linear statistics. This result helps to simplify my
analysis.

2.3. Value of Information
I start the analysis by calculating the maximum price that type (ti , v ) is willing to pay for
any statistic ψ. Since the firm utility is quadratic, the optimal forecast for type (ti , v ) is the
conditional expectation of θi given ψ. With this forecast, type (ti , v ) suffers an expected
loss equal to the negative of the expected conditional variance of θi given ψ times v .9
Claim 2.2. Given that the data broker provides the firm with a statistic ψ(x), type (ti , v )’s
optimal forecast is a∗ = E(θi | ψ(x)), and type (ti , v ) suffers an ex-ante expected loss equal
to
−v EX [Var (θi | ψ(x))].

I can use this result to formally define what incentive compatibility and individual rationality mean in my environment. Because types are two-dimensional, I need to consider the
possibility that a buyer lies about her information and/or valuation type. I say that the
mechanism (ψ, p) is incentive compatible (IC) if
−v EX [Var (θi | ψ(ti , v ))] − p(ti , v ) ≥ −v 0 EX [Var (θi | ψ(tj , v 0 ))] − p(tj , v 0 ) ∀(ti , v ), (tj , v 0 ),
9

The proof of Claim 2.2 and all others that are not in the main text can be found in Appendix 2.6.2.
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and it is individually rational (IR) if

−v EX [Var (θi | ψ(ti , v ))] − p(ti , v ) ≥ −vVarFθ (θi ) ∀(ti , v ).

These constraints have two distinct properties that make them slightly different from those
in the problems previously studied in the literature. First, in the IC constraint two possible
deviations are embedded: The first deviation is the usual one that the buyer can misreport
her type. Furthermore, when the buyer does this, she can use the statistic received to make
a forecast about the variable she is interested in, which might not coincide with the variable
that the statistic was targeted to. The second property is that the right-hand side of the IR
constraint is not the same across types, since when the buyer does not buy any information,
her best forecast is her prior expectation, resulting in an expected loss equal to the negative
of her prior variance times her valuation type.
By reordering the IR constraint, it is possible to conclude that the maximum that type
(ti , v ) is willing to pay is v times the reduction in the variance that type (ti , v ) can achieve
by buying the statistic that is targeted to her. Therefore, in this environment, the buyer’s
only interest is to reduce her forecast variance.
With this in mind I can show in Theorem 2.1 that in this environment it is optimal for the
seller to only sell linear statistics. When none of the IC constraints bind, the argument is
trivial since the seller will want to target to each type the conditional expectation of the
variable the firm is interested in, and by Claim 2.1 this conditional expectation is linear.
The significant part of the result, and to some extent a surprising one, is that even when
some IC constraints bind, the seller is still better off only offering linear statistics, even
though they do not necessarily coincide with the conditional expectation.
The proof of the theorem, which was inspired by the argument in one of the examples in
Basar (2008), consists of two steps. In the first step, by an argument similar to the one in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), I show that no loss results from considering mechanisms
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in which the seller offers forecasts that are followed by the buyer. In the second step, I
consider a simultaneous zero-sum game between the seller and a fictitious player. In this
game the payoff function is equal to the seller’s profits in a mechanism, and the conflict
arises from the seller choosing statistics to maximize his profits while the fictitious player
chooses updating rules to minimize any type’s posterior variance when observing the statistic
targeted to another type. I show that in the unique saddle-point of this zero-sum game the
seller offers linear statistics and the fictitious player uses linear updating rules. The optimal
mechanism corresponds to the seller’s saddle-point strategy, which completes the argument.
The existence of conflict between the two players is crucial for this argument: Witsenhausen
(1968) introduced an example without conflict between two players in which linear statistics
and updating rules are not always optimal.
Theorem 2.1. In the optimal mechanism, the seller only offers statistics that are linear
combinations of the data and independent noise; that is, the seller targets to each type a
statistic of the form ψ(ti , v ) = L(ti , v )T x +`(ti , v ) ∈ R, where L(ti , v ) ∈ Rk and `(ti , v ) ∈ R.
Since Theorem 2.1 implies that it is optimal for the seller to offer a mechanism in which
all statistics are linear combinations of the data and independent noise, I start the analysis
in Lemma 2.1 by calculating the reduction of θi ’s forecast error variance when type (ti , v )
receives a linear statistic.
Lemma 2.1. θi ’s forecast error variance reduction when observing a non-null linear combination of the data and noise, LT X + `, corresponds to
(LT Cov (θi , X ))2
.
LT Var (X )L + `2 σ 2

Furthermore, Claim 2.2 implies that type (ti , v )’s willingness to pay for a statistic is maximized when she observes the conditional expectation of θi given X . If the data broker were
not facing any feasibility constraints, he would sell these statistics to the firm. The following
lemma shows the conditional expectation of θi given X and the maximum reduction of θi ’s
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forecast error variance for any data set.
Lemma 2.2. The conditional expectation of θi given X is
E (θi | X ) = E (θi ) + Cov (θi , X )T Var (X )−1 (X − E [X ]),

and the maximum θi ’s forecast error variance reduction that can be achieved with data X
equals
Cov (θi , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ).

Therefore, type (ti , v )’s maximum willingness to pay is vCov (θi , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ).
This formula is not very helpful for understanding how much type (ti , v ) is willing to pay
for a statistic that is not sufficient to learn the conditional expectation of θi given X . I
therefore introduce new terminology that is easier to work with and to interpret. I define
the vector γi ≡ Var (X )−1/2 Cov (θi , X ), which measures how valuable any linear statistic is
for forecasting θi .10 Consider a linear statistic LT X + ` and let λ = Var (X )1/2 L denote the
transformed vector of coefficients that lives in the same space as γi . Type (ti , v ) is willing
(γ T λ)2

T
T
i
to pay for this statistic the amount v λT λ+`
2 σ 2 . Since γi γi = Var (E [θi | X ]), and γi λ is the

covariance between E [θi | X ] and LT X + `, type (ti , v )’s willingness to pay for this statistic
is proportional to the square of the correlation between E [θi | X ] and the signal. In other
words, type (ti , v ) is willing to pay more for statistics that are more correlated with the
forecast that she would implement if she could observe all the data.
An important special case is the one in which the statistic does not include any independent
noise. In this case the correlation between this statistic and the conditional expectation is
completely determined by the angle between γi and λ. Figure 2.3 represents type (ti , v )’s
willingness to pay for the transformed vector of coefficients λ when her preferred vector is
This vector is well defined since I assumed that Var (X ) is positive definite. Formally, I define Var (x)−1/2
as Var (X )−1/2 = SX 1/2 S T where X 1/2 is the diagonal matrix whose entries are the positive roots of the
eigenvalues of Var (X )−1 and S is an orthogonal matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of Var (X )−1 . All
the results that follow are true as long as I choose a square root of Var (X ) that is invertible.
10
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γi . The distance between the origin and the blue locus represents type (ti , v )’s willingness
to pay for a noiseless linear combination that generates a vector pointing in any particular direction—for example, in the same direction as λ0 . As the angle between these two
vectors increases from 0 to π/2, type (ti , v )’s willingness to pay changes continuously from
vCov (θi , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ) to 0.

Figure 2.3: The distance between the origin and the blue locus represents the willingness
to pay, by type with optimal vector γi , when it receives a noiseless linear combination with
coefficients pointing in that direction.
A similar comparison holds if the linear statistic contains independent noise. However,
adding independent noise reduces proportionally the willingness to pay for any linear statistic, and the slope with respect to the angle becomes flatter.
Overall, type (ti , v ) prefers statistics that have a higher correlation with E [θi | X ] and statistics for which uncorrelated noise accounts for a smaller portion of the statistic variance. The
objective of the rest of the paper is to understand how the data broker designs these linear
statistics to maximize profits when the mechanism must satisfy the IC and IR constraints.
To rule out cases in which two information types want to use the data in exactly the same
way, I assume that no two types have more preferred statistics that are parallel. Technically,
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I assume that no two information types have γ vectors pointing in the same (or opposite)
direction.
Assumption 2.2. For each i, j ∈ {1, ... , n}, i 6= j, and for any k 6= 0, γi 6= kγj .

2.4. Optimal Mechanism with Two Information Types
In this section I provide a complete characterization of the optimal mechanism when there
are only two information types. The general intuition from the previous section is that in
the optimal mechanism the data broker needs to reduce the correlation between the statistic
targeted to any mimicked type and the mimicking type’s preferred statistic. I present the
optimal way in which the seller modifies the statistics he sells to reach this objective for
two distinct cases: a unique common valuation type and a continuum of valuation types for
each of the information types.
2.4.1. A Unique Common Valuation Type
In this subsection I provide a complete characterization of the simplest case in which for each
information type there is a unique valuation type that is common across information types,
and I normalize it to one. This analysis provides insights about the forces that affect the
design of the optimal mechanism in the general case. The main result is that in the optimal
mechanism the data broker, without introducing independent noise, will deteriorate the
quality of the statistic targeted to the mimicked type by distorting the coefficients assigned
to each of the variables in the data in the direction opposite to the one the mimicking type
prefers the most. Though this quality degradation affects both types, it is designed in a
way that affects the mimicking type more than the mimicked type.
Without loss, I assume that γ 1 > γ 2 ;11 that is, type t1 is willing to pay more for all
the data than type t2 is, and that γ1T γ2 > 0.12
First, I introduce some of the properties that the optimal mechanism must satisfy and
11

I use the symbol kk to denote the Euclidean norm of a vector.
If γ1T γ2 < 0, I can always convert the problem to the one in which type t1 measure of information is
given by −γ1 . Lemma 2.1 shows that these problems are equivalent since a rational agent learns exactly the
same when receiving the linear combination LT X and when receiving −LT X .
12

81

that simultaneously simplify the problem. Proposition 2.1 shows that type t1 will receive a
statistic that from the perspective of that firm type is equivalent to observing all the data,
and type t2 will receive zero information rent. These properties are a result of type t1 being
willing to pay more for all the data than what type t2 is willing to pay for it, so that the
data broker can choose a price high enough for all the data such that type t2 never wants
to report type t1 .
The same proposition presents an easy to check condition that characterizes when the
IC constraint for type t1 reporting type t2 binds and when it does not. Intuitively, this
constraint binds only if type t1 can make an accurate guess about E [θ1 | X ] from observing
E [θ2 | X ]. As was pointed out in the previous section, this depends on the correlation
between the two conditional expectations or, equivalently, on the angle between γ1 and
γ2 . If they are perfectly correlated, type t1 can learn the same amount from observing
either of the two and will buy the cheapest one. If they are conditionally independent,
the IC constraint will never bind since type t1 cannot learn anything about E [θ1 | X ] from
observing E [θ2 | X ]. Proposition 2.1 shows that the IC constraint for type t1 reporting
type t2 binds if and only if the vectors γ1 and γ2 point in a similar direction, while γ1 ’s
magnitude is large relative to γ2 ’s magnitude. This means that the IC constraint for type
t1 reporting type t2 binds if and only if both types are interested in similar features of the
data, but one type is willing to pay substantially more for all the data than the other one.
Finally, Proposition 2.1 states that in the optimal mechanism the data broker offers statistics
that do not contain any independent noise. Modifying the direction of the statistic targeted
to type t2 is more efficient than adding independent noise to it; adding independent noise
reduces proportionally the willingness to pay of both types, while modifying the direction
of the signal targeted to type t2 in the direction opposite to type t1 ’s preferred direction
affects type t1 more than type t2 .13
13
The analysis in Section 2.4.2 present an instance in which adding independent noise is one of the ways,
though not the only one, in which the optimal mechanism can be implemented.
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Proposition 2.1. In the optimal mechanism, when there are two information types and a
unique common valuation type, it must be the case that
1. type t1 receives a statistic that reduces the variance of θ1 the same amount as observing
data x;
2. type t2 receives zero information rent;
3. the IC constraint for type t1 reporting type t2 binds if and only if

cos(β) >

kγ2 k
, or equivalently, kγ1 − γ2 k2 < kγ1 k2 − kγ2 k2 ,
kγ1 k

where β is the angle between the vectors γ1 and γ2 ; and
4. the data broker never adds independent noise to any of the statistics.
Proposition 2.1 implies that the data broker’s problem can be simplified to:
α1 p1 + (1 − α1 )

max
p1 ,L2

s.t.

γ1T γ1 − p1 ≥

2
(LT
2 Cov (θ2 ,X ))
T
L2 Var (X )L2

2
(LT
2 Cov (θ1 ,X ))
LT
Var
(X
)L
2
2

−

2
(LT
2 Cov (θ2 ,X ))
LT
Var
(X
)L
2
2

γ1T γ1 − p1 ≥ 0

If the IC constraint for type t1 reporting type t2 does not bind, the optimal mechanism for
the data broker is to offer to each type a distinct statistic that allows them to recover the
conditional expectation they are interested in and charge them the most they are willing
to pay for all the data.14 When the IC constraint for type t1 reporting type t2 binds, the
data broker cannot simultaneously offer all available information to both types while setting
monopolist prices. Since, by Proposition 2.1, adding independent noise is never optimal,
the data broker is left with two possibilities. He can either reduce the price targeted to
type t1 or he can deteriorate the quality of the signal targeted to type t2 by modifying the
coefficients that are used to create the statistic targeted to type t2 . The data broker will
14

Offering only the rough data is never optimal since it allows both types to calculate the conditional
expectation, resulting in each type reporting the type that pays the lowest price.
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optimally weight each of these two possibilities.
If I assume that the IR constraint for type t1 does not bind and that the IC constraint for
type t1 reporting type t2 binds, I can plug in for the value of p1 and obtain a maximization
problem that depends only on the coefficients L2 :


2
2
(LT
(LT
T
2 Cov (θ1 , X ))
2 Cov (θ2 , X ))
max α1 γ1 γ1 −
+
L2
LT
LT
2 Var (X )L2
2 Var (X )L2

Taking the first order condition and solving, I obtain the following equation for the optimal
coefficient vector:
L̃2 = Var (X )−1 (Cov (θ2 , X ) − cCov (θ1 , X )) ,
L̃T Cov (θ ,X )

where c = α1 L̃2T Cov (θ1 ,X ) > 0. This is an implicit equation in both L̃2 and c. Since c is
2

2

the solution to a single variable fixed-point problem, I am able to solve for it in closed
form, which allows me to obtain a closed-form solution for L̃2 .15 The proof presents the
details. In the optimal mechanism, the data broker deteriorates the informativeness of the
statistic targeted to type t2 by obfuscating it in the direction opposite to type t1 ’s preferred
direction. This distortion reduces the correlation between type t1 ’s preferred statistic and
the statistic targeted to type t2 , affecting type t1 more than type t2 .
So far I have assumed that type t1 ’s IR constraint does not bind. This assumption is
satisfied as long as

2
(L̃T
2 Cov (θ1 ,X ))
L̃T
Var
(X
)
L̃
2
2

2
(L̃T
2 Cov (θ2 ,X ))
. In
L̃T
Var
(X
)
L̃
2
2
T
γ (γ −γ )
α < α̃ = γ2T (γ1 −γ2 )
1
2
1

>

this inequality holds if and only if

the proof of Theorem 2.2 I show that
∈ (0, 1). When type t1 ’s IR constraint

binds, the data broker does not have an incentive to distort further the statistic targeted
to type t2 , since he cannot increase the price targeted to type t1 . This implies that the
quality of the statistic targeted to type t2 is never degraded until the point at which type
t2 is willing to pay nothing for it. This contrasts with the literature in quality degradation,
where there is always a distribution over types such that type t2 is offered a quality that
15
The objective function is not globally concave. One of the main steps in the proof shows that there
is a solution to the fixed-point problem for the constant c that is actually a solution to the maximization
problem.
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gives him a null payoff (see, for example, Mussa and Rosen (1978)). This difference comes
from the fact that in my environment the ranking of types according to their valuations is
statistic-dependent, while in the previous literature, it has been normally assumed that the
ranking of types according to their valuations is product-independent. This also implies
that the data broker can extract all the surplus created by the mechanism even when some
of the IC constraints bind, although the surplus created by the mechanism is smaller than
the maximum social surplus.
Theorem 2.2 provides a closed-form solution for the optimal mechanism.
Theorem 2.2. In the case of two information types, the data broker maximizes profits by
offering the mechanism with coefficients L(t1 ) = Var (X )−1 Cov (θ1 , X ) and coefficients
1. L(t2 ) = Var (X )−1 Cov (θ2 , X ) if kγ1 − γ2 k2 ≥ kγ1 k2 − kγ2 k2 ; and
2. L(t2 ) = Var (X )−1 (Cov (θ2 , X ) − cCov (θ1 , X )) if kγ1 − γ2 k2 < kγ1 k2 − kγ2 k2 ;
where c =

q
2
2
kγ2 k2 +α1 kγ1 k2 − (kγ2 k2 +α1 kγ1 k2 ) −4α1 (γ1T γ2 )
2α1 γ1T γ2

, if α < α̃ =

γ2T (γ1 −γ2 )
,
γ1T (γ1 −γ2 )

and c = α̃

otherwise. Furthermore, p(t1 ) = γ1T γ1 in case 1, and it is the value that makes the IC
constraint for type t1 reporting type t2 to hold with equality in case 2, while p(t2 ) is the
value that makes the IR constraint for type t2 to hold with equality.16
The amount of distortion of the statistic targeted to type t2 depends on the value of α1 .
As the probability of facing firm type t1 increases, the data broker wants to reduce the
information rent given to type t1 , and to reach this objective the data broker degrades the
quality of the statistic targeted to type t2 . In terms of the notation in Theorem 2.2, this
means that c is nondecreasing with respect to α1 .
Corollary 1. Suppose that the IC constraint for type t1 reporting type t2 binds. Then the
optimal mechanism satisfies the following properties:
1. the degradation of quality is increasing in α1 ; that is, c is nondecreasing in α1 , and
16

Explicit closed-form solutions for these prices can be found in the proof of the theorem.
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as α1 tends to 0 the data broker almost offers the undistorted statistic to type t2 ; that
is, limα1 →0 c = 0; and
2. the information rent given to type t1 is nonincreasing in α1 , and as α1 tends to 0 the
information rent tends to

(γ1T γ2 )2
γ2T γ2

− γ2T γ2 .

Using the characterization of the optimal mechanism in Theorem 2.2, I can study which
data sets the data broker would like to acquire. . If two data sets are offered to the data
broker at the same cost, he would choose the data set that allows vectors γ1 and γ2 to be
as nearly orthogonal as possible; that is, he would like to acquire data that generates the
smallest correlation between the conditional expectations of θ1 and θ2 given all the data.
The following corollary states precisely the conditions under which the profits of the data
broker are increasing in the angle between the vectors γ1 and γ2 .
Corollary 2. Let π be the optimal profits for some α, γ1 , and γ2 and let 0 < β < π/2 be
the angle between γ1 and γ2 . For any data set that generates γ10 and γ20 with kγ1 k = kγ10 k,
kγ2 k = kγ20 k and β < β 0 ≤ π/2, where β 0 is the angle between γ10 and γ20 , the optimal profits
are larger than or equal to π.
Unfortunately, I cannot directly translate the results in the corollary to a direct comparison between the covariance vectors. First, an uncountable number of statistical models
(covariance matrices of unknown and know consumer characteristics) generate exactly the
same vectors γ1 and γ2 .17 Second, even if I fixed a covariance matrix Var (X ), it is not true
that when two vectors γi and γj are closer to being orthogonal, the corresponding vectors
Cov (θi , X ) and Cov (θj , X ) are also closer to being orthogonal. Figure 2.4 presents such an
example where the vectors γ1 and γ2 are orthogonal (cos 2 (β) = 0) only when the angle
between Cov (θi , X ) and Cov (θj , X ) is strictly smaller than π/2.
17

Fix any positive definite matrix A of dimension 2 × 2 and say that this is the variance of the data X .
Then, by picking Cov (θi , X ) = A1/2 γi , we guarantee that the statistical model exactly generates the vector
γi .
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Figure 2.4: Value of cos 2 (β), with β being the angle between γ1 and γ2 , for
 different

1 0
values of ω, the angle between Cov (θ1 , X ) and Cov (θ2 , X ), when Var (X ) = 0 2 and
Cov (θ1 , X )T = (0.866, 0.5).

2.4.2. A Continuum of Valuation Types
I now proceed to a more general environment in which the buyer has both vertical and
horizontal private information. I still assume there are two information types {t1 , t2 }, but
for each information type there is a continuum of valuation types that are distributed
according to absolutely continuous distributions G (v | t1 ) and G (v | t2 ), with densities
g (v | t1 ) and g (v | t2 ) and supports [v1 , v̄1 ] and [v2 , v̄2 ], respectively.
¯
¯
Since I do not assume any special property relating to the support of these distributions,
the analysis in Section 2.3 implies that it is without loss to assume that kγ1 k = kγ2 k = 1.
This assumption means that for i ∈ {1, 2} the maximum reduction of θi ’s forecast error
variance is equal to 1.
To facilitate comparison with the classical paradigm, I impose the Regularity Condition
that has normally been assumed in the mechanism design literature.
Assumption 2.3. I assume that for each ti , i ∈ {1, 2}, the conditional distribution of
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valuation types, satisfies that
v−

1 − G (v | ti )
g (v | ti )

is nondecreasing in v .
To simplify the notation, I introduce two new notions. I let qiv be the reduction of information type ti ’s forecast error variance when observing the linear combination targeted to
type (ti , v ); that is, qiv =

2
(LT
iv Cov (θi ,X ))
2 σ2 ,
LT
Var
(X
)L
+`
iv
iv
iv

and I let δjiv be the reduction of information type

tj ’s forecast error variance when observing the linear combination targeted to type (ti , v );
that is, δjiv =

max

2
(LT
iv Cov (θj ,X ))
T
2
Liv Var (X )Liv +`iv σ 2

{Liv },{`iv },{piv }

st.

α1

R v̄1
v1
¯

.18 The problem that the seller faces can be rewritten as

p1v f (v | t1 )dv + α2

vqiv − piv ≥ vqiv 0 − piv 0
vqiv − piv ≥ v δijv 0 − pjv 0
vqiv − piv ≥ 0

R v̄1
v1
¯

p2v f (v | t2 )dv

for i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀v , v 0 ∈ [vi , v̄i ]
¯
for i 6= j, ∀v ∈ [vi , v̄i ], v 0 ∈ [vj , v̄j ]
¯
¯
for i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀v ∈ [vi , v̄i ]
¯

(IC iv-iv’)
(IC iv-jv’)
(IR iv).

Except for the constraints IC iv-jv’, the problem looks like two copies of the one studied by
Myerson (1981). This allows me to draw two conclusions that follow almost directly from
his analysis. First, for each i ∈ {1, 2} the constraints IC iv-iv’ and IR iv can be summarized
by an integral condition and a monotonicity condition that are easier to work with. Lemma
2.3 presents the formal statement.19
Lemma 2.3. The constraints IC 1v-1v’, IC 2v-2v’, IR 1v and IR 2v are equivalent to:
1. vqiv − piv = vi qi vi − pi vi +
¯
¯ ¯

Rv
vi
¯

qiw dw for i ∈ {1, 2}.

2. qiv is nondecreasing for i ∈ {1, 2}.
3. vi qi vi − pi vi ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
¯
¯ ¯
18
Remember that type (ti , v ) wants to forecast the stochastic variable θi . Therefore, I can use qiv as a
measure of the quality of the statistic that is targeted to type (ti , v ).
19
I omit the proof of Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.2 since they follow directly from standard arguments
used in Myersonian environments.
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Second, if none of the constraints IC iv-jv’ bind, the problem has a simple solution. The
seller will offer a menu with two packages. Each package is targeted to a specific information
type and contains a take-it-or-leave-it offer for a distinct signal that allows this firm type
to recover the conditional expectation in which she is interested.20 Without loss I assume
that the take-it-or-leave-it price for information type t1 , which I denote by v1∗ , is larger
than the take-it-or-leave-it price for information type t2 , which I denote by v2∗ . Proposition
2.2 formally presents the optimal mechanism for this case and introduces a condition that
establishes when none of the constraints IC iv-jv’ binds, a generalization of the condition
in Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that none of the constraints IC iv-jv’ bind. There exist values
v1∗ > v2∗ such that in the optimal mechanism
(
qiv =

1 if v ≥ vi∗
0 if v < vi∗ ,

and piv = 1qiv =1 vi∗ . Furthermore, none of the constraints IC iv-jv’ bind if and only if
v1∗ cos 2 (β) ≤ v2∗ , where β is the angle between γ1 and γ2 .
From now on I consider the interesting case in which at least some of the constraints
IC iv-jv’ bind. The challenge is that a priori I do not know which of them actually bind.
Furthermore, since the payoffs are nonlinear I cannot apply the results in the literature that
deliver necessary and sufficient conditions that summarize the IC constraints.21 Proceeding
constructively, I characterize the optimal mechanism for the relaxed problem without the
constraints IC 2v-1v’ and argue that its solution is actually the solution to the original
problem.
The next lemma generalizes part of Proposition 2.1. It states that, in the relaxed problem,
20
As pointed out before in footnote 14, offering all rough data to each information type will not be
optimal even in this case, since the seller, in general, wants to offer different take-it-or-leave-it prices to each
information type.
21
In particular the characterization of optimality in Rochet and Choné (1998) does not apply in my
environment since the payoffs are nonlinear.
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as long as the seller wants to sell an informative signal to type (t2 , v ), the signal targeted
to this type cannot contain any independent noise. The reason is similar to what we saw in
the previous case: by modifying the coefficients in the right direction, the seller can create
a larger difference effect in the types’ willingness to pay than he can by adding independent
noise.
Lemma 2.4. In the relaxed problem without the constraints IC 2v-1v’, if q2v 6= 0, `2v = 0.
This lemma allows me to rewrite the relaxed problem as a problem in which the seller
chooses the angles between the statistic targeted to type t2 and the vectors γ1 and γ2 that
represent the preferred statistics of type t1 and type t2 , respectively. Let β2v be the angle
between Var (X )1/2 L2v and γ2 and β be the angle between γ1 and γ2 . Then q2v = cos 2 (β2v )
√
and δ12v = cos 2 (β + β2v ), so that δ12v = g (q2v ) with g (q2v ) = cos 2 (β + cos −1 ( q2v )).22
Furthermore, in the relaxed problem the seller and the buyer are indifferent between any
pair (L1v , `1v ) that produces the same quality q1v .23
Plugging in the prices that are implied by Lemma 2.3, using integration by parts in the
traditional fashion, and denoting U(vi , ti ) = vi qi vi − pi vi , the relaxed problem can be written
¯
¯
¯ ¯
as
(RP)



1−F (v |t1 )
f (v | t1 )dvf (t1 ) − U(v1 , t1 )f (t1 )
q
v
−
1v
v1
f (v |t1 )
{qiv },{U(vi ,ti )}
¯
¯


¯
R v̄2
1−F (v |t2 )
+ v2 q2v v − f (v |t2 ) f (v | t2 )dvf (t2 ) − U(v2 , t2 )f (t2 )
R v¯0
Rv ¯
st.U(v1 , t1 ) + v q1w dw ≥ vg (q2v 0 ) − v 0 q2v 0 + U(v2 , t2 ) + v q2w dw ∀v ∈ [v1 , v̄1 ], v 0 ∈ [v2 , v̄2 ]
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
qiv non-decreasing for i ∈ {1, 2}
max

R v̄1

U(vi , ti ) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
¯
Lemma 2.5 presents two properties that the optimal solution to the relaxed problem must
satisfy. First, the seller must target to types (t1 , v ) with v ≥ v1∗ a statistic that for them
22

In principle I need to make sure that the angle inside the cos is smaller than π/2. However, it is
straightforward to conclude that as long as q2v is positive, the seller does not want to distort the statistic
targeted to type (t2 , v ) beyond the point at which type (t1 , v ) does not obtain any information from observing
this statistic, which happens when the angle is exactly π/2.
23
When I interpret the final solution to the relaxed problem, I will discuss again the multiple mechanisms
that implement the solution.
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is equivalent to observing all the data: the seller has no reason to distort the information
targeted to them since I have ignored the constraints IC 2v-1v’. Second, the problem of
implementing the mechanism presented in Proposition 2.2 is that type v1∗ has an incentive
to mimic type v2∗ . To reduce this incentive, the seller has an extra tool that he did not
have in the simplest version of the problem: he can choose the lowest valuation type of
information type t2 , to whom he sells a statistic. Lemma 2.5 shows that the seller always
increases the minimum valuation type of information type t2 , to whom he sells above v2∗ ,
but this adjustment is bounded by v1∗ since type (t1 , v1∗ ) places less value on the statistic
targeted to information type t2 than type (t2 , v1∗ ) does.
Lemma 2.5. In the solution to the relaxed problem, it must be the case that
1. q1v = 1 for all v ≥ v1∗ , and
2. v̂2 ∈ (v2∗ , v1∗ ), with v̂2 = inf{v : q2v > 0}.
Lemma 2.6 completely characterizes the solution for the allocation targeted to type t1 , q1v .
It shows that the seller will sell a homogeneous statistic to some valuation types below v1∗ ,
and the quality of this statistic is only a function of q2v̂2 . The reason for this is that all of
the types below v1∗ want to mimic type v̂2 , and since all of them have the same incentives
and a negative virtual value, the seller should treat them equally.
Lemma 2.6. In the solution to problem RP, there is a threshold v̂2 < v̂1 =

v̂2 q2v̂2
g (q2v̂2 )

< v1∗

such that q1v = 0 for v < v̂1 and q1v = g (q2v̂2 ) for all v ∈ [v̂1 , v1∗ ).
To conclude, I must indicate the optimal allocation targeted to information type t2 , q2v .
The next lemma shows that the only constraints that really matter, once I have fixed an
optimal allocation q1v , are the constraints IC 1v1∗ -2v’ for v 0 larger than v̂2 . The reason for
this is that for all types above v1∗ , the incentives to report some type (t2 , v 0 ) are smaller
than v1∗ ’s incentives. Given that the constraints IC 1v1∗ -2v’ bind, the lemma shows that
the optimal allocation q2v has at most two distinct sections: it is at first constant and may
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increase for high valuation types.
Lemma 2.7. Any allocation (q1 , q2 ) with q1 and q2 nondecreasing, such that q1v = 1 for
all v ≥ v1∗ , q1v = g (q2v ) for all v ∈ [v̂1 , v1∗ ], and q1v = 0 otherwise—and such that the
constraints IC 1v1∗ − 2v 0 for all v 0 ≥ v̂2 are satisfied—is a feasible allocation for problem P.
In the solution to the relaxed problem, all the constraints IC 1v1∗ − 2v 0 for v 0 ∈ [v̂2 , v̄2 ] bind.
Furthermore, there exists ṽ2 ∈ (v̂2 , v̄2 ] such that the optimal solution to problem P is given
by q2v 0 = q2v̂2 for v 0 ∈ (v̂2 , ṽ2 ], and for v 0 > ṽ2 , q2v 0 is equal to the solution to g 0 (q2v 0 ) =

v0
v1∗ .

Theorem 2.3 summarizes the characterization of the optimal mechanism that I have described throughout the lemmas. Figure 2.5 presents an instance in which the optimal
mechanism exhibits all the properties discussed above. Buyers that want to forecast θ2
are affected in two ways by the presence of the other information type. First, some extra
types will be excluded from the mechanism. Second, none of the valuation types that buy a
statistic receive a statistic that is equivalent to observing all of the data for them: intermediate valuation types receive the same degraded statistic and large valuation types receive a
more informative statistic, but it is never fully informative. Buyers that want to forecast θ1
are benefited in two ways. First, types in [v̂1 , v1∗ ] will buy an informative signal due to the
presence of the other information type, and second, types with high valuations will receive
a statistic that for them is equivalent to receiving all data for a price strictly below their
willingness to pay.
Theorem 2.3. There exist cutoffs v̂1 , v̂2 , and ṽ2 with v̂2 > v2∗ , v̂2 < v̂1 =
ṽ2 the value that solves g 0 (q2v̂ ) =

ṽ2
v1∗ ,

v̂2 q2v̂2
g (qv̂2 )

< v1∗ , and

such that in the optimal mechanism the seller targets

to types (t1 , v ) with v > v1∗ a statistic that reduces θ1 ’s forecast variance by 1, to types (t1 , v )
with v ∈ [v̂1 , v1∗ ] a statistic that reduces θ1 ’s forecast variance by g (q2v̂2 ), to types (t2 , v ) with
v ∈ [v̂2 , ṽ2 ] a statistic that reduces θ2 ’s forecast variance by q2v̂2 , and to types (t2 , v ) with
v > ṽ2 a statistic that reduces θ2 ’s forecast variance by q2v , where q2v solves g 0 (q2v ) =

v
v1∗ .

The theorem deserves two comments. First, if ṽ2 < v̄2 , the seller will offer a continuum of
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(a) Optimal q1v .

(b) Optimal q2v .

Figure 2.5: Optimal Mechanism when the angle between γ1 and γ2 is equal to 0.14◦ and
α1 = 0.85, and the distributions of valuation types satisfy that v1 = v2 = 0, v̄1 = 1 and
¯
¯
v̄2 = 2.4 with g (v | t1 ) = 15v 14 and g (v | t2 ) = 0.83̄ for v < 0.8 and g (v | t2 ) ∝ 4(2.4 − v )3 .
statistics as in Figure 2.5. There are other examples in which the seller only targets one
statistic to information type t2 . Second, the proposition describes the maximum variance
reduction that is targeted to each type, but it does not specify the actual statistics that
are offered. As in Section 2.4.1, to types (t1 , v ) with v > v1∗ the data broker provides all
the data, or a sufficient statistic for it, and to types (t2 , v ) with v > v̂2 the seller targets,
without adding independent noise, a linear combination that distorts the coefficients on the
data away from information type t1 ’s preferred direction. There is a new class of statistics
that needs to be offered when dealing with multiple valuation types since types (t1 , v )
with v ∈ [v̂1 , v1∗ ] are targeted with an only partially informative statistic. This can be
implemented in multiple ways. The data broker can do one of the following: modify the
coefficients on the data in the opposite direction of information type t2 ’s preferred direction,
include independent noise to information type t1 ’s preferred linear combination, or offer a
statistic that contains both distortions.

2.5. Many Information Types
In this section I present the main difficulties that impede me from obtaining a complete
characterization of the optimal mechanism in the general environment. In spite of these difficulties, I show that the main properties of the optimal mechanism that I have highlighted
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previously are still true. To simplify the analysis, I assume that there is a unique common
1

valuation type that I normalize to 1. I define, as before, the vector γi = Var (X )− 2 Cov (θi , X ),
and without loss assume that γ1T γ1 ≥ γ2T γ2 ≥ ... ≥ γnT γn , with at least one strict inequality.24 This means that type t1 is willing to pay more for all available data than type t2 is,
and by analogy the same is true for all the other comparisons.
Finding a condition such that none of the IC constraints bind is not a hard task. I need
only ensure that all the players want features of the data that are sufficiently distinct. The
next proposition presents a sufficient and necessary condition for none of the IC constraints
to bind. In such a case, the data broker can target to each type a statistic that for her
is equivalent to receiving all the data and then charge all of them them according to their
willingness to pay without worrying that some types will mimic others.
Proposition 2.3. Let βij be the angle between the vectors γi and γj . None of the IC
constraints bind if and only if for all i < j,

cos2 (βij ) <

kγj k2
kγi k2

.

The issue that prevents me from characterizing the optimal mechanism is that when some
IC constraints bind, it is not possible to identify a priori the relevant IC constraints. The
difficulty arises from two different sources. First, the seller may want to charge to one type a
price that is below the firm’s willingness to pay for the statistic that is targeted to her. This
might provoke an incentive problem since another type’s willingness to pay for this statistic
could now be larger than its price. Second, if the seller changes the coefficients of the linear
statistic targeted to one type, the modified statistic might become very informative to a
third type. I will use some examples to make these sources more explicit.
The first two examples demonstrate that a priori I cannot identify which downward IC
24
If all the inequalities are actually equalities, the data broker can reveal all the information to all types
and charge a uniform price equal to γ1T γ1 .
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constraints bind.25 The examples show that the condition in Proposition 2.1 is neither
necessary nor sufficient. The first example presents a case in which kγ1 − γ2 k2 > kγ1 k2 −
kγ2 k2 but the IC constraint for type t1 reporting type t2 binds. The reason is that the
IC constraint from type t2 to type t3 binds, and the seller wants to reduce the price of
the statistic targeted to type t2 . But if this price is severely reduced, the type t1 firm will
receive a positive surplus when buying the statistic targeted to type t2 .
Example 1. Suppose that γ1 = (6, 3), γ2 = (2, 5) and γ3 = (0, 4). It can be checked that
kγ1 − γ2 k2 > kγ1 k2 − kγ2 k2 , kγ1 − γ3 k2 > kγ1 k2 − kγ3 k2 , and kγ2 − γ3 k2 < kγ2 k2 − kγ3 k2 .
Following the analysis in Section 2.4.1, in a naive first attempt I assume that only IC 23 binds. Under this assumption, the seller’s optimal strategy is to target to types t1 and
t2 an undistorted statistic and target to type t3 a statistic that is distorted in the direction
opposite to type t2 ’s preferred statistic. When α2 is small enough relative to α3 , according to
Corollary 1, type t2 receives an information rent close to

(γ2T γ3 )2
γ3T γ3

− γ3T γ3 = 9, or equivalently

a price close to 20. At this price, type t1 can report type t2 and obtain a surplus of

(γ1T γ2 )2
γ2T γ2

−

20 = 5.24, so that the constraint IC 1-2 is not satisfied.26 It can be shown that in the
optimal mechanism the constraints IC 1-2 and IC 2-3 bind. In the optimal mechanism, as
α2 is too small, to satisfy the constraint IC 1-2, the data broker offers some information
rent to type t2 and modifies the recommendation targeted to type t2 in the opposite direction
of type t1 ’s preferred statistic, so that type t1 does not receive any information rent.27
Example 2 presents a case in which kγ1 − γ2 k2 < kγ1 k − kγ2 k, but the IC constraint for type
t1 reporting type t2 does not bind. This demonstrates that the condition in Proposition
2.1 is not sufficient in this general environment. In the example, type t1 can get a larger
surplus by reporting type t3 than by reporting type t2 . To eliminate the incentive for type
t1 of reporting type t3 , the data broker will want to give a large information rent to type
25

I designate an IC constraint as downward if it is one in which type ti considers reporting type tj with
i < j. Otherwise it is upward.
26
2
The surplus is positive as long as α2α+α
< 0.279.
3
27
The complete results of the numerical solution for this example and those following are available upon
request.
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t1 , and this rent may be larger than the surplus type t1 can obtain by reporting type t2 , so
that the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies IC12 .
Example 2. Suppose that γ1 = (6, 2), γ2 = (3.5, 4) and γ3 = (5, 0.5). It can be checked that
kγ1 − γ2 k2 < kγ1 k2 − kγ2 k2 and kγ1 − γ3 k2 < kγ1 k2 − kγ3 k2 . However, 12.81 =
kγ3 k2 > 1.52 =

(γ1T γ2 )2
kγ2 k2

(γ1T γ3 )2
kγ3 k2

−

− kγ2 k2 . That is, without any reduction in quality and when charging

them their willingness to pay, type t1 can obtain a higher rent by reporting type t3 than by
reporting type t2 . Consider the relaxed problem with only the constraint IC 1-3. In this
problem the seller targets to types t1 and t2 the undistorted statistics and charges type t2
according to her willingness to pay. Therefore, by mimicking type t2 , type t1 can obtain
a rent of 1.52 =

(γ1T γ2 )2
γ2T γ2

− γ2T γ2 . At the same time, when α1 is small relative to α3 , by

Corollary 1, the information rent given to type t1 is close to 12.81 =

(γ1T γ3 )2
γ3T γ3

− γ3T γ3 . Then,

for α1 small, the constraint IC 1-2 is satisfied.28
The problem with two information types was simplified significantly when I show that the
upward IC constraint never binds. The next two examples present instances in which some
upward constraints do bind.
Example 3 presents a case in which the solution to the two-type problem involves modifying
the direction of the statistic targeted to one type away from the mimicking type’s most
preferred statistic. While this avoids a situation one type mimics the other, it also makes
the distorted statistic more valuable for a third type. If this distortion is large enough it
gives the third type an incentive to report the originally mimicked type.
Example 3. Suppose that γ1 = (6, 2), γ2 = (5, 1.8), and γ3 = (0, 5). If none of the IC
constraints involving type t3 bind, the data broker will offer to this type a statistic that she
considers equivalent to receiving all the data at a price equal to her willingness to pay. In
the solution to the relaxed problem with only the constraint IC 1-2, the data broker distorts
the statistic targeted to type t2 in the opposite direction of type t1 ’s preferred statistic—that
28

In this example, this happens whenever

α1
α1 +α3

< 0.58.
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is, by rotating it towards type t3 ’s preferred direction.
Figure 2.6 presents the optimal recommendations in this relaxed problem for types t1 and t2
when

α1
α1 +α2

= 0.8, where the length of the recommendation vectors represents the optimal

price. The statistic λ2 that is targeted to type t2 is almost in the same direction as γ3 , and
it is offered at a low price relative to type t3 ’s willingness to pay. Therefore, the constraint
IC 3-2 is not satisfied.29

λ3 = γ3

γ2

γ1

λ2
λ1

Figure 2.6: Optimal solution of the relaxed problem in Example 3 when
length of the blue vectors represents the optimal price.

α1
α1 +α2

= 0.8. The

It can be shown that constraints IC 1-2 and IC 3-2 are the ones that bind. More interestingly,
in the optimal mechanism the data broker only targets to types t1 and t3 a statistic that for
them is equivalent to observing all the data, and he charges them a price equal to their
willingness to pay. The data broker does not offer any valuable statistic to type t2 , even
though type t2 is not the one with the lowest willingness to pay.
Finally, Example 4 presents a case in which the reduction in the price charged to one type
makes the upward constraint IC 2-1 bind. This means that in this environment there could
be distortions at the top—that is, the type with the highest willingness to pay for all the
29

This is true as long as

α1
α1 +α2

> 0.7.
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data may receive a distorted statistic.30
Example 4. Suppose that γ1 = (4.8, 2), γ2 = (5, 0), and γ3 = (4, 2). It is easy to check
that kγ1 − γ3 k2 < kγ1 k2 − kγ3 k2 and that the other two analogous conditions hold with the
opposite sign. Consider the relaxed problem with only constraint IC 1-3. Under such an
assumption, neither type t2 nor t3 receives any surplus under the optimal mechanism, and
by Corollary 1, when α1 is small enough relative to α3 , type t1 receives an information
rent close to

(γ1T γ3 )2
γ3T γ3

− γ3T γ3 = 6.91. Since in this relaxed problem the seller targets an

undistorted statistic to type t1 , he charges type t1 a price equal to γ1T γ1 − 6.91 = 20.12.
Given this price for the statistic targeted to type t1 , type t2 has an incentive to report type
t1 since

(γ1T γ2 )2
γ1T γ1

− 20.12 = 1.17.31

It can be shown that the constraints IC 1-3 and IC 2-1 are the ones that bind. In the optimal
mechanism the data broker distorts the statistic targeted to type t1 in the opposite direction
of type t2 ’s preferred statistic and targets to type t2 an undistorted statistic. This reduces
type t1 ’s willingness to pay for the information targeted to her, but it does not change type
t1 ’s incentive to report type t3 .
The examples show that it is difficult to know a priori the relevant IC constraints to consider
when solving for the optimal mechanism in this general environment. Despite this difficulty,
I am able to show that the optimal mechanism satisfies two important properties. First,
at least one type receives zero information rent. If this were not the case, the data broker
could easily increase profits by increasing all prices uniformly without affecting incentives.
Second, there is at least one type that receives an undistorted statistic, in the sense that
receiving this statistic is for that type equivalent to receiving all data. But this type is
not necessarily the one with the highest willingness to pay for all the data. Example 4
presented one such a case, where the type with the second highest willingness to pay for
all the data is the only one that receives an undistorted statistic. This is a generalization
30

In Theorem 2.4, I show that there is always a type that receives an undistorted statistic. In this
example, it is type t2 .
31
1
< 0.5910.
The same is true as long as α1α+α
3
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of the ”nondistortion at the top” property that holds in unidimensional mechanism design
problems with payoffs that satisfy the single crossing condition.32 The reasoning behind
this result is subtler. I show that if there is no type that receives an undistorted statistic,
the data broker can offer a new package with all the data at a price high enough such that
only one type is willing to pay for it, thus satisfying all constraints.
Theorem 2.4. The optimal mechanism satisfies the following properties:
1. at least one type receives zero information rent; and
2. there is at least one type ti that receives a nondistorted statistic; that is, from the
statistic she can learn E [θi | X ].
Although I cannot explicitly find the solution to the seller’s problem, I am able to characterize how the statistics that are offered in the optimal mechanism look. These statistics are
built to satisfy the main property I found in the case of two information types: when an IC
constraint binds, the data broker should ideally modify the statistic given to the mimicked
type in the opposite direction of the information preferred by the mimicking type(s). There
are two differences. First, there could be multiple types that want to report one single type,
so the data broker must weight the direction in which to distort the information. Second,
it might be optimal for the data broker not to sell a valuable statistic to certain types. It
is worth noting that in this environment, as occurred in Example 3, it is not always true
that the types who are willing to pay less for all the data are the ones that are left out of
the mechanism. Instead the seller wants to leave out those types that other types have a
higher incentive to report.
Theorem 2.5. In the optimal mechanism, the vector of coefficients of the statistic targeted
to type ti , to whom the data broker wants to sell, is one of the solutions to the fixed-point
32

Rochet and Choné (1998) show that in a multidimensional environment with linear payoffs, a similar
property holds. In their environment there is at least one boundary type that receives the optimal quality.
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problem



Li = Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ) −

X

λji cji
Cov (θj , X )
j∈I ,j6=i λij + µi

P
j∈I ,j6=i

where I ⊆ {1, ... , n} is the set of types to whom the data broker wants to sell, λk` is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint IC k-`, µi is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with constraint IR i, and ck` =

LT
k Cov (θk ,X )
.
LT
` Cov (θ` ,X )

2.6. Appendix
2.6.1. A Micro Foundation for Quadratic Loss
Suppose there is a monopolist that faces a linear demand q(p) = ā − bp and the monopolist
knows b but he is uncertain about the value of ā.
If the monopolist knows that the value of the intercept is ā he would choose to produce a
quantity q̄ =

ā
2

and he would receive a profit of π̄ =

ā2
4b .

Since the monopolist is not certain about ā he would choose some quantity q. Let a = 2q,
that is, the monopolist chooses the quantity q as if he thinks that ā = a. By choosing this

 aā
a
a2
quantity the monopolist obtains profits π = q bā − qb = 2a bā − 2b
= 2b − 4b
.
Then by choosing q the monopolist is leaving on the table the quantity

π̄ − π =

aā
a2
(a − ā)2
ā2
−
+
=
,
4b 2b 4b
4b

that is, the monopolist weights the losses of its uncertainty about the parameter ā according
to a quadratic loss function.
2.6.2. Proofs
2.6.2.1

Proof Claim 2.2

For any function g : ψ(X ) → R, where ψ(X ) is the set of possible realizations of statistics,




−Ex,θ (g (ψ(x)) − θ)2 | ψ(x) ≤ −EX ,θ (E(θ | ψ(x)) − θ)2 | ψ(x)
 

= −EX Eθ (E(θ | ψ(x)) − θ)2 | ψ(x) = −EX [Var (θ | ψ(x))].
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The inequality follows because E (b − θ)2 |ψ(x) is minimized by setting b = E[θ|ψ(x)].
The first equality follows from the Law of Iterated Expectations, and the second equality
follows from the definition of conditional variance.
2.6.2.2

Proof Theorem 2.1

First, I present a detailed argument of why selling linear mechanisms is optimal when there
are only two information types that share a common valuation type, and then argue why
this argument still applies to the general model.
Suppose there are two information types with a unique common valuation type. Since by
Proposition 2.1 the IC constraint for type t2 mimicking type t1 does not bind, the problem
that the Data Broker faces when the IC constraint for type t1 mimicking type t2 binds, can
be rewritten as

max α1 γ1T γ1 − Var (θ1 ) + E[Var (θ1 | ψ(t2 ))] + Var (θ2 ) − E[Var (θ2 | ψ(t2 ))]

ψ(t2 )

s.t

Var (θ1 ) − E[Var (θ1 | ψ(t2 ))] ≥ Var (θ2 ) − E[Var (θ2 | ψ(t2 ))],

where the remaining constraint represents the IR constraint for type t1 .
First, suppose that the remaining constraint does not bind. By an argument similar to the
one in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), it is without loss to assume that the Data Broker
gives to type t2 a recommendation that this type will follow, that is, E (θ2 | ψ(t2 )) = ψ(t2 ) ∈
R. This is true because, by Claim 2.2, type t2 learns the same by observing the statistic
ψ(t2 ) or by observing an a statistic the expected value of θ2 given the original statistic,
while type t1 cannot learn more about θ2 by observing the modified, probably aggregate,
statistic than by observing the original one. Claim 2.2 implies that E[Var (θ1 | ψ(t2 ))] is the
smallest variance that type t1 can reached by optimally choosing the updating rule he uses
to forecast θ1 when buying the statistic targeted to type t2 , a1 (ψ(t2 )). By allowing type t1
to choose a1 , I can define the functional
G (a1 , ψ(t2 )) = α1 E(θ1 − a1 (ψ(t2 )(x)))2 − E(θ2 − ψ(t2 )(x) | x)2 .
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Then the solution to the original problem has to be an equilibrium of the stochastic zerosum game in which type t1 wants to minimize G , where type t1 chooses a1 to minimize G
and the Data Broker chooses ψ(t2 ) to maximize G .
First, suppose that ψ(t2 ) is a linear combination of x. Claim 2.1 implies that the random
vector (θ1 , ψ(t2 )(x)) is jointly elliptical. By Claim 2.2, type t1 chooses a1∗ = E (θ1 | ψ(t2 )(x)),
a linear function of ψ(t2 ) since (θ1 , ψ(t2 )(x)) is elliptical.
Second, suppose that a1 is linear, that is, a1 = c1 ψ(t2 )(x) + c0 . In such a case the seller
wants to maximize


E α1 (θ1 − c1 ψ(t2 )(x) − c0)2 − (θ2 − ψ(t2 )(x))2 | x .

The First Order Condition implies that the optimal solution for the seller has to satisfy
ψ ∗ (t2 )(x) =

E[θ2 | x] − α1 c1 E[θ1 | x] − α1 c0
,
1 − α1 c12

a linear mapping since the conditional expectations are linear. Furthermore, the seller’s
problem is strictly concave as long as 1 > α1 c12 , and I show in Theorem 2.2 that there is a
unique fixed point of this linear mapping that satisfies this condition.
Therefore, the pair (a1∗ , ψ ∗ (t2 )) is a linear saddle-point strategy, that is, for any other a1
and ψ(t2 ) I have G (a1∗ , ψ(t2 )) ≤ G (a1∗ , ψ ∗ (t2 )) ≤ G (a1 , ψ ∗ (t2 )). To finish the argument I
use a well-known property of zero-sum games called ordered interchangeability property (see
for example Basar and Olsder (1999)). For completeness I present a general proof of this
property.
Property 1. In a simultaneous two-player zero-sum game, let (a1∗ , a2∗ ) and (ã1 , ãa ) be two
saddle-point strategies. Then (a1∗ , ã2 ) and (ã1 , a2∗ ) are also saddle-point strategies.
Proof. Let u be the payoff function of the zero-sum game, and suppose that player 1 wants
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to minimize u, while player 2 wants to maximize it. Let (a1∗ , a2∗ ) and (ã1 , ãa ) be two saddlepoint strategies, that is, for any a1 and a2 , u(a1 , a2∗ ) ≥ u(a1∗ , a2∗ ) ≥ u(a1∗ , a2 ), and analogously
for and (ã1 , ã2 ).
Then maxa2 u(a1∗ , a2 ) ≤ u(a1∗ , a2∗ ) ≤ u(a1 , a2∗ ) ≤ maxa2 u(a1 , a2 ) ∀a1 , that is, a1∗ ∈ arg mina1 maxa2 u(a1 , a2 ).
This means that a1∗ is a security strategy for player 1. Similarly, it can be argued that a2∗ is a
security point for player 2, and conclude that mina1 maxa2 u(a1 , a2 ) = maxa2 mina1 u(a1 , a2 ) =
v = u(a1∗ , a2∗ ) = u(ã1 , ã2 ), where the last inequality follows from an analogous argument.
Then v = mina1 u(a1 , ã2 ) ≤ u(a1∗ , ã2 ) ≤ maxa2 u(a1∗ , a2 ) = v , implying that v = u(a1∗ , ã2 ). This
means that (a1∗ , ã2 ) is a saddle-point strategy, since by the definition of v for any a1 and a2 ,
u(a1 , ã2 ) ≥ u(a1∗ , ã2 ) ≥ u(a1∗ , a2 ). By an analogous argument, (ã1∗ , a2∗ ) is also a saddle-point
strategy.
The ordered interchangeability property implies that the linear addle-point strategy (a1∗ , ψ ∗ (t2 ))
is the unique saddle point of the zero-sum game between the data broker and type t1 ; if
(â1 , ψ̂(t2 )) were another saddle-point strategy then the pair (a1∗ , ψ̂(t2 )) is also a saddle-point
strategy. If this is the case, by Claim 2.2 it has to be that E (θ1 | ψ̃(t2 )(x)) is a linear mapping with the same coefficients as E (θ1 | ψ ∗ (t2 )(x)), meaning that ψ̃(t2 )(x) and ψ ∗ (t2 )(x)
generate the same conditioning σ-algebras, that is, they are equal almost everywhere.
If the constraint does bind, the argument has to be slightly modified. Let a1∗ be type
t1 ’s optimal updating rule as a function of the statistic that is offered by the seller. The
constraint can be rewritten as Var (θ1 )−E [(θ1 −a1∗ (ψ ∗ (t2 )))2 ] = Var (θ2 )−E [Var (θ2 −ψ ∗ (t2 ))2 ].
Define ΨF = {ψ(t2 ) : (ψ(t2 ), a1∗ (ψ(t2 ))) satisfies the constraint}. The modified zero-sum
game where the seller’s available strategies are given by the set ΨF has a unique linear
saddle-point. The argument is analogous to the previous one. In particular, the seller’s best
response is linear when type t1 ’s updating rule is linear since the constraint is quadratic
in such a case. The proof of Theorem 2.2 shows that the mapping created by this linear
responses has at least one fixed point and one of them is the solution to the seller’s problem.
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Now I extend the argument to consider the general case with many information types and
many valuation types. I assume that I know which are the constraints that bind. This is
without loss since I argue that for any set of binding constraints the optimal mechanism is
linear.
It is always possible to either write p(ti , v ) = v (Var (θi ) − E[(θi − ψ(ti ))2 ], if there is not IC
constraint for type (ti , v ) reporting another type (tj , v 0 ) that binds, or p(ti ) = −v E[(θi −
ψ(ti ))2 ] + v E[(θi − aiv ,j (ψ(θj )))2 ] + p(tj ), if there is an IC constraint for type (ti , v ) reporting
another type (tj , v 0 ) that binds, where aiv ,j represents how type (ti , v ) updates his forecast
when observing the signal targeted to type (tj , v 0 ). Plugging in one of these prices in the
seller’s objective generates a functional analogous to functional G . The critical property of
the functional G is that, for any i, j, E[(θi − ψ(ti ))2 ] always appears with a negative sign
and E[(θi − aiv ,j (ψ(ti )))2 ] always appears with a positive sign. This keeps the conflict that
the seller wants to maximize E[(θi − aiv ,j (ψ(ti )))2 ] and type (ti , v ) wants to minimize it, and
the property that the seller wants to minimize E[(θi − ψ(ti ))2 ]. If there are multiples ways
to write the price for some type (ti , v ), some extra constraints have to be satisfied. Let
ΨF = {ψ : (ψ, a∗ (ψ)) satisfies all the constraints}, where a∗ denotes the buyers’ optimal
decisions when they buy a statistic in ψ that is not targeted to them.
Consider the zero-sum game between the seller that wants to maximize G by choosing any
ψ in ΨF and a fictitious player that wants to minimize G by choosing the updating rules
a, representing the buyers’ interests in the mechanism. By the assumption that the joint
distribution is elliptical and Claim 2.2, if the seller offers linear statistics, the fictitious player
wants to choose linear forecasting rules. At the same time, if the fictitious player announces
linear forecasting rules, the seller’s best response is to choose linear statistics. This is a result
of the problem being analogous to the one before with some extra constraints that are linear
combinations of quadratic terms. Theorem 2.5 shows that this linear best response mapping
has at least one fixed point, and that one of them is a solution to the seller’s problem when
the buyer uses linear forecasting rules. Therefore, by the same argument as in the two type
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case, there is a unique saddle-point strategy in which the seller offers linear statistics and
the fictitious player uses linear forecasting rules.
2.6.2.3

Proof Lemma 2.1

Consider the family of functions g (L, `, k) = Eθi [θi ] + k(LT X + ` − EX [LT X ]) for k ∈ R.
The conditional expectation belongs to this family of functions since the joint distribution of
(θ, X ) is elliptical. When the buyer uses g (L, `, k) as her estimator when observing LT X +`,
the variance of θi ’s forecasting error is equal to
EX , [Eθi [(θi − g (L, `, k))2 | LT X + `]] = EX , [Eθi [((θi − Eθi [θi ] − kLT (X − EX [X ]) − k`)2 ) | LT X + `]]
= Eθi [(θi − E (θi ))2 ] + k 2 `2 E [2 ]
+k 2 LT EX , [Eθi [(X − E (X ))(X − E (X ))T | LT X + `]]L
−2kLT EX , (Eθi [(θi − Eθi [θi ])(X − EX [X ])]) | LT X + `))
= Eθi [(θi − Eθi (θi ))2 ] − 2kLT EX ,θi [(θi − Eθi [θi ])(X − EX [X ])]
+k 2 LT EX [(X − EX [X ])(X − EX [X ])T ]L + k 2 `2 σ 2
= Var (θi ) − 2kLT Cov (θi , X ) + k 2 LT Var (X )L + k 2 `2 σ 2
where the the second equality follows from linearity of the expectation and from  being independent
of X and θ, the third one from the Law of Iterated Expectations and the last one from the definition
of variance and covariance. Claim 2.2 implies that the conditional expectation has to minimized this
forecasting error. The First Order Condition with respect to k is
−2LT Cov (θi , X ) + 2kLT Var (X )L + 2k`2 σ 2 = 0,

that is, k̂ =

LT Cov (θi ,X )
.
LT Var (X )L+`2 σ 2

Plugging in this value of k gives the conditional variance, which is equal

to
Var (θi ) −

2.6.2.4

(LT Cov (θi , X ))2
.
LT Var (X )L + `2 σ 2

Proof Lemma 2.2

Lemma 2.1 presented the value of the conditional variance when the buyer observes any linear
combination of the data. Since the conditional expectation minimizes the conditional variance, it
is enough to find the set of coefficients that minimize the expression in Lemma 2.1. Immediately it
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can be seen that ` = 0. The first order condition for L gives
−2LT Cov (θi , X )Cov (θi , X )LT Var (X )L + 2(LT Cov (θi , X ))2 LT Var (X )
= 0,
(LT Var (X )L)2
from which we obtain that L̂ = Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ). Therefore, the conditional variance of θi given
X is equal to
Var (θi ) − Cov (θi , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ).

2.6.2.5

Proof Proposition 2.1

To prove parts 1. and 2. I only need to argue that the IC constraint for type t2 reporting type t1
never binds. Suppose that in the optimal mechanism that targets statistics ψ(t1 ) and ψ(t2 ) to types
t1 and t2 , respectively, this constraint binds. Then it holds with equality, and by Claim 2.2 it can
be expressed as

VarFθ (θ2 ) − EX [Var (θ2 | ψ(t1 ))] − p(t1 ) = VarFθ (θ2 ) − EX [Var (θ2 | ψ(t2 ))] − p(t2 ).

(2.1)

Lemma 2.2 implies that γ2T γ2 ≥ VarFθ (θ2 )−Ex [Var (θ2 | ψ(t1 ))]. Therefore, p(t1 ) ≤ γ2T γ2 −VarFθ (θ2 )+
Ex [Var (θ2 | ψ(t2 ))] + p(t2 ). Since the IR constraint for type t2 implies that VarFθ (θ2 ) − Ex [Var (θ2 |
ψ(t2 ))] ≥ p(t2 ), it has to be that p(t1 ) ≤ γ2T γ2 . Similarly, p(t2 ) ≤ γ2T γ2 .
If one of these constraints is strict, the monopolist can do better by selling all the data to both
types, and charging to them the price γ2T γ2 , satisfying trivially all the constraints.
Now suppose that p(t1 ) = p(t2 ) = γ2T γ2 . In such a case to satisfy the IR constraint for type t2 it has to
be that ψ(t2 )(x) = E (θ2 | x). Consider the alternative mechanism that targets to type t1 the statistic
ψ 0 (t1 ) and charge him the price p 0 (t1 ) = γ1T γ1 − VarFθ (θ2 ) + Ex [Var (θ1 | ψ(t2 ))] + p(t2 ) > p(t1 ), since
by Claim 2.2 and assumption 2.2, γ1T γ1 > VarFθ (θ2 ) − Ex [Var (θ1 | ψ(t2 ))]. Clearly this mechanism
satisfies all the constraints and gives to the monopolist higher profits than the original mechanism,
contradicting the assumption that the original mechanism was optimal.
Now I proceed to prove part 3. According to Lemma 2.2, when the data broker offers to type t2 the
2

statistic ψ(t2 ) = E[θ2 | X ], the maximum price type t2 is willing to pay for it is γ2T γ2 = kγ2 k , and
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the maximum price that type t1 is willing to pay for the same statistic is
(Cov (θ2 , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θ1 , X ))2
(γ T γ2 )2
= 1 2 .
T
−1
Cov (θ2 , X ) Var (X ) Cov (θ2 , X )
kγ2 k

Therefore, when the data broker targets to type t2 the statistic ψ(t2 ) = E[θ2 | X ] and charges him
2

price p(t2 ) = kγ2 k , type t1 will report type t2 if and only if
(Cov (θ2 , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θ1 , X ))2 > (Cov (θ2 , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θ2 , X ))2
⇔ (γ1T γ2 )2 > (γ2T γ2 )2
⇔ cos 2 (β)γ2T γ2 γ1T γ1 > (γ2T γ2 )2
⇔ cos(β) >

kγ2 k
kγ1 k ,

where β is the angle between γ1 and γ2 , and the second equivalence follows from the fact that the
angle between vectors γ1 and γ2 satisfies the equality cos(β) =

γ1T γ2
kγ1 kkγ2 k ,

while the last equivalence

from the assumption that γ1T γ2 > 0. This provides the first equivalence in the theorem. Since
γ2T γ1 > 0, the expression after the first equivalence can be rewritten as γ1T γ2 − γ2T γ2 > 0, that is, the
dot product between the vectors γ2 and γ1 − γ2 has to be positive. Figure 2.7 helps to understand
how to derive the second condition.

y
γ2

γ1 − γ2
α0

ω

β
α

γ1

x
γ1 − γ2

Figure 2.7: Graphic representation of gamma vectors.
The dot product between two vectors is positive if and only if the angle between them is less than
90◦ . Therefore, γ2T (γ1 − γ2 ) > 0 if and only if the angle between this two vectors is smaller than 90◦ .
In the figure this implies that α + β < 90◦ . By the properties of the measures of angles between
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parallel lines, α = α0 . Therefore, the IC constraints will bind if and only if ω > 90◦ . By Pythagoras
theorem it has to be that the squared of the magnitude of the vector γ1 is larger than the sum of
2

2

2

the square of the magnitudes of vectors γ2 and γ1 − γ2 , that is, kγ1 k > kγ2 k + kγ1 − γ2 k , which
implies the second condition.
Finally, I proceed to prove part 4. If the IC constraint for type t1 reporting type t1 does not bind
the seller can give the optimal statistics to each type, so it does not include any noise. Now suppose
it binds. Since the IR constraint for type t2 binds and type t1 receives the optimal amount of
information the prices are given by
p(t1 ) = p(t2 ) + γ1T γ1 −
p(t2 ) =

2
(LT
2 Cov (θ2 ,X ))
2 2.
LT
2 Var (X )L2 +`2 σ

2
(LT
2 Cov (θ1 ,X ))
2 σ2 ,
LT
Var
(X
)L
+`
2
2
2

and

Therefore, the objective of the seller is to solve the problem

π = max α1
L2 ,`2

γ1T γ1

(LT Cov (θ1 , X ))2
− T 2
L2 Var (X )L2 + `22 σ 2


+

2
(LT
2 Cov (θ2 , X ))
2 2
LT
2 Var (X )L2 + `2 σ

Suppose that in the solution of this problem `∗2 > 0. If we reduce `2 by an small amount, the change
in the seller’s profits is equal to
2σ 2

2
2
(LT
(LT
2 Cov (θ1 , X ))
2 Cov (θ2 , X ))
2
−
2σ
α
.
1
∗2 2 2
∗2 2 2
(LT
(LT
2 Var (X )L2 + ` 2 σ )
2 Var (X )L2 + ` 2 σ )

2
T
2
T
Suppose that α1 (LT
2 Cov (θ1 , X )) ≥ (L2 Cov (θ2 , X )) . Then π ≤ α1 γ1 γ1 . Consider the alterna-

tive mechanism with coefficients L̃2 , such that L̃2 is orthogonal to Cov (θ2 ) − Cov (θ1 ), that is,
T
T
L̃T
2 Cov (θ1 , X ) = L̃2 Cov (θ1 , X ), and prices p̃(t1 ) = γ1 γ1 and p̃(t2 ) =

2
(L̃T
2 Cov (θ2 ,X ))
.
L̃T
2 Var (X )L̃2

p̃(t2 ) is strictly

positive since L̃2 is not orthogonal to Cov (θ2 ) by assumption 2.2. The new contract satisfies all
2
IC and IR constraints and give a profit π̃ = α1 γ1T γ1 + p̃(t2 ) > π. Therefore, α1 (LT
2 Cov (θ1 , X )) <
2
∗
∗
(LT
2 Cov (θ2 , X )) , and the net benefit of decreasing ` is positive. Therefore, ` > 0 cannot be the

optimal solution, that is, the data broker will never include independent noise into the statistic.

2.6.2.6

Proof of Theorem 2.2

Part 1. follows directly from part 3. in Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.1.
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To solve for the optimal mechanism design when the IC constraint for type 1 reporting type 2 binds,
I first assume that the IR constraint for type t1 does not bind. From the analysis in the main text,
the seller’s maximization problem is:

π = max α1
L

Letting a1 =

LT Cov (θ1 ,X )
LT Var (X )L

γ1T γ1

and a2 =

(LT Cov (θ1 , X ))2
−
LT Var (X )L

LT Cov (θ2 ,X )
,
LT Var (X )L


+

(LT Cov (θ2 , X ))2
LT Var (X )L

the First Order Condition is:

−2α1 (a1 Cov (θ1 , X ) − a12 α1 Var (X )L) + 2a2 Cov (θ2 , X ) − 2a22 Var (X )L = 0,
from which


Var (X )−1 Cov (θ2 , X ) −
L=



a1
a2 α1 Cov (θ1 , X )

a2

.

a2 − α1 a12
Rename c =

a1
a2

=

LT Cov (θ1 ,X )
LT Cov (θ2 ,X )

and normalize the denominator to 1. Lemma 2.1 implies that this

normalization is without loss. Therefore, if the IR constraint of type t1 does not bind the result is
true. The IR constraint for type t1 does not bind if and only if

⇔

(γ2T γ1 −cα1 γ1T γ1 )2
kγ2 −α1 cγ1 k2
(γ2T γ1 −cα1 γ1T γ1 )2
(γ2T γ2 −cα1 γ1T γ2 )2
2

>

(γ2T γ2 −cα1 γ1T γ2 )2
kγ2 −α1 cγ1 k2

>1

⇔ c > 1.

Furthermore, from the proof of Theorem 2.1, the problem is strictly convex if and only if 1 > α1 c 2 .
Therefore, I need to check that there is a solution of the fixed-point problem with c 2 < 1/α1 .
We have
c=

γ2T γ1 − cα1 γ1T γ1
,
γ2T γ2 − cα1 γ1T γ2

which generates the quadratic equation c 2 α1 γ1T γ2 − c(γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ1 ) + γ1T γ2 = 0. This equation
has two solutions given by
2

2

kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k ±

q
2
2
(kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2
2α1 γ1T γ2

.

In both solutions the denominator is positive, so that the two solutions have the same sign and the
sign coincide with the sign of γ1T γ2 .
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To make the notation easier let c be the negative solution and d the positive solution. The following
lemma shows that only the negative solution of the equation is a solution of the original problem
and that the IR constraint binds only when α1 > α̃ with α̃ ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 2.8. For all α1 , d 2 > 1/α1 , that is, d is never a solution of the problem, and c 2 < 1/α1 ,
that is, c is always a solution of the problem. Furthermore, c 2 > 1 iff α1 < α̃ =

γ2T (γ1 −γ2 )
,
γ1T (γ1 −γ2 )

that is,

the IR constraint binds only if α1 > α̃.
Proof. Since by assumption γ1T γ2 > 0, both c and d are positive. I first prove that d > 1/α1
independently of the parameters. This is true if
d 2 > 1/α1

q
√
2
2
(kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2 > 2 α1 γ1T γ2
q
√
2
2
2
2
⇔ kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k − 2 α1 γ1T γ2 > − (kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2 .
2

2

⇔ kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k +

√
2
2
The RHS is always negative and the LHS is always positive since kγ2 k − 2 α1 γ1T γ2 + α1 kγ1 k ≥
√
(kγ2 k − α1 kγ1 k)2 ≥ 0.
Now I prove that for any α1 , c 2 < 1/α1 . From the definition of c
c 2 > 1/α1

q
√
2
2
(kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2 > 2 α1 γ1T γ2
q
√
2
2
2
2
⇔ kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k − 2 α1 γ1T γ2 > (kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2
√
⇔ 8α(γ1T γ2 )2 ≤ 4 α1 (γ1T γ2 )(γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ1 )
√
2
2
⇔ 0 ≤ kγ2 k − 2 α1 γ1T γ12 + α1 kγ1 k ,
2

2

⇔ kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k −

and it was argued before that this inequality is always true.
Finally, I prove that c > 1 only for small values of α1 . From the definition of c
c >1

2

2

⇔ kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k − 2α1 γ1T γ2 >
2

q
2
2
(kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2

2

⇔ −4α1 γ1T γ2 (kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k ) + 4α12 (γ1T γ2 )2 > −4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2
⇔ 0 > γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ12 − α1 γ1T γ2 − γ1T γ2
⇔ 0 > −γ2T (γ1 − γ2 ) + α1 γ1T (γ1 − γ2 ) = (α1 γ1 − γ2 )T (γ1 − γ2 )
To complete the proof, notice that the vectors α1 γ1 − γ2 and γ1 − γ2 form a triangle where the
third side is given by the vector (1 − α1 )γ1 (See figure 2.8). As α1 increases, the length of the vector
(1 − α1 )γ1 decreases and by the sinus law the angle ω becomes smaller. As long as ω < 90◦ , the
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y
γ2
γ1 − γ2
ω
α1 γ1 − γ2

γ1

α1 γ1
x

Figure 2.8: Graphic representation for proof of Lemma 2.8.
condition in the last equation is satisfied, and when ω becomes larger than 90◦ the inequality is
reversed. To find when the measure of angle ω is exactly 90◦ notice that
−γ2T (γ1 − γ2 ) + α1 γ1T (γ1 − γ2 ) = 0
⇔ α1 = α̃ =

γ2T (γ1 −γ2 )
,
γ1T (γ1 −γ2 )

which is positive by Proposition 2.1, and by the fact that γ1 is always between γ2 and γ1 − γ2 .
2

Besides, α̃ < 1, since γ1T γ1 − 2γ1T γ2 + γ2T γ2 = kγ1 − γ2 k > 0.
Then the statistics in optimal mechanism are
ψ(t1 )

= E[θ1 ] + Cov (θ1 , X )T Var (X )−1 (X − E[X ]) and

ψ(t2 )

= E (θ2 ) + (Cov (θ2 , X ) − cα1 Cov (θ1 , X )) Var (X )−1 (X − E[X ])

T

√

with c(α1 ) =

kγ2 k2 +α1 kγ1 k2 −

(kγ2 k2 +α1 kγ1 k2 )2 −4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2
2α1 γ1T γ2

if α < α̃, and c(α) = α̃, otherwise. When

α1 < α̃, the optimal prices can be found by plugging in the IR constraint for type t2 and the IC
constraint for type t1 and are equal to p(t1 ) =

kγ1 k2 kγ2 k2 −(γ1T γ2 )2
kγ2 −cα1 γ1 k2

+ t(θ2 ) and p(t2 ) =

(kγ2 k2 −cα1 γ1T γ2 )2
.
kγ2 −cα1 γ1 k2

If α > α̃, the optimal prices can be found by plugging in the IR constraints and they are equal to
2

p(t1 ) = kγ1 k and p(t2 ) =

2.6.2.7

(kγ2 k2 −α̃γ1T γ2 )2
.
kγ2 −α̃γ1 k2

Proof Corollary 1

I first prove 1. By the definition of the function c

∂c(α1 )
∂α1

−0.5

=

γ1T γ1 −1/2((γ2T γ2 +α1 γ1T γ1 )2 −4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2 )
2γ1T γ2

111

(2(γ2T γ2 +α1 γ1T γ1 )γ1T γ1 −4(γ1T γ2 )2 )

It is enough to argue that the numerator is positive. The numerator is non-negative iff
γ1T γ1

p
(γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ1 )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2 ≥ (γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ1 )γ1T γ1 − 2(γ1T γ2 )2

(γ1T γ1 )2 ((γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ1 )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2 )

⇐
≥

4(γ1T γ2 )4 − 4γ1T γ1 (γ1T γ2 )2 (γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ1 ) + (γ2T γ2 + α1 γ1T γ1 )2 (γ1T γ1 )2
4(γ1T γ2 )2 γ2T γ2 γ1T γ1 ≥ 4(γ1T γ2 )4 .

⇔

2

2

2

2

The last inequality is always satisfied since (γ1T γ1 )2 = kγ1 k kγ2 k cos 2 (β) < kγ1 k kγ2 k , where β is
the angle between the vectors γ1 and γ2 .
Further, see that
2

lim c(α1 ) = lim

α1 →0

2

kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k −

q

2

2

(kγ2 k + α1 kγ1 k )2 − 4α1 (γ1T γ2 )2
2γ1T γ2

α1 →0

= 0.

For part 2., the information rent given to type t1 is equal to

Rent =

((γ2 − c(α1 )γ1 )T γ1 )2 − ((γ2 − c(α1 )γ1 )T γ2 )2
,
(γ2 − c(α1 )γ1 )T (γ2 − c(α1 )γ1 )

and by taking the derivative with respect to c(α1 ) I obtain
∂Rent
∂c(α1 )



∝ −(γ1T γ2 γ1T γ1 − γ2T γ2 γ1T γ2 ) + c(α1 )((γ1T γ1 )2 − (γ1T γ2 )2 ) γ2T γ2 − 2c(α1 )γ1T γ2 + c 2 (α1 )γ1T γ1


− −γ1T γ2 + c(α1 )γ1T γ1 (γ1T γ2 )2 − (γ2T γ2 )2 − 2c(α1 )(γ1T γ2 γ1T γ1 − γ2T γ2 γ1T γ2 ) + c 2 (α1 )((γ1T γ1 )2 − (γ1T γ2 )2 )
= (−γ1T γ2 + c(α1 )(γ1T γ1 + γ2T γ2 ) − c 2 (α1 )γ1T γ2 )(γ1T γ1 γ2T γ2 − (γ1T γ2 )2 )
∝ −γ1T γ2 + c(α1 )(γ1T γ1 + γ2T γ2 ) − c 2 (α1 )γ1T γ2
The last expression is increasing in c(α1 ) since γ1T γ1 + γ2T γ2 − 2cα1 γ1T γ2 > γ1T γ1 + γ2T γ2 − 2γ1T γ2 =
2

kγ1 − γ2 k > 0, where the first inequality follows from c(α̃) = α̃ and from c(α1 ) being non-decreasing
in α1 . Therefore, I only need to prove that the last expression is negative when evaluated at α̃. This
expression becomes
−(1 + α̃2 )γ1T γ2 + α̃(γ1T γ1 + γ2T γ2 )
∝


− (γ1T γ1 − γ1T γ2 )2 + (γ1T γ2 − γ2T γ2 )2 γ1T γ2 + (γ1T γ2 − γ2T γ2 )(γ1T γ1 + γ2T γ2 )(γ1T γ1 − γ1T γ2 )

=

(−γ1T γ1 + 2γ1T γ2 − γ2T γ2 )(γ1T γ1 γ2T γ2 − (γ1T γ2 )2 ) = − kγ1 − γ2 k (γ1T γ1 γ2T γ2 − (γ1T γ2 )2 ) < 0

Therefore,

2

∂Rent
∂c(α1 )

< 0. Since by the first part

∂c(α1 )
α1
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> 0,

∂Rent
∂α1

< 0 as stated. The limit condition is

a direct result the definition of rent and part 1.

2.6.2.8

Proof of Corollary 2

If the IC constraint does not bind when the vectors are γ10 and γ20 , the data broker charges the
monopolist prices and obtains the highest profits he is able to.
If the IC constraint binds when the vectors are γ10 and γ20 , then it binds when the vectors are γ1 and
γ2 . Since the angle between γ10 and γ20 is larger than the angle between γ1 and γ2 and the measure
of all angles is smaller than π/2, γ1T γ2 > γ10T γ20 .
Remember that the profits are given by

2
α1 γ1T γ1 γ2T γ2 − (γ1T γ2 )2 + γ2T γ2 − c(α1 )γ1T γ2
π=
γ2T γ2 − 2c(α1 )γ1T γ2 + c 2 (α1 )γ1T γ1
where c is defined in theorem 2.2. Then
∂π
∂γ1T γ2

∝ (−α1 γ1T γ2 − c(α1 )(γ2T γ2 − c(α1 )γ1T γ2 ))(γ2T γ2 − 2c(α1 )γ1T γ2 + c 2 (α1 )γ1T γ1 )


2 
+c(α1 ) α1 γ1T γ1 γ2T γ2 − (γ1T γ2 )2 + γ2T γ2 − c(α1 )γ1T γ2
=

(γ1T γ2 − c(α1 )γ1T γ1 )(γ2T γ2 − c(α1 )γ1T γ2 )(c 2 (α1 ) − α1 )

Since c(α1 ) ≤ α̃ it is easy to check that the first two factors are non-negative. Lemma 2.8 shows that
the third factor is negative. Therefore, the profits decrease when increasing γ1T γ2 , which implies the
result.

2.6.2.9

Proof Lemma 2.4

Suppose that q2v 6= 0 and `2v 6= 0. Let λ2v = Var (X )1/2 L2v and `ˆ2v =

`2v
.
kλ2v k2

I first show that it is

without loss to assume that the angle β2v between λ2v and γ2 is smaller than the angle β12v between
λ2v and γ1 .
Suppose that β12v ≤ β2v . Let β be the angle between γ1 and γ2 . Pick λ̃2v as the vector with the
same magnitude as λ2v such that the angle between λ̃2v and γ1 satisfies βγ1 ,λ̃2v = β2v + β and the
angle between λ̃2v and γ2 satisfies βγ2 ,λ̃2v = β2v . After this change the willingness to pay by any
type (v 0 , t1 ) for the statistic that is targeted to type (v , t2 ) has decrease, while it keeps constant the
willingness to pay by any type (v 0 , t2 ) for this statistic. This uniformly relaxes all constraints IC
1v’-2v, while it keeps the rest of constraints unchanged. This construction shows that it is without
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loss to assume that β12v > β2v .
Remember that q2v =

cos 2 (β2v )
.
1+`ˆ2v σ 2

0
I will show that there is another pair (β2v
, `02v ) with `02v = 0 such that

0
type (v , t2 ) still obtains the same forecast’s variance reduction, but such that δ12v > δ12v
, implying

that all constraints IC 1v’-2v are relaxed. This completes the argument.
0
Let β2v
= cos −1

q

cos 2 (β2v )
1+`ˆ2v σ 2



p

0
0
and `02v = 0. It is inmediate that q2v
= cos 2 (β2v
) = q2v . Furthermore,

0
δ12v

0
= cos(β2v
+ β)
0
0
= cos(β2v
)cos(β) − sin(β2v
)sin(β)
r
2 (β )
2v
sin(β)
= √cos(βˆ2v ) cos(β) − 1 − cos
1+`ˆ2v σ2
1+`2v σ2
√
1−cos 2 (β )
< √cos(βˆ2v ) cos(β) − √ ˆ 2v sin(β)

=
=

1+`2v σ2
1+`2v σ2
cos(β2v )cos(β)−sin(β2v )sin(β)
√
1+`ˆ2v σ2
√
cos(β2v +β)
√
= δ12v ,
ˆ
1+`2v σ2

where in the third equality I use that sin(cos −1 (x)) =

2.6.2.10

√

1 − x 2.

Proof Lemma 2.5

1. Suppose that in the solution to problem P, q1v < 1 for some v ∈ [v1∗ , v̂ ]. This cannot be
a solution since for v ∈ [v1∗ , v̂ ] the virtual value is positive and increasing q1v relaxes all
constraints IC 1v’-2w for v 0 > v and any w .
2. Suppose that in the solution to problem P v̂2 < v2∗ , that is, q2v > 0 for some v < v2∗ . Since the
virtual value for information type t2 is negative for v < v2∗ , by taking q2v = 0 for v < v̂2 the
objective function increases and all constraints are still satisfied. Therefore, v̂2 ≥ v2∗ . Now, if
v̂2 = v2∗ the seller can increase his profits. Consider slightly increasing v̂2 . This directly affects
the profits coming from information type t2 at a quadratic rate, but it reduces the information
rent given to types v > v1∗ in a linear way. Therefore, for a small increase of the threshold the
profits have to increase, and v̂2 > v2∗ .
Now suppose that v̂2 ≥ v1∗ . The allocation q1v = q2v = 1 for all v ≥ v1∗ and 0 otherwise,
satisfies all the constraints. By continuity, the seller can pick q2v = 1 for some neighborhood
(v1∗ − , v1∗ ) and still satisfy the constraints. By picking q2v = 1 for v > v1∗ −  and q1v = 1 for
v ≥ v1∗ , the seller can increases his profits. Therefore, v̂2 < v1∗ .
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2.6.2.11

Proof Lemma 2.6

I show a property that is stronger than the statement. I show that for any allocation q2v for type
t2 with q2v non-decreasing, and v̂2 < v1∗ such that the constraints IC 1v1∗ − 2v 0 for all v 0 ≥ v̂2 are
satisfied, it has to be that in the constrained solution to problem P, there is a threshold v̂1 =

v̂2 q2v̂2
g (q2v̂2 )

such that q1v = 0 for v < v̂1 and q1v = g (q2v̂2 ) for all v ∈ [v̂1 , v1∗ ).
Let v̂1 =

v̂2 q2v̂2
g (q2v̂2 ) .

That v̂2 < v̂1 is obvious from the definition. I show that in the optimal solution to

problem P, v̂1 < v1∗ . First, v̂2 has to be such that

v̂2
g (1)

≤ v1∗ . If not, the seller could offer q2v 0 = 1

to the type v 0 > v2∗ that solves this equation, which satisfies all the constraints and increases his
profits because this type’s virtual value is positive. Therefore, v̂1 ≤ v1∗ . Suppose that v̂1 = v1∗ .
Then q2v̂2 = 1 and v̂2 = g (1)v1∗ . As in Section 2.4.1 this cannot be a solution to the seller’s profits,
reducing q2v̂2 slightly has a negligible impact in type (t2 , v̂2 )’ willingness to pay for this statistic,
but it significantly reduces type (t1 , v1∗ )’ willingness to pay for it. Formally, the derivative of type
(t2 , v̂2 )’ willingness to pay is zero when evaluated at q2v̂2 = 1 since this means that the angle between
type (t2 , v̂2 )’s preferred vector of coefficients and that statistic targeted to her has zero magnitude,
and the derivative of the function cos is zero when the angle is zero, but it is non-zero for any angle
in (0, π/2).
Now I argue that picking the allocation q1v = 0 for v < v̂1 and q1v = g (q2v̂2 ) for v ∈ [v̂2 , v1∗ ) and the
values U(v1 , t1 ) = U(v2 , t2 ) = 0 is feasible in problem P. With this values the constraints IC 1v-2v’
¯
¯
with v < v1∗ and v 0 ≥ v̂2 are satisfied since
Rv
v
¯

q1w dw

=
≥
≥

R v1∗

R v∗
q1w dw − v 1 q1w dw
v
R v0
¯
v1∗ g (q2v 0 ) − v 0 q2v 0 + v q2w dw
R v¯0
vg (q2v 0 ) − v 0 q2v 0 + v q2w dw ,
¯

− g (q2v̂2 )(v1∗ − v )

where in the first inequality I use that the constraint IC 1v ∗ − 2v 0 is satisfied, and in the second
inequality I use that v1∗ > v .
Choosing U(v1 , t1 ) = U(v2 , t2 ) = 0 is clearly optimal and picking q1v = 0 when possible for v < v1∗
¯
¯
is optimal since the virtual value is negative in this case.
Now suppose that for an small interval to the right of v̂1 the constraints IC 1v -2v̂2 do not bind.
Since the virtual value for these types is negative, the solution would be to pick q1v = 0 for all of
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them, but these types can report type (v̂2 , t2 ) and obtain a positive profit since for them vg (q2v̂2 ) >
v̂1 g (q2v̂2 ) = v̂2 q2v̂2 . Then the constraints IC 1v -2v̂2 have to bind for any v ∈ (v̂1 , v1∗ ). Since virtual
value is negative in this interval, the seller wants to pick the lowest value of q1v that satisfies these
constraints and this value is q1v = g (q2v̂2 ).

2.6.2.12

Proof Lemma 2.7

I prove the lemma in many steps. First, I fix an allocation (q1 , q2 ) with q1 and q2 non-decreasing
with q1 satisfying the conditions in Lemma 2.6, and I show that if the constraints IC 1v1∗ − 2v 0
for all v 0 > v̂2 are satisfied, then the allocation (q1 , q2 ) is feasible for problem P. Finally, I show
that all these constraints have to bind, and, this implies, that the optimal solution q2v satisfies the
conditions in the statement.
Fix an allocation (q1 , q2 ) with q1 and q2 non-decreasing, and q1 satisfying the conditions in Lemma
2.6. I first show that if the constraints IC 1v1∗ − 2v 0 for all v 0 > v̂2 are satisfied, then the allocation
(q1 , q2 ) is feasible for problem P. For v 0 < v̂2 and any v , the IC constraints IC 1v-2v’ are automatically
satisfied since q2v 0 = g (q2v 0 ) = 0. In the proof of Lemma 2.6 I showed that for all v < v1∗ and v 0 ≥ v̂2
the constraints IC 1v-2v’ are satisfied. Now, I show that for all v ≥ v1∗ and v 0 ≥ v̂2 the constraints
IC 1v-2v’ are satisfied since
Rv
v
¯

q1w dw

=
≥
≥

R v1∗

Rv
q1w dw + v ∗ q1w dw
v
1
¯
R v0
v1∗ g (q2v 0 ) − v 0 q2v 0 + v q2w dw
R v¯0
vg (q2v 0 ) − v 0 q2v 0 + v q2w dw ,
¯

+ (v − v1∗ )

where the first inequality follows from the constraint IC 1v1∗ -2v’ being satisfied and from the fact
that q1v = 1 for all v > v1∗ .
Now, I show that all the constraints IC 1v1∗ − 2v 0 for v 0 ≥ v̂2 bind. First, suppose that the constraint
IC 1v1∗ -2v̂2 does not bind. Since the virtual value is positive for v > v2∗ the seller maximizes its
revenue by setting v̂2 = v2∗ and q2v̂2 = 1 and v̂1 = v1∗ , but this is not possible since in such a case,
by assumption, type (ti , v1∗ ) has an incentive to report type (t2 , v2∗ ). Therefore, the constraint IC
1v1∗ -2v̂2 binds. Furthermore, q2v̂2 < 1. If not, the seller can reduce q2v̂2 by a small amount which
almost does not decrease the revenue of selling to type (t2 , v̂2 ) but increases the profits coming from
information type t1 since the seller can reduce q1v̂1 and type (t1 , v̂1 )’s virtual value is negative.
By continuity of the RHS of the constraints IC 1v1∗ -2v’, they have to bind in a neighborhood to the
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right of v̂2 ; if not the firm should be able to pick q2v = 1 in this neighborhood but this contradicts
the continuity of the RHS. As these constraints bind, they hold with equality and the derivative of
the RHS with respect to v 0 has to be zero, that is,
v1∗ g 0 (q2v 0 )
Therefore, in this interval either

∂q2w
∂q2w
|w =v 0 −v 0
|w =v 0 = 0.
∂w
∂w

∂q2w
0
dw |w =v =

0 or g 0 (q2v 0 ) =

v0
v1∗ .

As limx→1 g 0 (x) = ∞, q2v 0 is bounded

away from 1 for all v 0 in this neighborhood to the right of v̂2 .
Suppose that v̊ is the first value at which the constraint IC 1v1∗ -2v’ does not bind, so that the seller
will pick q2v̊ = 1. Since limv →v̊ − q2v < 1 and the RHS of the constraints IC 1v1∗ -2v’ is continuous,
it is not possible that q2v̊ = 1 is feasible; if not, for v close and to the left of v̊ the seller should be
able to pick q2v close to 1. Therefore, for all v 0 > v̂2 the constraint IC 1v1∗ -2v’ binds.
Since all the constraints IC 1v1∗ − 2v 0 for v 0 ≥ v̂2 bind, either

∂q2w
0
dw |w =v =

0 or g 0 (q2v 0 ) =

v0
v1∗

for all

v 0 ≥ v̂2 . I show that q2v satisfies the first condition for v 0 close to v̂2 and that, in some cases, it
satisfies the second condition for large v 0 values.
Since cos −1 (q2v ) + β ∈ [β, π/2] and it is decreasing in q2v , it can be shown that the second derivative
of g (q2v ) is positive. Therefore, g 0 (q2v ) is increasing. This means that the solution of the equation
g 0 (q2v 0 ) =

v0
v1∗

is increasing. Since, q2v has to be increasing, and the virtual value for v > v̂2 is

positive, there exists ṽ2 > v̂2 such that q2v = q2v̂2 for v < ṽ2 and it is equal to the solution of the
equation g 0 (q2v 0 ) =

v0
v1∗

g (q

)

for all other values of v . ṽ2 and v̂2 are equal only if g 0 (q2v̂2 ) = q2v̂2v̂2 . After
2
q
1−q2v̂2
−1
some algebra this condition can be written as tan(cos (q2v̂2 ) + β) −
= 0 and the LHS is
q2v̂
2

strictly decreasing with lim LHS = tan(β). Therefore, there is not value of q2v̂2 that satisfies this
q2v̂2 →1

condition, and ṽ2 > v̂2 . Finally, since ṽ2 does not necessarily belongs to the support of the valuations
for type t2 , it might be that q2v is just a constant function.

2.6.2.13

Proof Theorem 2.3

I only need to check that the solution actually satisfies the constraints that I have not imposed in
the relaxed problem. It is straightforward to see that this is the case.
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2.6.2.14

Proof Proposition 2.3

That none of the IC constraints bind is equivalent to the optimal mechanism being the one that
gives recommendations ψi = E[θi ] + Cov (θi )Var (X )−1 (X − E[X ]) and charges prices γiT γi . For such
mechanism the IC constraint for type ti reporting type tj with i < j is satisfied iff
(γiT γj )2
2
2
4
− γjT γj < 0 ⇔ (γiT γj )2 > (γjT γj )2 ⇔ cos 2 (βij ) kγi k kγj k < kγj k .
γjT γj

Now, in such a mechanism the upward constraint for type tk reporting type tl with k > l is satisfied
iff
(γlT γk )2
2
2
4
− γlT γl < 0 ⇔ (γkT γl )2 < (γlT γl )2 ⇔ kγl k kγk k cos 2 (βlk ) < kγl k ,
γlT γl
where βlk is the angle between vectors γk and γl . The last inequality always holds since cos(βlk ) < 1
2

2

and by assumption kγl k ≥ kγk k .
Since all IC constraints are satisfied by the proposed mechanism, it is feasible and none of the IC
constraints bind.

2.6.2.15

Proof Theorem 2.4

1. Suppose all types receive a positive surplus and let P = mini

n

2
(LT
i Cov (θi ,X ))
T
Li Var (X )Li +`i σ 2

− pi

o

> 0. Then

the data broker can charge new prices p̃i = pi + P, so that all IC constraints are unaffected
and the IR constraints are satisfied. This modification of the mechanism clearly increases the
seller’s profits.
2. Suppose by contradiction that in the optimal mechanism (ψ, p), the statistic ψ(ti ) is not
sufficient to learn the conditional expectation of θi given the data X , that is, there is not
k 6= 0 such that Li = kVar (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ) or `i 6= 0.
Let Ri = Var (θi ) − Var (θi | ψ(ti )) − p(ti ) be the rent that type ti receives in this mechanism,
and let i ∗ ∈ arg maxi γiT γi − Ri be the type that in net terms is willing to pay more for all the
data.
Consider the alternative mechanism (ψ 0 , p 0 ) with ψ 0 (ti ∗ ) = E[θi ∗ | X ], p 0 (ti ∗ ) = γiT∗ γi ∗ − Ri ∗ ,
and for any ti 6= ti ∗ , ψ 0 (ti ) = ψ(ti ) and p 0 (ti ) = p(ti ). First, type ti ∗ does not have incentive
to report any other type since in the modified mechanism she obtains the same rent as in the
original mechanism. Furthermore, any type ti 6= ti ∗ does not want to report type ti ∗ since by
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Claim 2.2 and Lemma 2.1
Var (θi ) − Var (θi | ψ 0 (ti ∗ )) − p 0 (ti ∗ ) < γiT γi − (γiT γi − Ri ) = Ri .
Finally, p 0 (ti ∗ ) = γiT∗ γi ∗ − Ri ∗ > Var (θi ) − Var (θi | ψ(ti )) − Ri = p(ti ). Therefore the mechanism
(ψ 0 , p 0 ) is feasible and gives higher profits to the seller than mechanism (ψ, p), a contradiction.

2.6.2.16

Proof Theorem 2.5

Fix δ > 0 with δ < min{γiT γi : i ∈ {1, ... , n}}. For the subset of types I ⊆ {1, ... , n}, consider the
modified problem
V (I , δ) =

max

{pi ,Li ,`i }i∈I

s.t.

P

i∈I

αi pi

2
(LT
i Cov (θi ,X ))
2 2
LT
i Var (X )Li +`i σ
2
(LT
i Cov (θi ,X ))
2 σ2
LT
Var
(X
)L
+`
i
i
i

− pi ≥

− pi ≥ 0

pi ≥ δ
and let V (δ) =

max

I ⊆{1,...,n}

V (I , δ) and I ∗ (δ) = arg

2
(LT
j Cov (θi ,X ))
T
2
Lj Var (X )Lj +`j σ 2

− pj

∀i, j ∈ I
∀i ∈ I
∀i ∈ I

max

I ⊆{1,...,n}

V (I , δ). This problem must have a solution

in which some Li are non-zero and some pi > δ since, by Lemma 2.1, the vector of coefficients
L̃i = Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ), the noise coefficient `˜i = 0 and prices p̃i = min{γiT γi : i ∈ {1, ... , n}}
satisfy all the constraints. In other words, one of the points that satisfy the Khun-Tucker conditions
is the optimal solution.
In the optimal mechanism min{pi : pi > 0} > 0. Then as δ → 0, the sequences V (δ) and I ∗ (δ) are
finally constant, and equal to the seller’s optimal profits and equal to the set of types to which the
seller sells in the optimal mechanism.
Let I ∗ be the set of types to which the data broker sells in the optimal mechanism and δ small
enough such that the constraints pi ≥ δ do not bind. When considering the modified problem with
I ∗ and such small δ, the solution is exactly equal to the optimal mechanism for the data broker. For
this problem let λij be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the IC constraint from type ti to
type tj and µi be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the IR constraint for type ti for i, j ∈ I ∗ .
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Defining aji ≡

LT
i Cov (θj ,X )
2 2,
LT
i Var (X )Li +`i σ

P



 P

aii Cov (θi , X ) − aii2 Var (X )Li = j6=i λji aji Cov (θj , X ) − aji2 Var (X )Li
P


λji aji
.
Var (X )−1
P j6=i
P
Cov
(θ
,
X
)
−
Cov
(θ
,
X
)
2
i
j
λ
a
(λ
+µ
)a
ij
i ii
j6=i ji

j6=i λij + µi

⇔ Li =

the First Order Condition with respect to Li can be written as

aii
P
− P (λ +µji)a
i ii
j6=i (λij +µi )
j6=i ij

j6=i

Since the value of the objective function is scale invariant, Li can be normalized such that
P

2
j6=i λji aji

P

j6=i (λji +µi )aii

= 1. Further, define cji ≡

aji
aii

P

aii
j6=i (λij +µi )

−

, and since the problem is bang-bang with respect to `i ,

it has to be that `i = 0 for all i ∈ I ∗ and `i = ∞ for all i 6∈ I ∗ . Therefore, I obtain the desired
expression.
I still need to show that the mapping from the vector (cij )i,j ∈ R2n into itself has a least one fixed
point. The mapping is clearly continuous. I argue that each cij in the codomain can be bounded,
and that in such a case the image is bounded as well. Then the domain and the codomain of the
mapping can be restricted to be the same compact convex subset of R2n and by Brouwer Fixed-Point
theorem the mapping has at least one fixed point.
2
T
2
∗
Since pi ≥ δ > 0 and (LT
i Cov (θi , X )) ≥ pi , (Li Cov (θi , X )) > 0 for each i ∈ I .

In par-

ticular this implies that Li 6= 0, and since Var (X ) is positive definite, LT
i Var (X )Li > 0. Let
o
n T
(Li Cov (θi ,X ))2
> 0. By Lemma 2.1
ζ = mini∈I ∗
LT Var (X )Li
i

2
(LT
i Cov (θj , X ))
≤ Cov (θj , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θj , X ).
T
Li Var (X )Li


Let M = maxi∈I ∗ Cov (θi , X )T Var (X )−1 Cov (θi , X ) . Then it has to be that for each i and j, cij2 ≤ M
ζ .
 q q 2n
M
Then the mapping can be restricted to go from the domain − M
to itself. This restricted
α,
α
map satisfies all the hypothesis of Brouwer Fixed Point theorem, so it has at least one fixed point.
Since the problem is guaranteed to have a solution, its solution needs to satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. Therefore, one of the fixed points has to be the solution to the original problem.
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CHAPTER 3 : Higher Order Information Complementarities and Polarization
Carlos Segura-Rodriguez

3.1. Introduction
Homophily and belief polarization are two of the most pervasive characteristics of social
networks. Homophily is the tendency of individuals to relate to others with similar backgrounds in terms of characteristics such as ethnicity, gender, religion, and education,1 while
belief polarization is the fact that individuals’ beliefs and conceptions about specific matters differ across groups.2 In a frictionless environment in which individuals are completely
rational and their objective is to learn, one would not expect homophily and belief polarization to arise since the agents within the various groups would communicate with those who
have different beliefs from their own, and information would spread throughout the whole
network (DeGroot (1974), DeMarzo et al. (2003)). The literature has pointed out the distortions in an environment that might disrupt this logic, ranging from different meet-rates
across and inside groups, along with the higher returns of being with individuals in the
same group (Currarini et al., 2009), to psychological factors, such as feeling at ease among
those with similar backgrounds (Kets and Sandroni, 2016).
I investigate a new motive that arises in a fully rational environment in which individuals
are only able to communicate their private signals: due to complementarities in information
it may be optimal for an individual to communicate with those who have information that is
highly correlated with her signal. These preferences originate from the fact that some signal
structures allow for forecasting a stochastic state when all signals are positively conditionally
correlated with higher precision than when the signals are conditionally independent. As a
result, I can find instances in which homophily and belief polarization simultaneously appear
in the endogenous network. In my model a finite number of individuals want to forecast a
stochastic state about which they are uncertain. Each individual receives a private signal
1

For a summary of the empirical evidence, see, for example, McPherson et al. (2001).
For example, despite strong scientific evidence that the planet is warming, in large part due to human
activity, a partisan divide exists in public opinion as to whether or not this is true (Dunlap et al. (2016)).
2
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and can decide whether to share his signal with others. If two individuals agree to engage
in costly communication,3 a new social link is created. Communication decisions such as
these generate a social network. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that individuals face a
quadratic loss when forecasting, so their objective is to pick the right set of links to minimize
the communication cost plus the conditional variance given the information they gather.
I prove that for generic correlation matrices, the only network that satisfies a strong definition of stability, due to Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), is a network of disconnected cliques.
Focusing only on disconnected cliques, I characterize the conditions under which n > 2
signals generate a very precise forecast of the state. It turns out that there is a continuum
of correlation matrices such that observing all the signals will allow individuals to learn
the state perfectly, and many of these matrices contain only positive correlations.4 These
complementarities in information can be very powerful. For any number of signals K , there
are information structures such that after observing all K signals, the agents learn the state
perfectly, but if they observe any subset of the signals, they learn almost as little as a single
individual would.
This approach leads to new economic insights. First, I present an example where the
indirect preferences become reversed: an individual’s preferences over who he wants to share
information with depends on the number of people with whom he wants to communicate.
Second, the size of the cliques in the stable network is limited only by the cost of forming
links; if this cost is small enough, it is always possible to find a correlation matrix for which
the unique strongly stable network consists of a clique containing all the individuals.
Finally, homophily and belief polarization can coexist in my model’s environment. For each
small δ ≥ 0, there is a two-block matrix, with all intra-clique correlations larger than a
threshold ρ̃ > 0, for which the unique strongly stable network consists of the two cliques
and the ex-ante expected value of the squared difference of the forecasts between the two
3
4

Time and resources have to be spent in order to communicate with other individuals.
This result is robust in the sense that the variance reduction is continuous in the correlations.
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cliques is larger than δ. Due to the information complementarities, individuals with similar
information optimally communicate between themselves, emulating the homophily patterns
that have been found in social networks. At the same time, as the individuals’ forecasts
are different across cliques, for an external observer it will appear as if the cliques’ beliefs
are polarized. An interesting applied insight is that these phenomena are easier to sustain
when the cost of communicating is smaller, and certainly this cost has decreased in recent
years due to the surge in online social networks; and during this time belief polarization
has simultaneously increased.
I show that in my model these two phenomena are closely associated since higher levels of
belief disagreement require higher intra-clique correlations. On one hand, an upper bound
for the intra-clique posterior variance is the posterior variance between any pair, and this
variance decreases with respect to the correlation. On the other hand, a low correlation
between two individuals in a clique means that they can provide more information to the
individuals in the other clique, making it more difficult to deter deviations.
3.1.1. Related Literature
As noted above, my result can be considered a new explanation for the homophily phenomenon (see Currarini et al. (2009),Kets and Sandroni (2016)). Golub and Jackson (2012)
show that homophily can reduce the speed of learning when individuals are only able to
take averages of their neighbors’ beliefs. My work focuses on what kinds of networks can
be formed when only signals, and not beliefs, can be communicated, and I show how this
may result in the presence of homophily in the endogenous stable network.
There is a growing literature that studies how individuals acquire signals in similar Gaussian environments. Sethi and Yildiz (2016) ] study an environment where individuals do
not know other priors and choose whom to observe, so they can simultaneously learn about
the state and others’ priors. Liang et al. (2017) study information acquisition patterns by
two agents, a myopic one and a fully rational one, when the agents can decide sequentially
which signals to acquire from a set of correlated signals that identify the state. Kamb-
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hampati et al. (2017) study the inefficiency patterns that can arise in a stable matching,
when individuals can decide with whom to match and how many signals to acquire from a
correlated information structure after they are matched.
The paper whose results resemble mine the most is Sethi and Yildiz (2018). In their environment individuals have different priors and can decide whom to observe over every period.
The prior realizations are both correlated between individuals in the same group and independent across groups. Their main result is that when the intra-group correlation is large
enough, individuals will observe only others in the same group. In contrast to the complementarities of information I describe, the explanation for homophily in their environment is
that individuals understand other biases better when the correlation between their priors is
high. There is previous work (e.g., Meyer and Strulovici (2015)) that has focused on finding the right measure of interdependencies for non-Gaussian environments with more than
two signals. I contribute by showing that in any information environment, the correlation
structures of signals that do not provide new information or that lead to perfect learning
cannot be summarized by simple linear rankings of the pairwise correlations.

3.2. Model
I study a society with a finite number of agents N = {1, ..., N}, N ≥ 2. Individuals are
uncertain about a stochastic state, θ ∈ R, which they want to forecast. They evaluate their
estimate using a quadratic loss function; that is, if their forecast is a ∈ R they receive a
utility equal to u(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2 .
I assume that all the agents share a common prior belief that follows a Normal distribution,
with mean µθ and precision τθ . Each agent privately observes an unbiased Normal signal,
yi , with precision τ . I allow the individuals’ signals to be correlated in any feasible way. Its
correlation matrix, which I denote by Σ, only needs to be a positive semidefinite matrix,
and, in particular, it does not have to be invertible. Explicitly, the vector of signals is
distributed according to:
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Individuals can communicate with others and learn their signal realizations. Communication is a costly activity: if an agent communicates with K other individuals, he has to pay a
cost c(K ), with c an increasing function.5 I impose three restrictions in the communication
protocol. First, individuals must decide with whom to communicate before they observe the
realization of their own signals. Second, communication between two individuals actually
occurs only if both of them agree to communicate. Finally, individuals can communicate
only the realization of their signals, not their beliefs.6
The communication links that are created define a network in the set N . The endogenous
network is represented by the matrix g , where gij = 1 if agents i and j communicate and 0
otherwise.
The timing in the model is summarized in Figure 3.1. Each individual first decides with
whom to communicate. Once the communication network has formed, Nature draws the
individuals’ signals. Upon observing their own signals, the agents communicate, and, with
the signals gathered, each individual chooses a forecast a.
Individuals
form links

Nature draws
signals

Individuals
communicate

Individuals choose
forecast a

Figure 3.1: Timing in the model.

3.3. Optimal Action and Endogenous Networks
The objective of this section is twofold. First, I describe the optimal agents’ forecast after
observing any set of signals. Second, I characterize the shape of the communication network
that endogenously arises. I do not model how each communication link forms, but I require
5
If communication were without cost, individuals would communicate with everybody since observing
more signals would allow them to make a better forecast.
6
One possible interpretation for this assumption is that individuals can only communicate information
they can support with evidence.
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that the resulting network must satisfy a strong notion of stability.
Fix a network g . Agent i observes her own signal and her neighbors’ signals—that is,
she learns the signals received by Ni (g ) = {j : gij = 1} ∪ {i}. Since individual i suffers a
quadratic loss, her optimal forecast is equal to the conditional expectation, and her expected
utility, which I denote by Ui (g ), is equal to the negative of the posterior variance minus the
communication cost she has to pay, c(|Ni (g )| − 1). In the Normal environment the posterior
variance is independent of the signals’ realization and can be expressed in a simple closed
form solution. Lemma 3.1 formalizes this discussion.7
Lemma 3.1. Fix agent i and a network g . Let ΣNi (g ) be the correlation matrix between
the signals i observes. For any signal realization xNi (g ) , individual i’s optimal action is
a = E [θ | xNi (g ) ], and individual i’s expected utility is

Ui (g ) = Ui (Ni (g )) = −Var θ | xNi (g ) − c(|Ni (g )| − 1).
Let B be a base of the null space of ΣNi (g ) . If 10Ni (g ) B = 0 then
−1
Var (θ | xNi (g ) ) = (τ 10Ni (g ) Σ+
Ni (g ) 1Ni (g ) + τθ ) ,

0
where Σ+
Ni (g ) is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of ΣNi (g ) , and if 1Ni (g ) B 6= 0 then Var (θ |

xNi (g ) ) = 0.
I use the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse, a generalization of the inverse of a matrix, to account
for the possibility that the correlation matrix of a group of signals is singular. When the
correlation matrix is invertible this generalization coincides with the inverse of the matrix,
and if it is singular it can be thought of as an approximation of the inverse by the inverse of
nearby positive definite matrices.8 The lemma provides two important insights. First, an
agent, conditional on the number of signals, prefers the set of signals with the highest sum
7
8

The proof of this lemma and all others not in the main text can be found in Appendix 3.7.1.
Formally, for any symmetric matrix A, A+ = T ( lim (D 2 + δ 2 I )−1 D)T 0 , where D is a diagonal matrix
δ→0

and T is an orthogonal matrix such that A = TDT 0 . Its proof can be found on page 23 Albert (1972).
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of the entries in Σ̂+
Ni (g ) . As the inverse of a matrix is a highly nonlinear function, no simple
ranking of the pairwise correlations corresponds to the individual’s preferences over groups
of signals. I analyze in Section 3.4 the relation between the pairwise correlations and the
individuals’ preferences. Second, an individual’s utility depends only on the neighbors she
has. In particular, an agent is indifferent as to the choice od networks as long as she has
the same set of neighbors. This fact will be critical for my network characterization.
In my environment there are two ways in which an individual’s utility can be equal in two
different networks, g and g 0 . The first one occurs when the individual has the same number
−1
0
0
of neighbors in the two networks and 10Ni (g ) Σ−1
Ni (g ) 1Ni (g ) = 1Ni (g 0 ) ΣNi (g 0 ) 1Ni (g ) . The second

occurs if the difference in communication costs is offset by the difference in the posterior
variances. While the first occurs only in a zero measure space, the second one can be
destroyed by a small perturbation in the cost function. To avoid these peculiar cases I
introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1. If individual i’s neighbors differ in two networks g and g 0 , then Ui (g ) 6=
Ui (g 0 ).
Since I know the payoff for any individual in any possible network, I can characterize which
networks endogenously arise. I require that the endogenous network be strongly stable, a
concept introduced by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).9 I say that a network is strongly
stable (Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997) if there is no coalition that can strictly improve the
utility of each of its individual members by merely creating extra links within the coalition
or cutting an existing link that is held by someone in the coalition. Formally,10
Definition 3.1. A network g is strongly stable with respect to U if there is no S ⊆
{1, ... , N} or network g 0 that satisfies
9
I could ask for a weaker solution concept such a pairwise stability, a notion introduced by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). This alternative notion only requires that no pair has incentive to deviate, but this
requirement is too weak for my interests.
10
There is another notion of strong stability due to Jackson and Van den Nouweland (2005). The only
difference is that the group will deviate if it can weakly increase the utility of all its members and strictly
increase the utility of at least of one of them. Assumption 3.1 makes both definitions equivalent in my
environment.
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• If gij0 = 1 and gij = 0 then i, j ∈ S.
• If gij0 = 0 and gij = 1 then either i ∈ S or j ∈ S.
such that ∀i ∈ S, Ui (g 0 ) > Ui (g ).
Since in my environment all individuals attain the same level of utility when observing the
same set of signals, it makes sense to look at networks where if individual i has as neighbors
both j and k, then individuals j and k are neighbors as well. In other words, individuals
may have incentive to form closed and disconnected cliques. Definition 3.2 formally defines
this class of networks. Theorem 3.1 shows that a disconnected clique network is the only
one that satisfies strong stability.
Definition 3.2. The network g consists of disconnected cliques g1 , ... , gM if

∪· i gi = N ,

for all i, j ∈ gl , gij = 1 and if i ∈ gli , j ∈ glj , li 6= lj then gij = 0.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose assumption 3.1 is satisfied.11 There is a unique strongly stable
network, and it is a disconnected clique network.
Proof. The set 2N \ ∅ contains all the possible cliques that can be formed. By Lemma 3.1
each clique is associated with a unique utility level for each of its members. Since 2N \ ∅
is a finite set, we can order the utility generated in each of the cliques, from the highest to
the lowest.
Form the clique that gives the highest utility (if there are ties, pick one of the largest cliques)
and call it S 1 . From the cliques without individuals in S 1 pick the clique that gives the
highest utility (if there are ties, pick one of the largest cliques) and call it S 2 . Continue
inductively. This process delivers a partition S := {S 1 , S 2 , ... , S m }. I will show that this
partition is strongly stable.
Consider the incentives to deviate for an individual in clique S 1 . If individual i in clique
11

Without Assumption 3.1, the first part of the proof implies that one of the strongly stable networks is
a disconnected clique network, but I cannot argue that all strongly stable networks belong to this class.
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S1 decides to create links with individuals in A1 and cut links with individuals in C1 , he
will obtain utility as being in group S 1 ∪ A1 \ C1 . However, individual i weakly prefers
group S 1 over S 1 ∪ A1 \ C1 . Therefore, no player in S 1 can be part of a deviating group.
Continuing inductively allows us to conclude that the disconnected clique network defined
by S is strongly stable.
To prove uniqueness, I use assumption 3.1. Suppose a network g is strongly stable. Take
the individuals in S1 = {i11 , ... , i1m }. Let D = {1 ≤ l ≤ m : ∃k 6= l ∈ S 1 with gi k i l =
0 or ∃j ∈
/ S1 with gi l j = 1} and suppose that D is non-empty. By definition all individuals
in D are derive a lower utility than would be the case if they formed the clique S1 . If
D = S1 they have a strict incentive to create the network where clique S1 forms. If D 6= S1
for all j ∈ S1 \ D, individual j is connected to everyone else in S1 and has no connections
outside S1 . Therefore, the individuals in D are able to create the clique S1 by creating
links between individuals in D and cutting links with individuals outside S1 , a network they
strictly prefer. This contradicts the assumption that network g is strongly stable. Thus it
must be that g contains the disconnected clique S1 . Inductively we conclude that g must
be the disconnected clique network defined by S.

This result implies that in an environment where individuals can only communicate their
own experiences, they will create disjointed clusters of information.12 From now on I assume that the endogenous network is a disconnected clique network. My objective is to
characterize how individuals partition into cliques.
To the best of my knowledge, Theorem 3.1 is not a direct consequence of any of the results
in the literature. Jackson and Van den Nouweland (2005) focuses on studying the set of
strongly stable networks when the value function satisfies anonymity. My environment does
not satisfy this property; instead, an individual’s identity characterizes the complementarity
12

The disconnected clique network characterized in Theorem 3.1 satisfies other notions of stability. It
satisfies pairwise stability, and under Assumption 3.1, it is the only strongly stable network as defined by
Jackson and Van den Nouweland (2005) and the unique farsighted stable network as defined by Herings
et al. (2009).
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of others’ information with his own. Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) focuses on finding an
allocation rule that delivers strongly stable outcomes. My allocation rule is fixed and does
not coincide with the one they proposed.
Since Theorem 3.1 implies that the only strongly stable network consists of disconnected
cliques, my result is related to the literature on coalition formation. In particular, if I
restrict attention to coalitions alone, my environment satisfies the Top Coalition Property
introduced by Banerjee et al. (2001). Since by assumption 3.1 the preferences in my environment are strict, I obtain that the cliques in the network described in the theorem
correspond to the elements of the unique partition in the Core.13 This means that the
strongly stable network maximizes social welfare as well.

3.4. Higher Order Information Complementarities
This section studies two questions: How does the posterior variance relate to correlation
structure inside any possible clique? And, for a given clique, what is the marginal value
of adding a new individual? The answer to these questions will give us some interesting
economic insights that I will present and discuss in Section 3.5.
I start by studying how the posterior variance relates to the correlation matrix. Consider
first the simple case in which there are only two individuals in a clique, {i, j}. By Lemma
3.1 the posterior variance is given by
1
2
1+ρij τ

+ τθ

.

This posterior variance has some important properties. First, when the correlation is −1, the
posterior variance is 0. The reason is that the realized signals are going to be symmetrically
located around the mean, and thus the individuals can perfectly forecast the state by taking
the average of the two signals. Second, when the correlation is 1 the reduction of the variance
after observing both signals is exactly the same as when observing only one of the signals
since the realizations of the signals coincide. Third, the posterior variance is continuous
13

See Theorem 2 in Banerjee et al. (2001).
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and strictly increases with respect to the pairwise correlation.
I show through a series of results that most of these properties still hold when considering
larger cliques. Theorem 3.2 establishes that, for any clique size, when a new member
is added the resulting posterior variance ranges from 0 to the posterior variance in the
original clique. However, the intuition is trickier than when the clique has two agents. The
new challenge is that the variance reduction that results when a new signal is observed is
not a monotonous function of the correlation coefficients or linear combinations of them,
and thus I need to focus my analysis on the correlation matrix itself. The key insight is
that the signal observed by an individual provides direct information, and simultaneously
it helps, in a nonlinear fashion, in the interpretation of the information provided by others.
I call such complementaries Higher Order Information Complementarities.
Theorem 3.2. Let An−1 be a positive definite correlation matrix of dimension (n−1)×(n−1)
and P a vector of dimension (n − 1) × 1 such that P 0 A−1
n−1 P ≤ 1. Let


An =

An−1 P
P0
1


.

1. An is positive semidefinite.
2. Var (θ | An ) = Var (θ | An−1 ) if and only if ∃{a1 , ... , an−1 } such that

Pn−1

k=1 an

= 1 and

P = a1 A1 + ... + an−1 An−1 ,
where Ai is An−1 ’s i-th column. Further, An is invertible if and only if ∀i, ai 6= 1.
3. Var (θ | An ) = 0 if and only if An is singular and none of the entries of P are equal to
1.14
The proof of Theorem 3.2 consists of two parts. First, by using the Cholesky decomposition
14

I use the normality assumption to prove only the ”only if” part of the argument. Therefore, in any
setting with unbiased signals, it is possible to identify correlation matrices that generate the extreme values
of the posterior variance.
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of the correlation matrix, I can express the n-th signal as a linear combination between the
state, the previous n − 1 signals, and independent noise:

yn =

1−

n−1
X

!
an,k

θ + an,1 y1 + an,2 y2 + ... + an,n−1 yn−1 + ann n .

k=1

This clearly defines two extreme cases. On one hand, if ann = 0 and 1 6=

Pn−1

k=1 an,k ,

after

observing the n signals the individuals in the clique can recover the state perfectly since
the state can be expressed as a linear combination of the signals. On the other hand, if
Pn−1
1 = k=1
an,k , observing the first n − 1 signals or observing all of them produces the same
reduction in the variance since the last signal is just a linear combination of the previous
signals and independent noise.
The second part of the proof studies how these linear combinations relate to the correlation
structure between the n signals. First, I show that observing all n signals allows individuals
to learn the state perfectly if and only if the correlation matrix between the n signals is
singular and all the correlation submatrices are invertible.15 Second, I show that the n − th
signal does not provide any extra information if and only if the correlation vector between
the n-th signal and the previous signals can be expressed as a linear combination of the
columns of the correlation matrix between the first n − 1 signals, where the sum of the
weights in the linear combination is equal to 1.
Example 5 presents interesting insights that are embedded in the result. First, it may
be that the individuals learn the state perfectly even when many of the correlations are
positive. Second, the amount of information provided by the signals is not a monotonic
function of the correlation coefficients. Finally, a correlation matrix does not need to be
singular to contain a signal that is redundant.
15

The condition that all the correlation submatrices must be invertible has two implications. First, none
of the correlations can be 1. Second, any case in which the individuals can learn the state perfectly with
fewer than n signals must be excluded: n must be construed as the smallest number of signals that allow
the individuals to learn the state perfectly.
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Example 5. Suppose the correlation matrix is given by
√



1

 √0

2
2

0
1
√

2
2



2
√2 
2
.
2

1

According to Theorem 3.2, perfect learning occurs in a clique with signals that share this
correlation pattern since this matrix is singular and all of the correlation submatrices are
invertible.
Now, suppose the correlation matrix is given by

!
1
0 0.5
0
1 0.5 .
0.5 0.5 1
In this case the third column of the matrix is a convex combination of the first two columns of
the matrix. According to Theorem 3.2 this implies that the third person signal is redundant
in this clique.This happens even when this matrix is invertible.
Furthermore, some of the correlations in the second matrix are smaller than in the first
matrix. This exemplifies the argument that the reduction in the variance does not need to
be monotonic in the correlation coefficients.
Figure 3.2 represents the posterior variance as a function of the correlation matrix when
there are three signals. In the figure I fix the correlation between y1 and y2 and allow the
other two correlations to vary. I highlight three properties. First, due to the complementarities in information that I discussed earlier, many correlation matrices that contain only
positive correlations generate a small posterior variance. Second, there is a continuum of
correlation matrices in which the third signal is redundant. This set corresponds to the
hyperplane that connects the two extreme points with a correlation equal to 1, and except
for the two extreme points, all matrices in this set are invertible. Third, the posterior variance is not monotone in the pairwise correlations: along the main diagonal the posterior
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Figure 3.2: Ex-post variance for different correlations ρ13 and ρ23 when fixing ρ12 = −0.2,
σ = 1 and σθ = 2.
variance is strictly concave, a result that I generalize in Proposition 3.2.
Example 6 shows how we can use Theorem 3.2 to built interesting extreme cases. The
example shows that there are information structures for which the posterior variance of
a clique with two or three signals is similar to the posterior variance after observing only
one signal, but after observing four signals the clique learns the state perfectly. The key
insight from the example is that having small groups that generate little information does
not imply that there cannot be larger groups containing these smaller ones that generate
plenty of information. I extend this intuition to the case with many signals in my analysis
of the economic insights in Section 3.5.
Example 6. Suppose τ = τθ = 1. Suppose that there is a group with four individuals with
correlation matrix

1
0.9
0.982 0.9876 
0.9
1
0.918 0.9219 
Σ =  0.983 0.918
1
0.9994
0.9876 0.9219 0.9994
1
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(1, 2) is the size-two group with the smallest posterior variance: 0.4872. Upon the formation of group (1, 2, 4), the posterior variance only reduces to 0.4869, and this is the lowest
conditional variance in a group with three agents. However, the posterior variance in the
clique with the four individuals reduces to 0; that is, the state is learned perfectly.
I have discussed cases in which adding a new person to a clique either adds or does not add
information; I have also looked a cases in which adding a new person allows the clique to
learn the state perfectly. Although this is an interesting characterization, I am interested
in whether the variance reduction is similar for nearby information structures. Proposition
3.1 states a particular form of continuity that holds everywhere except at a finite number
of points. I cannot strengthen this result to uniform continuity since the variance reduction
is more sensitive to small changes in the correlations when the correlations are positive.
Proposition 3.1. Let An be a correlation matrix of dimension n × n, An−1 the correlation
matrix of the first n − 1 signals, and P the correlation vector between the n-th signal and all
other n − 1 signals. Suppose that either P 0 A−1
n−1 P 6= 1 or ∀i ∈ {1, ... , n − 1} pi 6= 1. For all
 > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that if P − P̂ < δ and P̂ 0 A−1
n−1 P̂ ≤ 1 then
Var (θ | An ) − Var (θ | Ân ) < ,

where Ân is obtained from An−1 by adding P̂.
The other interesting question is how much variance reduction the agents can obtain when
their correlation matrix is far from the extreme cases described in Theorem 3.2. Proposition
3.2 shows that the posterior variance is concave when I consider a particular direction in the
set of feasible correlation matrices. In the proposition I show that if the new signal has a
uniform correlation with the previous n−1 signals, there exists a positive threshold such that
the posterior variance increases for correlations lower than the threshold and it decreases
in the opposite case. While the effect for correlations to the left of the threshold follows
the intuition from the two signals case, an opposite effect appears for positive correlations
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when I consider many signals.
Proposition 3.2. Let An−1 be a positive definite correlation matrix of dimension (n −
1) × (n − 1) and let P = (p, ... , p) be the correlation vector between the n-th signal and the
previous n − 1 signals such that P 0 A−1
n−1 P ≤ 1. Let An be the resulting n × n correlation
matrix. Then,

∂Var (θ|An )
∂p

is negative if p >

1
10n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1

and it is positive if p <

1
.
10n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1

3.5. Economic Implications
In this section I present the main economic insights from this approach. First, I introduce an
example that shows how individuals’ preferences concerning their interlocutors can change
when clique size is taken into consideration. Second, I show that the fact that a correlation
matrix is positive semidefinite does not restrict the maximum size of a clique. Finally, I
show that certain information structures endogenously generate cliques of individuals where
information is highly correlated and individuals’ forecasts differ across cliques. When both
of these effects occur simultaneously I say that in equilibrium homophily and polarization
coexist.
3.5.1. Reversion of Preferences
An interesting property of this environment is that the reduced form preferences of individuals deciding which group to join depend critically on the size of the potential group.
An individual’s choice of a partner with whom to form a group of two depends only on
partial correlations, while choosing fellow members of a group of three people depends on
the inverse of a 3 × 3 matrix. Here I present an interesting example where individuals’
preferences in terms of joining a group become reversed when clique size increases.
Suppose τ = τσ = 1 and the signals are correlated according to the network depicted in
Figure 3.3. The number in each circle is the identity of the individual, and the numbers
next to the edges are the correlations between their signals.
By Proposition 3.2, an individual considering the formation of only one communication link
prefers to join the person who receives the signal that is less correlated with hers. Thus,
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Figure 3.3: Preferences Reversion Example.
Player 1 (Player 2) prefers to form a pair with Player 3 rather than with Player 4; that is,

3 1(2) 4.

Theorem 3.2 implies that Player 3 does not add any extra information when he joins the
pair (1, 2) since ρ13 + ρ23 = 1 + ρ12 . But this condition does not hold for Player 4; that is,
Player 4 will provide extra information beyond the information shared by Players 1 and 2.
Hence, their preferences have reversed:

4 (1,2) 3.

Although in this section I introduced a very particular example, it exemplifies a pervasive property of the model. My analysis in Section 3.4 shows that a coalition may prefer
to include new individuals with whom they have highly correlated information, and this
preference depends as well on the identity of the coalition members.16
3.5.2. Which is the optimal size of a clique?
In this section I tackle the question of whether it is possible to characterize the size of the
cliques in a strongly stable network. I show that the fact of the correlation matrix being
positive semidefinite does not impose any limit in the size of an endogenous clique. The
reason for this is that it is always possible to build a correlation matrix for which any clique
16

Deciding whom to spend free time with is another situation where this result may be applied. An agent
may spend time with different groups of friends instead of simultaneously meeting all of them.
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of a size K − 1 or less learns nearly the same amount as a single individual, whereas the K
individuals coalition can figure out the state perfectly.
This matrix can be built in the following way. I start with two individuals with a very high
pairwise correlation—say, ρ12 = 0.99, and they learn almost as much as a single individual.
By Theorem 3.2, I can add a third individual that does not add any extra information.
I can repeat the process any number of times—say, until I have K − 1 individuals in a
group. Finally, Theorem 3.2 allow us to add a K -th individual such that the K individuals
coalition can learn the state perfectly. This procedure will fulfill my objective unless the last
individual is part of coalition with fewer than K −1 individuals in which extra information is
created. Lemma 3.2 shows that I can pick the last individual such that this is not the case.
The critical observation is that I can pick the last signal close to the one that generates a
singular matrix and does not provide any extra information. If this is done, the last signal
is closed to the hyperplane in which no information is created for any coalition with fewer
than K individuals.
Lemma 3.2. For each number of individuals K there exists a correlation matrix Σ such
that the state is learned perfectly when all signals are observed and, for any subset of signals,
an individual can learn almost as much as he can when observing only one signal; that is,
for each  > 0 and any subgroup of k individuals with k < K , Var (θ | Σk ) ≥

1
τ +τθ

− .

This implies that it is always possible to find correlation structures for which the only
strongly stable network consists of a clique containing all of the individuals in society. This
happens whenever the cost of forming a clique containing all individuals is smaller than the
difference between the value of learning the state perfectly and the value of the information
an individual can learn by herself. In other words, the fact that the correlation matrix is
positive semidefinite does not impose any limit in the optimal size of a clique.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose c(N − 1) <

1
τ +τθ .

Then there exists a correlation matrix such that

forming one clique with all individuals in it is the only strongly stable network.
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Proof. Take  =

1
τ +τθ

−c(N−1)
2

> 0. By Lemma 3.2 there exist K signals with correlation

matrix Σ such that Var (θ | Σ) = 0 and for any subgroup of k < K signals Var (θ | Σk ) ≥
1
τ +τθ

− . By forming a group with k < K individuals, each of the individuals in this

subgroup obtains a utility smaller than or equal to

−

1
1
+  − c(k − 1) ≤ −
+  < −c(K − 1),
τ + τθ
τ + τθ

which is the utility each of them can obtain by forming the clique with all individuals. If Σ
is the correlation matrix of the signals, then the only strongly stable network has a clique
with all individuals in it.
3.5.3. Homophily and Belief Polarization
In this section I analyze how homophily and belief polarization can be rationalized by my
model. I first introduce the definition will use for these phenomena.
Definition 3.3. I say that a strongly stable network is
a. ρ−homophilic if the correlations between all individuals in a clique are larger than ρ;
and
b. δ−polarized if the ex-ante expected value of the squared difference of the forecasts
between two cliques is at least equal to δ.
For high ρ, saying that the stable network is ρ−homophilic means that individuals with
similar information optimally communicate with each other, creating patterns that appear
homophilic. For high δ, saying that the endogenous network is δ−polarized means that
we expect individuals in different cliques to have different beliefs about the value of the
stochastic state.
There is a close relationship between δ−polarization and the posterior variances in each of
the cliques. When in both cliques the posterior variance is close to the prior variance, the
difference in the forecasts must be small since in both cliques the forecasts are close to the
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prior mean. When in both cliques the posterior variance is close to zero, the difference in
the forecasts has to be small since in both cliques the forecasts are close to the realization
of θ. The difference between the forecasts has to be larger for intermediate values of the
posterior variances: when forecasting, the agents assign similar weights to the prior mean
and to the signal realization. Therefore, as we increase the posterior variance in both cliques,
the difference between the forecasts first increases and then decreases as both posterior
variances approach the prior variance. The next lemma formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that in a strong stable network two cliques form and all the signals
across the cliques are independent. Let v1 and v2 be the posterior variance in each of the
cliques. Then the ex-ante expected value of the squared difference of the forecasts is:

v1 + v2 − 2τθ v1 v2 .

Suppose v2 = kv1 , k 6= 0. Then this expectation increases in v1 iff v1 ≤

1+k
4kτθ

and decreases

in v1 otherwise.
Example 7 shows that the endogenous network that arises in my environment can exhibit
both homophily and belief polarization. Due to the complementarities of information that I
introduced in Section 3.4, individuals with high correlations form a clique even when there
are opportunities to link with individuals that have signals that are independent from theirs.
At the same time, since there is no information flowing across the two cliques, the agents’
posterior beliefs across the two cliques are different.
Example 7. Assume τ = τθ = 1, c(k) = 0.01k 2 , and N = 6. The correlation structure
between the agents’ signals is depicted on Figure 3.4.
In this signal structure there are two identical cliques, {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6}, with positive
intra-clique correlations, and all signals are independent across these cliques. I show that
the unique strongly stable network only contains these two cliques.
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Figure 3.4: Correlation structure for example 7.
First, it can be calculated that the utility in a coalition with two individuals who receive
independent signals is −0.343, which is the largest utility of a two-agent coalition. Naively
carrying over the intuition from the two-agent coalitions, I would conclude that the clique
with two zero correlations and a correlation equal to 0.65 should have the smaller variance of
any three-agent coalition, but this is not the case. The three-agent coalitions that minimize
the variance are {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6}. The net utility in any of these coalitions is −0.2708.
One of the four-agent coalitions that maximizes the net utility is {1, 2, 3, 4}. In this coalition
the net utility is −0.2775. Groups with 5 and 6 individuals are too costly to be formed in
equilibrium. Therefore, the only strongly stable network consists of the cliques {1, 2, 3} and
{4, 5, 6}.
Since the posterior variance in each of the cliques is equal to 0.23, Lemma 3.3 implies
that the expected value of the squared difference between the forecasts is 0.41, which is
almost half of the prior standard deviation. Therefore, this network is 0.65−homophilic
and 0.41−polarized.
Theorem 3.4 generalizes the example. I assume that there are two cliques such that all
inter-clique signals are independent. Under some mild conditions on the cost function, I
show that for any δ small enough there exists ρ sufficiently large such that the only strongly
stable network is ρ−homophilic and δ−polarized. The last two conditions in the theorem
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are always satisfied for small enough δ since there is a strictly increasing mapping between
δ and v . The first condition deserves some discussion. This condition implies that the level
of inter-clique disagreement that can be sustained decreases as the cliques become large.
The reason is that a clique with a large number of individuals is stable only if the agents
in the clique can learn very well, a condition implying immediately that the variance inside
the clique is small and, by Lemma 3, that there is little polarization. Another implication
is that obtaining a polarized society is easier when the communication cost is smaller. This
finding is especially relevant in light of recent technologies, such as online social networks,
which have reduced the communication cost at the same time that political polarization
has increased.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose there are two cliques of individuals of sizes 3 ≤ n ≤ m such that
all inter-clique correlations are 0. Let δ <

4τ
(τθ +2τ )2

and v =

√
1− 1−2τθ δ
.
2τθ

Suppose that the

following three conditions are satisfied:
1. c(m − 1) <

1
τθ +2τ

− v,

2. min{c(n) − c(n − 1), c(m) − c(m − 1)} >

v 2τ
v τ +1 ,

and

3. c(n + m − 1) − c(m − 1) > v2 .
There exist ρ̃ > 0 and a correlation matrix with all intra-clique correlations larger than ρ̃
such that the only strongly stable network consists of the two cliques, and this network is
ρ̃−homophilic and δ−polarized.
I conclude this section by analyzing the relationship between level of polarization and homophily in a network. There are two effects. First, high levels of belief disagreement require
large intra-clique correlations: if they are too low, then individuals will be able to learn the
state very well just by forming pairs. However, there is a second effect that reinforces the
first one: two individuals in a clique and a third one in another clique can learn more when
the correlation between the signals of the two individuals in the same clique is lower,making
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a joint deviation between these three individuals more profitable. Therefore, this outside
option effect reduces the number of correlation structures that are consistent with high
levels of disagreement.
Corollary 3. Suppose δ <

1
τθ +2τ .

Higher beliefs polarization requires that the endogenous

network is more homophilic.

3.6. Discussion
In this paper I have introduced an environment in which rational individuals want to forecast a stochastic state, and communicating the information they exogenously observed to
others is costly. By studying the endogenous network that forms from the individuals’
optimal communication decisions, I conclude that homophily and belief polarization can
simultaneously emerge. Thus I offer a novel explanation for why homophily patterns are
observed in the real world, using a model that does not require introducing behavioral biases
or asymmetric frictions across groups.
In the process of working out this explanation, I discovered a counterintuitive statistical
result: after observing a finite number of highly conditionally correlated signals, an individual can learn the state perfectly. This is an interesting result that might be important
when studying other environments, and I point out two related situations that I believe are
interesting for future work.
As a first example, consider a storyteller who wants to maximize the time a listener is
exposed to his message and who wants to convey a narrative that is coherent and carries a
clear message to the audience. My results suggest a way for the storyteller to achieve these
objectives simultaneously: he can send a coherent message and keep the listener’s attention
for a long time by splitting the information into many positively correlated signals in a way
that these signals communicate the whole message he wants to convey.
As another related example, consider a listener who needs to decide between two storytellers
and pay attention to one of them. The listener will also have an opportunity to communicate
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with others who have listened to the storytellers. Assume that each storyteller sends a finite
number of messages that are positively correlated and allow the listener to learn perfectly
the state after processing all the messages, but these messages are independent across
storytellers. A coordination effect emerges if the listener knows that he might miss some of
the messages his storyteller sends: by communicating with individuals that have listened
to the same storyteller, he is likely to recover information he has missed and recover the
state perfectly, while if he communicates with individuals who have listened to the other
storysteller, he may never learn the state perfectly.

3.7. Appendix
3.7.1. Proofs
3.7.1.1

Proof Lemma 3.1

For any function g : XNi (g ) → R, where XNi (g ) is the set of possible realizations of signals
observed by individual i,




−ExN (g ) ,θ (g (xNi (g ) ) − θ)2 ≤ −ExN (g ) ,θ (E(θ | xNi (g ) ) − θ)2
i
i
 

= −ExNi (g ) Eθ (E(θ | xNi (g ) ) − θ)2 | xNi (g )
= −Var (θ | xNi (g ) ).


The inequality follows from E (b − θ)2 |xNi (g ) being minimized by setting b = E[θ|xNi (g ) ].
The first equality follows from the Law of Iterated Expectations, and the second equality
follows from the definition of conditional variance.
Let Σ be the correlation matrix of joint signals XNi (g ) , and 1|Ni (g )| be a |Ni (g )|-column
vector of 1s.
First, suppose that Σ is invertible. The likelihood function of joint signals is p(xNi (g ) |θ) =




1
det(2πσ −2 Σ)− 2 exp − 12 (θ · 1|Ni (g )| − xNi (g ) )0 σ −2 Σ−1 (θ · 1|Ni (g )| − xNi (g ) ) , and the prior




−2
− 12
1
−2
2
density is p(θ) = (2πσ ) exp − 2 (θ − µθ ) σθ
.
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By Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of θ|xNi (g ) is proportional to,

p(xNi (g ) |θ)p(θ) ∝ exp

−



(θ −

−

1
2



θ2 (σθ−2 + σ −2 10|Ni (g )| Σ−1 1|Ni (g )| )


∝ exp

µθ )2 σθ−2

1
2

−θ(2µθ σθ−2

∝ exp

+

+ (θ · 1|Ni (g )| − xNi (g )

σ −2 (xN0 i (g ) Σ−1 1|Ni (g )|

+

)0 σ −2 Σ−1 (θ


· 1|Ni (g )| − xNi (g ) )

10|Ni (g )| Σ−1 xNi (g ) )









0 

1
− 2 θ−A C θ−A ,

where C = (σθ−2 + σ −2 10|Ni (g )| Σ−1 1|Ni (g )| ), A = C −1 (µθ σθ−2 + σ −2 10|Ni (g )| Σ−1 xNi (g ) ), and the
proportionality operator eliminates positive constants. Since the derived expression is the
kernel of a normal distribution, Var (θ | x) = C −1 .
Now suppose that Σ is singular with rank r < |Ni (g )|. Let the vector B be a basis of the null
space of Σ. With a singular correlation matrix the distribution assigns positive probability
only in an affine subspace of Rr . In this subspace the density can be expressed (see for
example Rao (1973)) as
1

1

f (xNi (g ) | θ, Σ) = (2π)− 2 det(Λ)− 2 exp{− 12 (xNi (g ) − θ · 1|Ni (g )| )0 Σ+ (xNi (g ) − θ · 1|Ni (g )| )}
such that B 0 xNi (g ) = θB 0 1|Ni (g )| with probability 1,
where Σ̂+ represents the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of Σ, and Λ is the r × r diagonal
matrix that contains the positive eigenvalues of Σ.
Suppose first that B 0 1|Ni (g )| = 0. Then for any xNi (g ) such that B 0 xNi (g ) = 0 I can follow
the same procedure as before and obtain Var (θ | xNi (g ) ) = (σθ−2 + σ −2 10|Ni (g )| Σ+ 1|Ni (g )| )−1 .
If in the contrary, B 0 1|Ni (g )| = k 6= 0 I can rewrite the condition that defines the subspace
as θ =

B 0 xNi (g )
,
k

that is, after observing the realization xNi (g ) , the individuals can perfectly

recover θ. In such a case, Var (θ | xNi (g ) ) = 0.
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3.7.1.2

Proof Theorem 3.2

The Schur Complement of An−1 in An is given by 1−P 0 A−1
n−1 P. The proof of 1. is immediate
from the Schur Complement characterization of positive definiteness (semidefiniteness) (See
for example Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004)).
Before proving parts 2. and 3. I present two lemmas that will be important for their
proof. I start by showing that a generalization of the Cholesky Decomposition is valid in
my environment.
Lemma 3.4. Fix a correlation matrix An of dimension n × n. There exist a vector  =
(1 , ... , n ) of independent random variables and a lower triangular matrix C ∈ Rn×n such
that
y=

y1
 
 y2 
 
 . =
 .. 
 
yM


θ
+
C
 


θ
1
0
0 ...
0
 


θ
 c21 c22

0
...
0
 


. +  .
..
..
.. 
..
 .. 
 ..
. .
.
. 
 


θ
cM1 cM2 cM3 ... cMM




1



 
 2 
 
 . .
 .. 
 
M

Proof. If An is positive definite, the result is immediate from the Cholesky Decomposition
1

of An . If An is singular use the LDL decomposition and take C = LD 2 , which is well defined
since D is a non-negative diagonal matrix.

Let C̄n−1 be the (n − 1) × (n − 1) principal submatrix obtained by removing the last column
and row from C and Cn the first n − 1 entries of the n-th row of C . The matrix C̄m−1 is
invertible as long as all of its diagonal components are non zero, which is implied by the
correlation matrix between the n − 1 signals being positive definite. From the definition of
P
the matrix C , ρij can be rewritten as ρij = nk=1 cik cjk . Then the correlation vector between
the observation n-th and the first n − 1 observations can be written as:
−1
−1
0
0
P 0 = Cn C̄n−1
= Cn C̄n−1
C̄n−1 C̄n−1
= Cn C̄n−1
An−1
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(3.1)

−1
Let an,i to be the i − th entry of the vector Cn C̄n−1
. Therefore, ρni =

Pn−1

k=1 an,i Aki ,

or

equivalently P = an,1 A1 + ... + an,n−1 An−1 .
Furthermore, if the correlation matrix between the first n − 1 signals is positive definite I
have:
−1
Yn−1 = θn−1 + C̄n−1 En−1 ⇒ En−1 = C̄n−1
(Yn−1 − θn−1 )

Therefore, signal yn can be rewritten as a function of only the first n − 1 signals, the state
and n as follows:
−1 0
−1
Ŷn−1 + cnn n
yn = θ + (Cn , cnn )En = θ(1 − Cn C̄n−1
1(n−1) ) + Cn C̄n−1


Pn−1
= θ 1 − k=1 an,k + an,1 y1 + ... an,n−1 yn−1 + cnn n .

The following lemma characterizes in which cases the coalition can learn perfectly the state
and in which cases the last signal is redundant in terms of these linear combinations.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose that n − 1 signals have a positive definite correlation matrix. Then:


P
a
6= 0 and cnn = 0, the n signals perfectly reveal the state.
1. If 1 − n−1
nk
k=1


P
= 0, the n-th signal is redundant given the other n − 1 signals.
a
2. If 1 − n−1
nk
k=1
Proof. The assumptions in case 1 imply that yn = an,0 θ + an,1 y1 + ... + an,n−1 yn−1 with
Pn−1
an,k 6= 0. Then after observing the n signals the agents can invert the
an,0 = 1 − k=1
expression above to find θ as

θ=

1
an,0

yn −

an,1
an,n−1
y1 − ... −
yn−1 .
an,0
an,0

The assumption in case 2 implies that yn = an,1 y1 + ... + an,n−1 yn−1 + cnn n . Signal yn does
not contain any extra information about θ, so signal yn is redundant given all the other
n − 1 signals.

Now I proceed to prove part 2. From Lemma 3.5 I conclude the first direction in part 2.: if
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P

i

ani = 1 it has to be that Var (θ | An ) = Var (θ | An−1 ).

Now suppose that Var (θ | An ) = Var (θ | An−1 ). If An is singular then cnn = 0 and

P

i

ani

has to be equal to 1; if not the coalition could learn the state perfectly according to Lemma
−1
0
3.5. Suppose An is invertible. Then Lemma 3.1 implies that 10n A−1
n 1n = 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 . An

can be written as:

An =

An−1 P
P0

1

!
=

An−1 0n×1
01×n

!

1

+

0n×1 P
1

0

!

!
0

P0

01×p−1 1

= Ān−1 + UV .

Clearly Ān−1 is invertible since An−1 is. The Woodbury Matrix Identity implies that:
−1
−1
−1
−1
−1
A−1
n = Ān−1 − Ān−1 U(I − V Ān−1 U) V Ān−1 .

0
The sum of the entries of Ā−1
n−1 is equal to 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 + 1. From the definition of the

matrices and using that the inverse of a block matrix is equal to the matrix formed by the
inverse of each block, I obtain
0n×1 A−1
n−1 P

−1
−1
−1
Ā−1
n−1 U(I − V Ān−1 U) V Ān−1 =

=

and the sum of its entries is

1

!

0

1
1−P 0 A−1
n−1 P

1
1−P 0 A−1
n−1 P

0 −1
−A−1
n−1 PP An−1
P 0 A−1
n−1

1
[10 A−1
n−1 P(2
1−P 0 A−1
n−1 P

1
−1

−P 0 A−1
n−1 P
1
!

!

P 0 A−1
n−1 0
0n×1

A−1
n−1 P
0
−P A−1
n−1 P

0 −1
− P 0 A−1
n−1 1n−1 ) − P An−1 P]. I conclude

that
−1
0
10n A−1
n 1n = 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 + 1 −

1
1−

P 0 A−1
n−1 P

0 −1
0 −1
[10n−1 A−1
n−1 P(2 − P An−1 1n−1 ) − P An−1 P]. (3.2)

−1
−1
0
0
0 −1
Since 10n A−1
n 1n = 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 , it has to be that 1n−1 An−1 P(2 − P An−1 1n−1 ) = 1. This is
0 −1
a quadratic equation in P 0 A−1
n−1 1n−1 with unique solution P An−1 1n−1 = 1. From Equation
P
−1
(1) I conclude that Cn C̄n−1
1n−1 = 1, that is, i ani = 1.
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1

!

The next lemma characterizes when is that the matrix An is invertible if

P

i

ani = 1, which

concludes the proof of part 2.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that

P

i

ani = 1. The matrix An is singular iff ∃i ∈ 1, ... , n − 1 such

that ani = 1 and anj = 0 for j 6= i.
Proof. Remember that in the Cholesky decomposition cnn = 0 if and only if An is singular.
Since all the signals have the same variance it has to be that
cnn = 1 −
≥1−
=1−

Pn−1 P
2
k=1
j>k
k=1 ank + 2
Pn−1 2
Pn−1 P
k=1
j>k
k=1 ank − 2
Pn−1
( k=1 ank )2 = 0
Pn−1

ank anj ρkj
ank anj

and the inequality is strict if two different ank and anj are non-zero, since by assumption
|ρjk | < 1. Then cnn = 0 if and only if ani = 1 for some i and anj = 0 for j 6= i.
To prove 3. I will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. If P 0 A−1
n−1 P = 1, the conditions

P

i

ani = 1 and ∃i ∈ 1, ... , n − 1 such that

pi = 1 are equivalent.
Proof. First, by lemma 3.6 I know that P 0 A−1
n−1 P = 1 and

P

i

ani = 1 imply that ∃i ∈

1, ... , n − 1 such that ani = 1 and anj = 0 for j 6= i. Then pi = ρni = ani = 1.
Now suppose that ∃i ∈ 1, ... , n − 1 such that pi = 1. WLOG, reorder the first n − 1
observations such that p1 = 1. As p1 = cn1 , it has to be that cn1 = 1. By part 2 I have
−1
0−1 0
0
that 1 = P 0 A−1
n−1 P = Cn C̄n−1 An−1 C̄n−1 Cn = Cn Cn . Then cnj = 0 for j 6= 1. I conclude that
−1
Cn C̄n−1
= (1, 0, ... , 0) since c11 = 1. Therefore, an1 = 1 and anj = 0 for j 6= 1, that is,
P
i ani = 1.

From part 1. I know that An being singular implies that P 0 A−1
n−1 P = 1. By the last lemma
P
I can replace the condition pi 6= 1 by
i ani 6= 1. As An is singular we have cnn = 0.
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Therefore, Lemma 3.5 implies the if direction of part 3.
For the other direction suppose that Var (θ | An ) = 0. By Lemma 3.1 it has to be that
P
An is singular. Further, i ani has to be different from 1; if not, Lemma 3.5 implies that
Var (θ | An ) = Var (θ | An−1 ) and this cannot be true since An−1 being invertible implies that
Var (θ | An−1 ) 6= 0. By Lemma 3.7 it has to be that for all i pi 6= 1.
3.7.1.3

Proof Proposition 3.1

0
−1
Suppose P 0 A−1
n−1 P 6= 1. By Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, Var (θ | An ) = (τθ + τ 1n An 1n ) .

Besides, by equation 3.2
−1
0
10n A−1
n 1n = 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 +

1
1−

P 0 A−1
n−1 P

0 −1
[1 − 10n−1 A−1
n−1 P(2 − P An−1 1n−1 )].

(3.3)

Clearly, 10n A−1
n 1n is a continuous function of P, so Var (θ | An ) is a continuous function of P.
Suppose P 0 A−1
n−1 P = 1 and pi 6= 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ... , n − 1}. Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 imply
that Var (θ | An ) = 0. Take a sequence Pk → P such that the matrix Akn generated by
adding Pk to An−1 is positive semidefinite. As pi 6= 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ... , n − 1} it has to be that
0 −1
0 −1
P 0 A−1
n−1 1 6= 1. Therefore for large k, Pk An−1 1 6= 1. Furthermore, Pk An−1 Pk → 1.
k
If the sequence Pk0 A−1
n−1 Pk is finally constant and equal to 1, I have Var (θ | An ) = 0 for large

k, completing the proof.
Suppose for all k, there exists k 0 > k such that Pk0 0 A−1
n−1 Pk 0 6= 1. Take the subsequence
generated by those indexes where the equality does not hold. Then I can use equation 3.3
to calculate 10n Akn

0 −1

1n . The function x(2−x) has a unique maximum at 1 and the maximum

value is 1 which is reached when x = 1. Then, for large k the numerator of the last summand
0
is strictly positive since Pk0 0 A−1
n−1 1n−1 6= 1. As k → ∞ the denominator approaches 0 from
0

the right since Akn is positive definite and part 1 in Theorem 3.2. Therefore, as k 0 → ∞,
10n Ank

0 −1

0

1n → ∞ and Var (θ | Akn ) → 0.
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From both cases, if P − P̂ < δ and Ân is positive definite then the inequality

Var (θ | An ) − Var (θ | Ân ) < 

holds, where Ân is obtained from An−1 by adding P̂.
3.7.1.4

Proof Proposition 3.2

−1
0
By equation 3.2, 10n A−1
n 1n = 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 + 1 −

0 −1
0 −1
10n−1 A−1
n−1 P(2−P An−1 P)−P An−1 P

1−P 0 A−1
n−1 P

. If P =

−1
0 −1
0 −1
2 0
(p, ... , p), 10n−1 A−1
n−1 P = p1n An−1 1n and P A P = p 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 . Then from Lemma 3.1

I conclude that:

∂10n A−1
n 1n

∂Var (θ | An )
∂p
=
∂p
Var (θ | An )2
Solving for the derivative in the numerator I obtain
∂10n A−1
n 1n
∂p

=
=
=

−1
−1
−1
−1
0
2 0
0
0
2
210n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1 (1−p1n−1 An−1 1n−1 )(1−p 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 )−2p1n−1 An−1 1n−1 (1−p1n−1 An−1 1n−1 )
2
(1−p 2 10n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1 )
−1
−1
−1
0
2 0
0
21n−1 An−1 1n−1 (1−p1n−1 An−1 1n−1 )(1−p 2 10n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1 −p+p 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 )
−1
0
2
2
(1−p 1n−1 An−1 1n−1 )
−1
0
210n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1 (1−p1n−1 An−1 1n−1 )(1−p)
(1−p 2 10n−1 A−1 1n−1 )2

which is positive iff p <
3.7.1.5

,

1
10n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1

since 10n−1 A−1
n−1 1n−1 > 0.

Proof Lemma 3.2

Fix  > 0. Pick ρ12 < 1 such that

1
1
τ 1+ρ

12

+τθ

≥

1
τ +τθ

− 2 . Such correlation always exists

since the posterior variance continuously decreases with respect to ρ12 and when ρ12 = 1 it
is given by

1
τ +τθ .

By Theorem 3.2 I can sequentially find vectors P2 , ... , PK −1 such that the matrix with
K − 1 observations still have the same posterior variance and the matrix with the K − 1
observations is positive definite. Using the same Theorem, I can find the vector P̂K such
that the posterior variance remains the same and the matrix Σ̂ is singular. This implies
that the posterior variance after observing any k signals, with k < K , is greater than or
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equal to

1
τ +τθ

− 2 .

By Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.1, I can find a vector PK that satisfies two properties.
First, the correlation matrix between any k < K signals that is generated by the correlation
structure with vector PK is invertible. Second, PK is close enough to P̂K such that the
posterior variance after observing any k signals, with k < K , is greater than or equal to
1
τ +τθ

− . I only need to show that I can pick a vector PK as close as I want to P̂K that

satisfies the first property and such that PK0 Σk−1 PK = 1 and PK0 Σk−1 1K −1 6= 1.
When considering the Cholesky decomposition with P̂K it has to be that ĉnn = 0 and
∃i ∈ {1, ... , n} such that âni = 1 and ânj = 0 for j 6= i. Build a new signal such that cnn = 0
and ani = 1 − δ and anj = γ for j 6= i. Since none of the correlations between the first K − 1
signals is 1, it has to be that δ 6= (K − 2)γ. Then under the new signal with correlation
vector PK , PK0 Σk−1 PK = 1 and PK0 Σk−1 1K −1 6= 1 , that is, the state would be perfectly
learned. When δ and γ are small, P̂K and PK are close and the correlation matrix between
any k < K signals that is generated by the correlation structure with vector PK is invertible.
3.7.1.6

Proof Lemma 3.3

Let µ1 and µ2 to denote the expected value of the forecast. From Lemma 3.1, for any
τθ µθ +τ 10 Σ−1
i x
.
τθ +τ 10 Σ−1
i 1
−1
0
τ1 Σ 1
= (τ +τ 10 Σi −1 1)2
θ
i

vector of signals x, the team forecast is given by, µi =

Therefore, E[µi | θ] =

τθ µθ +τ 10 Σ−1
i 1θ
τθ +τ 10 Σ−1
i 1

= δi (1 − δi τθ ).

= (δi τθ µθ + θ(1 − δi τθ )), and Var (µi | θ)

As the signals across the two cliques are independent

z | θ = µ1 − µ2 | θ ∼ N(τθ (µθ − θ)(δ1 − δ2 ), δ1 (1 − δ1 τθ ) + δ2 (1 − δ2 τθ )) = N(µz , σz2 ).

Therefore,
E[z 2 ] = E[E[z 2 | θ]] = E[σz2 + µ2z ]
= E[τθ2 (µθ − θ)2 (δ1 − δ2 )2 + δ1 (1 − δ1 τθ ) + δ2 (1 − δ2 τθ )]
= −2δ1 δ2 τθ + δ1 + δ2 ,
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where in the third line we use that E [(θ − µθ )2 ] = τθ−1 . E[z 2 ] value is always positive since
δi < τθ−1 .
If δ2 = kδ1 then
3.7.1.7
Fix δ <

∂E[z 2 ]
∂δ1

= 1 + k − 4kδi τθ , so it increases with respect to δ1 iff δ1 ≤

1+k
4kτθ .

Proof Theorem 3.4
4τ
(τθ +2τ )2

and let v =

√
1− 1−2τθ δ
.
2τθ

Notice that v is one of the solutions to the equation

δ = 2v − 2v τθ . Therefore, by Lemma 3 if we can find a strongly stable network with two
cliques in which the posterior variance is equal to v we are done. Further, v <
is true since

√
1− 1−2τθ δ
2τθ

<

1
τθ +2τ .

This

1
τθ +2τ

√
⇔ 2τ − τθ < (τθ + 2τ ) 1 − 2τθ δ.
If the expression in the left is negative we are done. Suppose it is positive then the inequality
is equivalent to
4τ 2 − 4τ τθ + τθ2 < (4τ 2 − 4τ τθ + τθ2 )(1 − 2τθ δ)
⇔ δ<

4τ
.
(τθ +2τ )2

Let γ = c(m − 1) + v . Find ρ̃ to be the minimum correlation that satisfies simultaneously
that γ ≤

1
,
4
τθ + 1+ρ
τ

v ≤

1
2
τθ + 1+ρ
τ

and

v 2τ
v τ + 1+ρ
2

≤ c(n + 1) − c(n − 1). I can find always a

correlation smaller than 1 that satisfies all the inequalities since v <
in the 1. in the theorem implies that γ <
implies that c(n + 1) − c(n − 1) >

1
τθ +2τ ,

1
τθ +2τ ,

condition one

and as c is strictly increasing, condition 2.

v 2τ
v τ +1 .

I build a correlation matrix inside the first clique such that the posterior variance inside
the clique is equal to v and all intra-clique correlations are larger than ρ̃. First, pick the
correlation between the first two individuals such that ρ112 > ρ̃. Then by the definition of
ρ̃, it satisfies

1
τθ +

2
τ
1+ρ1
12

> v , that is, the first two individuals have a posterior variance that

is larger than the objective. Now for the individuals 3 to n − 1, I can pick sequentially
correlation vectors, as described in Theorem 3.2, such that after observing the first n − 1
signals they have learned the same as if they had observed only the first two, and all the
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1
τθ +

correlations in these vectors are larger than ρ̃. Let 1 =

4
τ
1+ρ1
12

−γ

, which is larger than

2

0 since ρ112 > ρ̃. A small variation of Lemma 3.2 shows that I can add the n-th individual
such that with the n signals the variance reduces to v and for any smaller subgroup the
integrated variance is at least

1
τθ +

2
τ
1+ρ1
12

− 1 .

I want to show that forming the two cliques is the only strongly stable network. The utility
for each individual of forming clique 1 is −v − c(n − 1). The utility of forming any subgroup
of individuals in 1 is at most
1

−

1
τθ +

2
τ
1+ρ112

τθ +

+ 1 < −

2
τ
1+ρ1
12

+γ

2

< −γ ≤ −v − c(n − 1),

where the first inequality follows from the definition of 1 and the second one follows from
the inequality ρ112 > ρ̃ and the definition of ρ̃. Then deviations to smaller groups inside 1
are not profitable. An analogous argument holds for smaller groups inside 2.
Now consider a joint deviation for a proper subset S1 of individuals in 1 and a proper
subset S2 of individuals in 2. The correlation matrix between the signals of this individuals
is a block matrix. Then the posterior variance in this case is
Since after observing the signals in Si the variance is at least

1
.

−1
0
1|S |
τθ +τ 1
ΣS 1|S | +10 Σ−1
S
2
1
|S2 | 2
|S1 | 1
1
−

>
γ
>
v
,
we
can
i
τθ + 2 i τ
1+ρ

find ρ̂I > ρ̃ such that 10|Si | Σ−1
Si 1|Si | =
−

2
.
1+ρ̂i

1


−1
0
τθ + τ 10|S1 | Σ−1
S1 1|S1 | + 1|S2 | ΣS2 1|S2 |

12

Therefore, the utility of such deviation is at most

 =−

1
τθ + τ

2
1+ρ̂1

+τ

2
1+ρ̂2

<−

1
= −γ,
4
τθ + τ 1+ρ̃

so this deviation is not profitable for any of the individuals.
Now consider the deviation where all individuals in group 1 and a proper subset S2 of
individuals in 2 are together. Since v =

1
,
τθ +τ 10n Σ−1
n 1|n|
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10n Σ−1
n 1n =

1−v τθ
vτ .

If in S2 there is

only one individual, every deviator’s utility is

−

1
v
v
v 2τ
−
c(n)
=
−
−
c(n)
<
−
−
− c(n + 1) = −v − c(n − 1),
vτ + 1
vτ + 1 vτ + 1
τθ + τ + τ 10n Σ−1
n 1n
so this deviation is not profitable. Now, if there are more than one individual in S2 , I can
find ρ̂2 > ρ̃ as before and the utility is at most
−

1
τθ +τ

1−v τ
2
+ v θ
1+ρ̂2

− c(n − 1 + |S2 |) < − 2v τv+1 − c(n − 1 + |S2 |)
1+ρ̃

=

v 2τ
v τ + 1+2 ρ̃

− v − c(n − 1 + |S2 |)

< c(n + 1) − c(n − 1) − v − c(n + 1) = −c(n − 1) − v ,
and this deviation is not profitable. A similar argument holds for the deviation where all
individuals in clique 2 and some individuals in group 1 are together.
The last possible deviation is to create the grand coalition. Individuals in group 2, since
this is the largest group, are the ones that can gain the most. The utility of any individual,
when in the grand coalition, is
−

1
τθ +τ

2(1−v τθ )
vτ

− c(n + m − 1) = − 2−vv τθ − c(n + m − 1)
<

v
2

− v − c(n + m − 1)

< c(n + m − 1) − c(m − 1) − v − c(n + m − 1) = −c(m − 1) − v ,
and forming the grand coalition is not optimal.
In an analogous way we can build the correlation matrix inside the second clique such that
the posterior variance in the second clique is equal to v as well and all the intra-clique
correlations are larger than ρ̃.
3.7.1.8

Proof Corollary 3

From the definition of ρ̃ in the proof of Theorem 3.4 it is immediate that higher posterior
variance inside each clique requires a higher threshold ρ̃. By Lemma 3 this means that
higher levels of beliefs’ disagreement requires larges correlations inside each clique.
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J. Gierlinger and S. Laczó. Matching to share risk without commitment. The Economic
Journal, 128(613):2003–2031, 2018.
B. Golub and M. O. Jackson. How homophily affects the speed of learning and best-response
dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3):1287–1338, 2012.
A. Grandori. Organization and Economic Behavior. Psychology Press, 2001.

157

P. J.-J. Herings, A. Mauleon, and V. Vannetelbosch. Farsightedly stable networks. Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(2):526–541, 2009.
M. O. Jackson and A. Van den Nouweland. Strongly stable networks. Games and Economic
Behavior, 51(2):420–444, 2005.
M. O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal
of economic theory, 71(1):44–74, 1996.
A. Kambhampati, C. Segura-Rodriguez, and P. Shao. Matching to produce information.
Working paper, 2017.
E. Kamenica and M. Gentzkow. Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6):
2590–2615, 2011.
J. J. Kao. Oticon (a). Harvard Business School Case, pages 9–395, 1996.
A. Kaya and G. Vereshchagina. Partnerships versus corporations: Moral hazard, sorting,
and ownership structure. The American Economic Review, 104(1):291–307, 2014.
W. Kets and A. Sandroni. A belief-based theory of homophily. 2016.
H. H. Larsen. Oticon: Unorthodox project-based management and careers in a ”spaghetti
organization”. People and Strategy, 25(4):30, 2002.
P. Legros and A. F. Newman. Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince: Assortative matching
with nontransferabilities. Econometrica, 75(4):1073–1102, 2007.
A. Liang, X. Mu, and V. Syrgkanis. Dynamic information acquisition from multiple sources.
Technical report, Working Paper, 2017.
A. M. Manelli and D. R. Vincent. Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiplegood monopolist. Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1):1–35, 2006.
B. Marr. Where can you buy big data? here are the biggest consumer data brokers, 2017.
URL https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/09/07/
where-can-you-buy-big-data-here-are-the-biggest-consumer-data-brokers/
#48968656c278.
E. Maskin and J. Riley. Monopoly with incomplete information. The RAND Journal of
Economics, 15(2):171–196, 1984.
M. McPherson, L. Smith-Lovin, and J. M. Cook. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social
networks. Annual review of sociology, 27(1):415–444, 2001.
M. Meyer and B. Strulovici. Beyond correlation: Measuring interdependence through complementarities. Technical report, CSIO Working Paper, 2015.

158

D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):
124–143, 1996.
M. Mussa and S. Rosen. Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic theory, 18
(2):301–317, 1978.
R. B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1):58–73,
1981.
S. E. Page. The difference: How the power of diversity creates better groups, firms, schools,
and societies. Princeton University Press, 2008.
G. Pavlov. Optimal mechanism for selling two goods. The BE Journal of Theoretical
Economics, 11(1), 2011.
A. Prat. Should a team be homogeneous? European Economic Review, 46(7):1187–1207,
2002.
C. R. Rao. Linear statistical inference and its applications, volume 2, pages 527–528. Wiley
New York, 1973.
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